A STUDY OF MODERNIZING NIGERIA’S OIL EXPLOITATION FOR PROFIT, THE ENVIRONMENT AND LOCAL POPULATIONS
Introduction
In over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality
have provided the Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over forty
billion Naira, thirty billion dollars. That in return for the above
contribution, the Ogoni people have received NOTHING. (Saro-Wiwa 1995, 68)
Dissimilar to the recent
Deep Horizon or 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spills, in which oil expeditiously spewed
into earth’s waters, Nigeria’s oil experience is listless, painful, and
seemingly endless. The link between oil wealth and the destruction of native
enterprise is not unique to Nigeria, but common among oil bearing nations
(Riddell 2003, 26). Quoted above, deceased poet and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa
reduces decades of utter neglect by the Nigerian government and transnational corporations
to one truth—the Nigerian people have not prospered from the oil on their lands.
Amidst international opposition, the government confirmed its disinterest in entering
into discussions with Saro-Wiwa by hanging him and eight of his colleagues for
speaking against the devastation imposed by oil conglomerates. Equally guilty, locally-operating
oil firms failed to intervene while continuing to earn billions of dollars (US)
in revenues from Nigeria’s crude reserves.
Having long dismissed
agricultural exports, Nigeria’s economy and leaders unilaterally depend on Nigeria’s
oil reserves and the transnational corporations that exploit them. As Africa’s greatest
oil-producing nation, Nigeria’s wealth continues to escape a populous which as
a majority lives below the poverty line. Extending the resourcefully-rich and
economically-poor dichotomy is the Niger Delta, which sources 95 percent of the
country’s oil but has slightly higher poverty rates than Nigeria as a whole
(Aaron 2005, 127). The Nigerian government, transnational oil companies, and
the oil mining central to their operations are wholly to blame. Environmental
catastrophe from oil mining shapes local life, with subsistence farmers and
fisherman consigned to intoxicated soils and watersheds, residents accustomed
to the constant flash of oil flares, and females traveling greater distances to
find potable water. Through the freedom that the government allows foreign
investors to desecrate the environment in return for their economic inputs, the
government directly profits from such local turmoil (Kiel 1992). Encouraged by
the government’s land entitlements and non-regulatory environmental schemes,
the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC/Shell) leads the rush for
Nigeria’s oil.
The SPDC is a powerful,
wealthy corporation with no concerns but those of its shareholders. The SPDC’s
operations in the Delta would be unacceptable by the people or government in
any developed nation. Essentially voiceless, Delta residents continue to
protest peacefully, and to allow violence and theft to penetrate their lands by
other Nigerians who target the oil firms’ staff and infrastructure. The tapping
of pipelines, kidnapping of rig workers, and the threat of such incidences has
prevented oil infrastructure within the Delta from operating at peak capacity. Such
activism has become the most effective method to combat SPDC’s irresponsibility
in the Delta. Shell, “responsible for about half of Nigeria’s daily output of
2.6 million barrels of oil”, has at times experienced the halving of production
levels as a result of such action (Aspen Publishers 2007). Shifting from a
negligent, deleterious, operating approach driven by short-term profits to one
of long-term principles could produce economic gains for the firm. SPDC is
limited by both its shareholders and the Nigerian government from reforming its
operating procedures, but well positioned to benefit from pursuing a greater degree
of corporate responsibility.
Background
History
In 1908, the exploration of Nigeria’s marshlands by a
German company seeking bitumen deposits illustrated the country’s potential for
natural resource excavation (Walker 2000, 72-73). Shell first explored for
Nigerian oil in 1937 while the region was still under British colonial rule,
and discovered its first commercial oil field in 1956 (Boele, Fabig, and
Wheeler 2001, 75). Between 1973 and 1983 the surge of Nigeria’s oil industry
drastically shifted the country’s economy away from agricultural dependence to
that of oil reliance (Walker 2000, 71). Per 2009 statistics, peak production exceeded
two million barrels per day with Nigeria positioned as the world’s fourteenth
greatest and Africa’s greatest oil producer (EIA under “Top World Oil
Producers, 2009”).
