CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The
petroleum industry is an international business concern that is usually
governed by certain standards to regulate its various operations. The Federal
Government of Nigeria recognizes this fact and, through appropriate agencies,
has passed over 100 principal and subsidiary pieces of legislation to deal with
all aspects of Nigerian oil and gas industry.[1]
They
further explain the industry’s transactions scope of operation, responsibility
to the government, consumers and Nigerians in particular and the international
community at large. Private enterprise laws confer powers on individuals and
corporate bodies to operate business as prescribed by the authorities and in
line with the laws guiding such enterprises for mutual benefit.
The
Nigerian oil and gas Laws are a system of standards and rules on corporate
conduct that impose well defined obligations, penalties and corresponding
rights regarding the continuity of such businesses in the country. Such
legislation affecting the oil and gas industry in Nigeria are not static; they are
either amended or promulgated as the government deem fit in the context of the
complex political, social ethnic and religious environment development survival
and independence of the country.
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Successive governments have cause to promulgate
appropriate laws to take care of their changing priorities, goals and
aspiration as dictated by both local and international politics.
The
diverse nature of the oil and gas industry operations necessitates appropriate
enactment to regulate every activity relating to the hydrocarbon oil reserves
and its derivatives.
The
oil and gas industry in Nigeria
is undoubtedly going through serious crisis, due partly to a sharp reaction by
the oil producing communities, which suffer grievous hardships resulting from
the operations of the laws governing the sector. The various attempts to
suppress these people through the gun have failed woefully. The only option
clearly available to the key players in the industry (the government and the
oil producing/serving companies) is to adopt fair and equitable laws as a
framework for the exploitation of the oil and gas resources in Nigeria.
However,
this work is organized in five chapters with Chapter one, providing the approach and theoretical
framework of the study.
The
chapter two, surveys the meaning
of petroleum, participation of state/joint ventures agreements, production
sharing contracts/risk service contract and ownership of oil by investigating
the Britain,
Venezuela
and some other OPEC countries, and pre and post in-dependence constitutional
and statutory arrangements on ownership of petroleum in Nigeria. Chapter three provides a brief
analysis of the major provisions of some the existing legal framework for the
regulation of Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Chapter five, deals with the
observations, recommendations, and lastly the conclusion.
1.1 Background of the Study
The diverse nature of the
oil and gas industry operations necessitates appropriate enactment to regulate
every activity relating to hydrocarbon oil reserves and its derivations.
The
oil and gas industry in Nigeria
is undoubtedly going through serious crisis, due partly to a sharp reaction by
the oil producing communities, which suffer grievous hardships resulting from
the operations of the laws governing the sector[2].
The various attempts to suppress these people through the gun have failed
woefully.
The
only option clearly available to the key players in the industry (the
government and the oil producing/service companies) is to adopt fair and
equitable laws as framework for the exploitation of the oil and gas resources
in Nigeria.
An
examination of Nigerian oil and gas statutes would reveal that the major
constituents of the laws that touch upon the exploration and production of
petroleum date back to the Mineral Oil Act of 19143
which was promulgated to regulate the right to search for, win, and mine
mineral oils4. This means that the
exploration of petroleum in Nigeria
is regulated by laws.
The
earliest attempt at legislating on oil in Nigeria was the Oil Mineral
Ordinance of 1990, which after the amalgamation of the north and south became
operational in the entire country. The 1990 Ordinance was followed by Mineral
Oil Regulation Ordinance of 1907. These legislations laid down the basic
framework for other subsequent legislations governing oil contractual
relationship between the Nigeria
government and multinational oil companies in Nigeria.
Currently,
the Nigeria
oil and gas industry is primarily regulated by the Petroleum Act and the
Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations5.
In addition there are other laws that are directly or indirectly relevant to
the oil industry in Nigeria.
This work mostly is based on the examination of laws under the oil and gas
industry in Nigeria.
As stated above, there are enormous in that each or some of these laws were
enacted to cover a particular area or field under petroleum industry.
However,
the first part is to fill the gap, the previous researchers did not cover on
the issue of ownership and control of natural resources and the laws therein.
Secondly,
it will be clear to everyone who will find time to go through this work on the
need to enact new laws, in the area of exploration, exploitation and production
in our petroleum industry. This is because the present standard is too poor to
compare its OPEC member countries.
There
is also task to put up harsh measures on the area of environmental pollution in
oil producing communities, as resulting from the reckless activities of oil
production companies.
There
is also an outstanding task, to examine seriously some of the present
legislations under fiscal system, which has affected the income the federal
government is generating in its petroleum industry like other countries in
OPEC.
1.2 Statement of the Problems
Since
the late 1980s, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has become the venue for
mobilization and protests by littoral states on the one hand and oil bearing
communities and civil society groups6
on the other hand.
