“Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law or enactment, no suit shall lie against any
member of the council, the Director General or any other Officer or employee of
the Bureau for any act done in pursuance or execution of this Act or any other
law or enactment or any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged
neglect or default in the execution of his duty under this Act or any other law
or enactment, duty or authority, shall lie or be instituted in any court unless
it is commenced within three months next after the acts, neglect or default
complained of; or in the case of a continuation of jury, within six months next
after the ceasing thereof”[1].
It seems to me that this limitation
period for action under the Act is too short. Acts have always validly provided
for limitation periods for actions or acts done or omissions made under them,
but when we consider the Act in review and the nature of disputes that are
likely to arise under it, we realize the shortcoming I am pointing at. Since
the Privatization and Commercialization process are somewhat new to us, I
submit that there is need for some judicial liberalization. Let people be given
time enough to bring their disputes to Court after finding out their causes of
action. This will not only enhance a peaceful execution of the program, it will
also afford our Courts the opportunity to research and study the intricacies of
the program and come out with seasoned legal decisions and principles that
reflect our circumstances.
SERVICE OF
NOTICES, DOCUMENTS AND SUMMONS
S. 23(1) Provides that:
“No
suit shall be commenced against a member of the Council, the Director General,
officer or employee of the Bureau before the expiration of a period of one
month after written notice of intention to commence the suit has been served
upon the Bureau by the intending plaintiff or his agent”.
We need recall that under S. 23(2), the limitation period for
action under this Act is three months. Then under this Subjection (3) one out of the three months must be spent on filing
notice and waiting. This is clearly a further reduction of the limitation
period to two months.
This situation is made worse by S. 24 which provides that:
“A
notice, summons or other documents required or authorized to be served upon the
Bureau under the provisions of this Act or any other law or enactment may be
served by delivering it to the Director General or by sending it to the
Director General at the principal office of the Bureau”
This provision makes palpable the
difficulties which the intending litigant encounters in filing his notice
within one month. He has to get to the Director General in person at the
principal office of the Bureau. It means that if someone in Cross River State
wants to sue the Bureau he must go to Abuja with his notice to see the Director
General who he is most unlikely to actual see. It occurs to me that this good
for nothing provision has the singular effect of frustrating litigants and
their actions against the Bureau.
Furthermore, this provision is a violation
of the rule of natural justice that nobody shall be judged in his own case. If
for instance, I want to sue the Bureau for a claim the Director General is both
my personal and nominal defendant. It may be that serving notice on the
Director General does not mean that it is him that hears the matter but it
nonetheless clothes him an air of superiority over the claimant. The question
is why then am I presenting a notice of the action to the Director General?
More seriously considered why must I be bound to wait for a month for my notice
before I go on with the suit. These are fundamental legal questions, and I hope
that when the time comes the legislature shall answer them and make
corresponding amendments to the Act.
[1]
S.23(2) of the Act