Politics
Per the Land Use Act of 1978 and successive constitutional
clauses, the Nigerian government retains exclusive rights to the country’s oil
reserves, while proportions of the accrued revenue are allocated to the
communities where the oil is mined. While the Nigerian constitution originally
provided for a 50% allocation to such regions actual allocations have been much
lower (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler 2001, 76). Exemplifying the extent of the
government’s eminent domain is a 1999 constitutional clause, which states that “the entire property in and control of all
mineral oils and natural gas in, under, or upon the territorial water and the
exclusive economic zone of Nigeria shall vest in the government of the
federation”. When Nigeria joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in 1971 it was required to nationalize a majority stake in all
of its oil endeavors, which was facilitated by the government’s ability to
seize “any land needed for oil exploitation” (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler 2001, 76). Therefore, the exploitation of
Nigeria’s oil falls well outside the domain of Nigeria’s general population,
and entirely within the jurisdiction of the Nigerian government.
The Nigerian government allows transnational
corporations (TNCs) to acquire land at little or no cost under the premise revenues
produced from oil mining on those lands will be shared between the TNCs and the
government. Considering the dearth of economic development in Nigeria, this profit
sharing remains undetectable among the general population. Almost 100 percent
of revenues are believed to benefit the country’s elite government workers,
suggesting that Nigerian lands are sold by the government with virtually no
interest for the general population. This government corruption enables its
leaders to become rich while simultaneously permitting
TNCs to exploit Nigeria’s land and people without accounting to the government
for their acts.
Compared to the rest of Nigeria, the Delta has more highlighted poverty, with economic indicators such
as good roads, electricity, potable water, housing, medical care, and
educational facilities all lacking (Aaron 2005, 127). Operating through its
Nigerian subsidiary SPDC, Shell controls roughly half the land in the Delta,
and as the dominant foreign producer has been under intense international
pressure to act more responsibly for the Delta’s environment and population (129).
Illustrating Shell’s irresponsibility in Nigeria is its involvement in hundreds
of pending court cases for operations in-country, many of which concern oil
spills (Frynas 2000, 161). In order to minimize its liabilities, Shell prolongs
the legal proceedings in which it is involved in order to wear on plaintiffs’
resources, thereby inducing economic hardship on plaintiffs who must then cease
their pursuit in the courts.
Environmental Impacts
In a 2007 article titled Shell Still Hell, the New
Internationalist quoted Niger Delta resident Ifieniya Festavera stating “an oil spill flows through
my river so I can't get fresh water. Gas flares give us acid rain—when we build
houses the roof leaks within three to four months”. References to the Delta as one of earth’s most polluted
places are attributable to the oil industry. Thousands of oil spills have
destroyed wildlife, damaged soil fertility, and degraded watersheds. Higher acidic
levels of the soil and hydrocarbon content of the water have had adverse
chemical effects on biodiversity. Oil-polluted mangroves have experienced a
decline in fish, crustaceans, and the death of a large number of birds and
mammals (Ipingbemi 2009, 10). Locals describe the impacts from oil spills to
include air unsuitable for breathing, brackish water color, withering plant
shrubs, and “crude oil estimated at half a meter thick (2009, 15). Adverse
health impacts on humans include increased water-borne illness, transmission of
pollutants via food crops, “aggravation of asthma, increased hospital admission
for respiratory conditions, chronic lung diseases, bronchitis, and accelerated
aging of the lungs” (Okoji 2002, 203).
Socioeconomic Impacts
Local populations depend
almost entirely upon the environment for their livelihood, thus absorbing the
environmental consequences of oil mining at the socioeconomic level. Lands
previously used to farm are no longer conducive to crops and watersheds used to
fish can no longer support aquatic life. Children have forcibly quit school as
a result of their parents’ inability to pay tuition costs, and workers must
seek alternative sources of income in order to support their families
(Ipingbemi 2009, 13). People and farms have been displaced by “the intricate traversing
and overlay of oil pipelines and rigs within the region” (Onwuka 2005, 658), while
personal commutes have been rerouted. Resource competition existed between
ethnicities independently of oil companies, but ethnic disputes have augmented
in determining who receives compensation for oil spills based upon ownership of
the spoiled resource (Okoji 2002, 200).
Substandard Practices
Standard operating
procedures with adverse impacts on the environment are acceptable worldwide,
but Shell employs substandard tactics which augment its environmental
footprint. Most oil mining requires geological and geophysical surveys involving
the “cutting of traverses, seismic operations, identification of rock
formations…the vegetation is cut down, the terrain is dotted with seismic holes
while seismic explosions scare away wildlife and cause buildings to crack or
collapse” (Okoji 2000, 717). Drill rigs require the assembly and erection of
heavy equipment, modification of the underlying ground support, the building of
new roads, the cutting of new water channels, or expansion to existing
infrastructure (717). Leaks occur accidentally during oil transport and waste
is produced at various steps in the excavation process. All the above describe
oil-industry norms in no way unique to operations in the Delta, though several
procedures specifically employed in the Delta would not be accepted elsewhere
(Aspen Publishers 2006).
Specifically in the
Delta, pipelines used to transport oil are greatly susceptible to corrosion and
technically inferior to those used in developed countries. Gas flaring
techniques, reserved for emergency situations in developed countries, are
systematic in SPDC’s daily operations. Oil spills, whether from local sabotage,
malfunction, or SPDC malfeasance, are responded to slowly and remediated
partially. “According to Shell
data, the company’s equipment and errors were responsible for fifty-three
spills in 2008, a total that would lead to immediate action anywhere in the
developed world” (Chavkin 2010, 24). The ubiquity of Shell’s usage of
substandard practices in Nigeria suggests that the firm implements such
practices as standard operating procedure and an accepted cost of doing
business.
Gas flaring, the process
by which the gaseous byproducts of oil mining are burned on-site, is permitted
only in emergency situations in developed countries, but routine to Shell’s Delta
operations. “The proper use of
flares is a good engineering practice because flares can prevent damages, fires
and explosions, and injuries to employees” (EPA, 1). But the routine usage of
flaring causes “unacceptably high releases of sulfur dioxide and other noxious
pollutants” (1). Developed countries re-inject
these gases back into the ground or contain or transport them for commercial or
industrial use, while oil flaring is permitted and used only for the release
and burning of over-pressured gases which might otherwise cause an explosion. Shell
attributes the decades-long absence of re-injection and containment
infrastructure in the Delta to the Nigerian government’s failure to meet its
financial obligations. So Shell uses gas flares 24 hours per day, causing
environmental effects that include thermal conduction, particulate emissions,
and high radiant energy, while “changing night into daylight, preventing sound
sleep and scaring away wildlife” (Okoji 2000, 721-722).
Oil spills, while not
intentional, could also be considered part of Shell’s operating procedures, in
that more spills have occurred in the Delta than any other place on the planet.
From 1989-2000, there were 2252 incidents of oil spills, with approximately
536,000 total barrels of oil spilled, of which only 4.3 percent was recovered
(Ipingbemi 2009, 9). The various causes of spills include the separating of or
damage to pipelines, leakage, oil tank overflow, and sabotage by Nigerian groups.
Shell, often been blamed for using outdated pipelines which are more
susceptible to corrosion than modern pipelines, counter-blames local
populations for intentionally causing spills to receive compensation. Furthermore,
the percentages of oil spills which Shell asserts were caused by sabotage are
strikingly inconsistently across media sources and citations (Human Rights
Watch 1999).
Operational Conflict
Oil spills have become
central to speculation and blame regarding the environmental degradation in the
Delta. Shell’s passing of guilt onto the locals for “sabotaging” pipelines in
order to receive compensation as mandated under Nigerian law is standard practice.
However, Shell’s reasoning suggests that locals, by their own free will, have decided
that their most profitable response to their current plight involves the sabotaging
of their own lands. Premising such a theory concurrently with the fact that the
majority of locals depend upon the land for their survival infers that locals
might have finally forfeited the well-being of the land. Perhaps this is
attributed to the irreparable damage to the land caused by oil excavation so farmers
and fisherman can no longer use it. However, compensation provided by industry
to locals is neither guaranteed nor particularly prosperous, therefore placing
suspicion on the notion that the Nigerian population would disvalue its greatest
resource—the environment.
The allegation that
locals would resort to consciously destroying their own environment, used as
habitat and workplace, for incendiary gain, is debatable. During a spill, 88.4%
of locals run at a loss during spills, while 8.9% make less profit than normal
(Ipingbemi 2009, 17). Furthermore, the compensation provided by industry is
often menial, only equivalent to the gains derived from one harvest cycle of
the damaged resource. Mango trees have been observed to provide fruit for as
long as 300 years, rendering the industry’s basis for compensation off one
harvest cycle grossly inadequate and inequitable. Locals who depend on mangoes
and similar crops for their livelihood would briskly learn that industry
compensation is insufficient in meriting its invitation through intentional
sabotage. Considering that the risks of a spill exceed the loss of livelihood, it
is not in the best interest of the populations most dependent on the land to ruin
it. Considering the continuance of oil spills throughout Shell’s presence in
the Delta, the hundreds of thousands of barrels of lost oil, and Shell’s
ability to maintain profits, it seems more logical to blame Shell.
The industry status quo
has not been to prevent oil spills from happening, but rather to perceive them
as a standard risk and accepted consequence of doing business in the Delta.
While there should be economic incentives in place for industry to prevent
spills, the opposite is more truthful. Instead of voluntarily investing in
infrastructure which might safeguard against the frequency of spills, Shell has
deferred to compensating locals and forfeiting any oil spilled, which
represents pennies in comparison to oil retained. Furthermore, response time to
spills is often slow, even during the presence or threat of fire (Ipingbemi
2009, 14). Delays in response time have been attributed to locals attempting to
increase the resulting incendiary gain from greater damage wrought by the spill
(Aaron 2005, 132). Furthermore, “an
oil company has an economic self-interest in claiming sabotage in court as it
can escape compensation payments to communities” (Frynas 2000, 161). Shell’s entire approach to the Delta, including its slow
responsiveness to oil spills and its claims against locals in both the media
and the courts, suggest that Shell thrives from an operational standard of
scapegoating and irresponsibility.
If spills have been
unsuccessful in thwarting industry’s unadulterated exploitation of the Delta,
local rebel groups have at times severely limited production outputs. The least
abrasive tactics of these groups—tapping into pipelines and siphoning oil—if
not vindicates local populations at least identifies the root of some of the
oil spills. Such local groups may reside outside the vicinity of areas impacted
by the pipes they tap into, or such groups might flee in commerce with the oil.
More striking is the recurrence of hostage-taking by these armed militia
groups, which typically return the hostages for a ransom. When serious, threats
by rebel groups have at times led to reduction in Nigeria’s oil exports by as
much as 20% (Aspen Publishers 2006). Rebel groups are not representative of
those local groups most affected by the mining, and considering that several
leaders have been paid off, the groups’ mission is likely driven by profit
rather than social justice. This should not discount Ken Saro-Wiwa and advocacy
groups which defend the rights of Nigeria’s people and have a genuine interest
in protecting the Nigerian people against big business.
Ethical
Responsibility
Dutch Responsibility
The Netherlands’ should assume responsibility as
Shell’s parent nation in applying its own legal framework to Shell’s operations
in the Delta. The Netherland’s
comprehensive Environmental Protection Act of 1994 protects the
“environment while allowing for development that improves the total quality of
life, both now and in the future, in a way that maintains the ecological
processes on which life depend” (Netherlands 1994, 39). Considering that Shell
is a Dutch corporation, the concept of environmental protection as outlined
above is familiar to it, and the Dutch government instills such laws on
corporations within its own borders. Extensive laws protecting Dutch soil,
water, air marine life, ecosystems, and agriculture, pervade Dutch society, while
environmental protection is void in Nigeria. Through the application of its
laws on Shell and Shell’s operations within the Delta, including necessary
sanctions, the Dutch government can force Shell to operate more responsibly.
The
Corporation
Noam Chomsky said that
corporations were “given the
rights of immortal persons… special kinds of persons, persons who had no moral
conscience…designed by law, to be concerned only for their stockholders. And
not, say, what are sometimes called their stakeholders, like the community or
the work force or whatever” (The Corporation, 2003). Considering Chomsky’s
description of a corporation, it is problematic to argue that Shell, as a
corporation, must assume an ethical responsibility for either environment
protection or human rights. Shell’s board of directors does not act
individually, but as a homogenous governing body which makes decisions
according to the company’s best financial interest. If Shell’s corporate
executive officer personally developed a want to change the company, he or she
would be limited to act freely on such thoughts by challenge from board
members, voting shareholders, and the risk of losing employment. Residents from
oil-afflicted countries, Nigeria included, who have the required documents for
entry, have been barred from shareholder conferences, as have several human
rights organizations. Such parties do not present Shell with the financial
incentive or interest to warrant their engagement in discussions, but instead
suggest that Shell either cease operations or make significant changes that
would affect the company’s bottom line. Therefore, Shell’s destructive capacity
for neglecting human rights exceeds the authority of any individual agent
internal to the company.
Unsustainability
Shell’s continued
irresponsibility progressively exacerbates the destruction caused to the
Delta’s people and environment, and if uninterrupted has irreversible
consequences for the region. “The basic idea is simple. People and development
are linked to the environment because societies extract, process and consume
natural resources for their survival and for the sake of development” (Onwuka
2005, 657). The shortsightedness with which Shell operates ignores the
long-term consequences for the Delta’s future once oil reserves are exhausted.
Local populations once depended on the Delta’s fertile lands and waters to farm
and fish, but this is longer possible because of Shell’s irresponsibility. The
dichotomy between Shell’s exploitation of and locals’ dependence on the same Delta
lands produces an uneven balance which inherently threatens the well being of
locals. In the Delta, Nigerians already cannot farm, fish, or live without
threats to their health and economic stability, and such threats augment so
long as Shell continues to pollute.
In order to foster
greater sustainability within the Delta, Shell, in collaboration with the Dutch
government, should assume a degree of responsibility for economic development
in the region. Presently, Shell’s exportation of oil profits deprives locals of
their natural resources and inhibits them from pursuing economic development.
Rather than benefitting from a resource-rich homeland, locals are penalized by
and divided from the potential benefits of their oil reserves (Onwuka 2005,
657). However, if Shell allocates a percentage of its oil profits locally, the
Delta could benefit from the continued exploitation of such oil. Allocations
for environmental remediation could help return the Delta to a more livable
state which could sustain the locals, and economic development could address
the socioeconomic issues affecting populations via the environmental
degradation.
Sustainability
In initiating development
of the Delta, Shell should limit its approach to include projects that garner
local support, require local cost sharing, and involve local leadership. “Prior to 1995, Shell’s [corporate social
responsibility] strategy in Nigeria focused on risk and reputation management”,
and emphasized corporate philanthropy, or the giving of things to the community
such as water and health infrastructure, training, education, agriculture, and micro-credit
(Ite 2004, 5). Once Shell’s support for an approach such as this dissipates,
local populations which lack the capacity to maintain infrastructural support
previously provided by Shell are at a loss. To prevent this downfall, Shell
should allow the Delta communities leeway in determining which projects are
most important to them, and refrain from pushing locals towards a project that
does not require their participation. By fostering development work that is community
driven, Shell will empower local communities while reducing their dependence on
the company (Ite 2004, 6).
Corporate Ills and Responsibilities
Limitations of the Nigerian Government
Financially vested in the
continuation of foreign oil mining, the government is equally culpable in
Shell’s negligence of the Nigerian people and their environment. “When a natural resource provides the bulk of a
state’s revenue, as in many oil-producing states, there is no incentive for the
state to encourage the development of representative government. Oil removes
the need to tax the population and win its consent for taxation” (Riddell 2003,
27). At times, the government actually opposes
corporate responsibility. Responding to a supposed victory by Niger Delta
locals who convinced Shell to extract its operations from one Delta region, the
government told Shell to resume operations or risk losing its greater land
concessions (Aspen Publishers 2006). Failing to meet its budgetary obligations
concerning a joint-venture with Shell that would allow for an end to gas
flares, the government allows Shell to excuse its own irresponsibility with that
of the government (Chavkin 2010, 23-24). “The government often issues public
orders and reprimands to the oil majors but fails to hold them accountable even
for outright disregard of its regulations” stated Michael Watts, a UC Berkeley
professor and expert on the Niger Delta (22). Such limitations cloud the
distinction between the interests of Shell and the government, both of which seem
unilaterally concerned with protecting their stakes in oil.
Limitations of a Corporation
Current inadequacies in
governance allow for instability within the Delta, but if governance is
entirely entrusted to Shell, the risk of aggravating that instability mounts.
Failing to support its population,
the State has led to an unhealthy overreliance on the oil companies, and in the
long-term Shell could effectively be leading the pace of economic development
in the region with virtually no contribution from the Nigerian government (Ite
2004, 1-7). Initially, federal agencies were created to allocate the oil
revenues derived from oil-bearing regions back to those regions, but the
members of these agencies commonly pilfer the funds (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler
2001, 75-76). Without the government-appointed delegations fulfilling their
responsibilities, Shell and other corporations are indirectly burdened with
caring for local populations. However, corporations were created as
profit-bearing enterprises with no public interest beyond the individuals who
own shares in their market value. A corporation will only create
infrastructure—transportation, education, health
care, employment—if such development adds value to or increases profits for itself.
Dysfunction on the State’s part not only permits Shell to act irresponsibly,
but absolves the firm of assuming a more ethical approach to its operations.
Fiscal Responsibility
Legal Challenges
Acting more responsibly could
benefit Shell by mitigating the large quantity of lawsuits which impede its operations.
Considering Shell’s systematic nature of arbitration, it remains unclear
whether this seemingly standard operating procedure is an accepted obstacle or an
actual nuisance. Regardless, the hundreds of cases that Shell has been
simultaneously involved in verify that the company devotes significant
attention to them. Through a narrow fiscal scope, legal proceedings such as the
2009 settlement with Ken Saro-Wiwa, Jr. for $15.5 million on behalf of his
murdered father would seem quite costly (Lerner 2009, 1). But during the 13
years which Shell arbitrated for this settlement, it maintained operations
while realizing billions of dollars in oil profits. This epitomizes Shell’s
strategy in using avoidance and delay in dealing with Nigerian courts, absent
any respect for the victims of its actions (Chavkin 2010, 23). Regardless, if Shell revised its field operations
so that they were less destructive, with greater responsibility for local
populations and the environment, a significant decline in legal challenges
would follow.
Public Relations
Reparation of its environmental, socioeconomic, and
legal tribulations could help polish Shell’s public image, an asset invaluable
to any firm. To date, most attempts to polish Shell’s image have been vacuous
propaganda, intended to ease international pressures while evading problems
real to the Nigerian people. Similarly, Shell’s public relations investment has
done little to change perception among locals in the Delta, suggesting the
extreme degree of apathy expressed by Shell towards Nigerians (Boele, Fabig,
and Wheeler 2001, 78). However, by reconciling its public image per local
perception through greater responsibility, Shell could gather support among its
staunchest critics. Locals cannot be fooled through empty media gimmicks, but Shell
could employ tangible changes in the region that might deter populations from
legal or vigilante action targeted at the company. “The reputation of any
corporation is an important tangible asset in business” (Frynas 2000, 158). Reevaluation
of its local image could allow Shell to mend the longstanding, pervasive
distrust that is felt towards it among local populations. While local
acceptance is not imperative to the company’s success, it could do nothing but
allow the firm greater facility through which to operate.
Vandalism
The monikers applied to those who attack Shell’s
infrastructure —vandals, saboteurs, rebels, locals, foreigners— are irrelevant,
though the actions of these individuals are blatantly visible. “Shell said in [mid]
2008 that it was losing 30,000 barrels per day of crude oil production to
recent attacks” (Hyder 2008, 2). A more
ecologically friendly business model might help counter such attacks by instilling
greater stability in the region. If Shell fixes some of its most polluting
operations, locals are less likely to garner contempt towards the company.
Saboteurs living outside the Delta often travel into the region and tap into
and siphon from pipelines, leaving them unplugged to spill into local lands.
However, locals might restrict such saboteurs’ access to their lands if Shell
illustrates to them that it provides a more likeable environmental alternative.
Furthermore, a reduction in vandalism would lead to lessened police presence,
and Shell would not have to operate within business situations that falter
between degrees of normalcy and uncertainty caused by such unrest (Okoji 2002).
Infrastructure
Shell’s attempts to stop
vandalism will be more successful if performed in conjunction with a correction
of the company’s own infrastructural inadequacies. Locals’ accusations that Shell
uses technologically outdated pipelines have been confirmed, suggesting that
Shell is guilty for much of the spills and the associated lost revenue. Furthermore,
many “residents say that the use
of fire as a cleanup method is commonplace” (Chavkin 2010, 23). Most significantly, gas flaring is economically
wasteful, in that it burns the valuable gas byproducts of oil excavation (The
Oil and Gas Forum, under “Gas Flaring”). In assessing the long-term
feasibility of associated gas recovery, researcher Michiko Ishishone found that
the necessary infrastructure would likely produce gains for both local
populations and investors within 15 years (2004). Although it requires a large
initial investment, more immediate economic benefits of improved health and
environment could be realized with the local populations, again bolstering
Shell’s local image. If the expenses that Shell incurs from the local
compensation and lost product associated with accidental spills are greater
than the costs of building gas-recovery infrastructure, the latter option is
only sensible.
Conclusion
When a child
is stubborn and you scold it, it tries to cover its ears-that's what Shell is
doing. It may say that now it is socially responsible, but it has not cleaned
up its act. If wishes were like magic, individuals in the Niger Delta would
just click their fingers and all these oil companies would disappear. (Shell still hell 2007)
Any attempt in motivating Shell Petroleum towards
greater corporate social responsibility does not negate the heinous, despicable
actions that are central to their operations. Shell’s status as a corporation
does not exonerate it from decades of transparent negligence for the Nigerian
people or their environment. Shell pollution spews into every crevasse of the
Delta’s water, soil, and air, harming forests, farms, fish, animals, humans,
and the commerce, sleep, travel, and education on which they depend for
survival. No level of pecuniary, judicial, or environmental remediation can
suffice in compensating the Delta residents for the havoc forced upon them by
SPDC. Displaced persons, dead animals, noxious air and water, dehabilitated
incomes, and poisoned habitats—characteristics of the Delta inflicted by Shell
illuminate the firm’s unwavering pursuit of profits despite the consequences to
humanity. Shell deserves no forgiveness.
Similarly, there are numerous other political, social,
and economic agents which deserve blame for passively and impassively
permitting Shell’s irresponsibility. Foremost, the Nigerian government has
denounced its own peoples for oil profits, deferring to Shell in almost all
circumstances despite international opposition to the catastrophes in the
Delta. Equally culpable, the Dutch government instills law and order within its
own borders, but exonerates Shell in Nigeria. Additionally, the United States
government, leading the world in consumption of Shell’s Delta oil, and other
heavily-consuming countries, do nothing in spite of the millions of barrels
oils they import monthly. This affluence among the world’s richest populations
exhibits a need to manage economic growth while considering the well being of
present and future generations (Onwuka 2005, 656). On the surface, oil seems to
be oil, irrespective of the associated consequences of its mining, whether they
are environmental degradation, social destruction, or government oppression.
In spite of its current position and heavily negative
image in Nigeria, Shell has the opportunity in correcting its actions to become
the champion of its own irresponsibility. Continued degradation of the Nigerian
environment and disregard for local populations on Shell’s behalf will only
incite greater “awareness, discontent, [and] feelings of social neglect” among
locals (Okoji 2002, 197). Rather, Shell can reduce this ill will by correcting
itself through environmental stewardship and limited support for economic development
in the region. As the leader among transnational corporations operating in the
Delta, Shell can make changes more widespread and impacting than any of its
competitors. Subsequently, Shell’s reparations could motivate smaller firms in
the region to behave similarly, which could play well for Shell’s image
locally. However, stockholder interests, a corrupt Nigerian government, and a Dutch
government which evades the issues severely limit Shell’s operations by
permitting the firm’s heightened degree of irresponsibility. International
pressures from human rights groups can only push Shell so far, which means that
Shell must independently decide to change, or be convinced or forced to do so
by one of the other parties interested in its success.
References
References
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