They
are protesting not only against ownership and control of oil and gas7 and the distribution of its benefits,
but also challenging policies and practices that disadvantage the region,
destroy its environment8 and
impoverish its people.
The
purposes of this study are four fold. Our first task is to attempt an overview
of the issue of ownership of oil and gas in Nigeria. The second task is to
investigate if the principles of law and contemporary legislation/enactment on
oil and gas industry in Nigeria
have been complied with to promote the exploitation, exploration and production
in the industry.
Out
third task is to examine whether the principles of law and contemporary
development in our municipal environmental Law have been applied to protect the
environment and safeguard the environmental rights of individuals, communities
and the society in the Nigeria’s
Niger- Delta.
In
spite of its contribution to national wealth, the Niger-Delta is the poorest in
terms of economic and infrastructural development9.
This has given rise to the emergence of NGOs and civil society groups demanding
equity in the distribution of oil wealth.10
Accordingly,
our final task is to review the aims and objectives of petroleum industry bill
(PIB), and its fiscal system under the petroleum industry in Nigeria.11
1.3 Research Questions
In
relation to the first task, the question to ask is as between the Federal
government, littoral states and oil bearing communities, who is vested with the
ownership of oil and gas in Nigeria?
This inquiry has become necessary following agitations by littoral states/oil
bearing communities that they and not the Federal Government are vested with
ownership of oil and gas located onshore and offshore in the territorial sea
and continental shelf on Nigeria.12
For the second task, the
question to ask is whether enacted legislations for the regulation of
activities in Nigeria
oil and gas industry are of standard to promote exploitation, exploration and
production and also mitigate the long lasting crisis in petroleum industry?
Another related question is
how have the various problems associated with petroleum development been
addressed in the Niger- Delta? Our aim is to see how effective have the laws
been in addressing environmental issues and protection of the interest of oil
and gas host communities.
The question to ask for the
third task is, if the principles of law and existing legislations are of
quality to protect the environmental needs within the oil production
communities?13
Finally, in relation to the
fourth task, the question to ask is, is the PIB and new fiscal system14 as proposed by Petroleum Industry Bill
(PIB),one of the harshest in the world or that it will halt investment as
alleged by the international oil companies in Nigeria. And also if the powers
of minister of petroleum resources, as proposed by the Petroleum Industry Bill
(PIB), is of excessive as seriously argued by the legislators15.
1.4 Objectives of the Study
Studies
conducted on petroleum development in Nigeria have concentrated on the
pros and cons of ownership of petroleum resources. There are also many studies
on sustainable development of natural resources in the Niger- Delta.
However,
very few writers have gone beyond these pros and cons to examine the legal
framework for the regulation of oil and gas industry. More also, few work has
been written on the place of the new petroleum industry Bill, especially on the
institutional regulatory framework. This is what this study intends to
accomplish.
Etiferentse,16 Frynas17,
Ahmad Khan,18 Kachukwu,19 Akpan,20
and Omoregbe21 have
all made very brilliant and excellent contributions. Kachukwu, for instance, he
has given a broad overview of the relevant legal issue in the Nigeria’s oil
and gas sector and various legislations that relate to them.
Omoyola22 and Worika23 have both given very insightful,
literate and succinct analysis of environmental Laws and policy of petroleum
development and compensation.
One
very significant contribution to the ongoing bathymetrical mappings of the
littoral states of Nigeria
is the work of Mobolaji, Aluko24,
on the bathymetric data of the 200 meters Isobaths of the littorals tastes. It
shows the main sites of onshore production wells and offshore blocks in Nigeria’s deep
and ultra deep waters.
The
brilliant contributions of M. Ng’s Ang’a, S. Nichols and Monahan I.V.,25 on the deliration of seaward limits of
a coastal Marine protected area are very useful as guide in the identification
of resources and the legal boundaries for hydrocarbons and natural gas.
The
present work is to do a proper examination on the legal framework under oil and
gas industry in Nigeria,
inclusive of the petroleum industry bill, 2012 and co-ordinate all these
strategies within an overall orientation to provide a way forward to the
lingering crisis in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Concerns about environmental
consequences of petroleum development in the Niger Delta has brought to the
take, the necessity of examining the relationship between exploration and
exploitation of the country’s natural resources and the management of the
environment for economic development.
There
is also a rising need/demands to put to standard the fiscal system of the Nigeria oil and
gas industry. The present work is significant not only because it reviews
environmental, fiscal system policies and programmes put in place to promote
petroleum development, but because it goes ahead to design/discuss legal and
institutional framework, which if put in place, will reduce the tensions in the
region to the barest minimum.
1.6 Scope of the Study
The petroleum industry is an
international business concern that is usually governed by certain standards to
regulate its various operations. The federal government of Nigeria
recognizes this fact and, through appropriate agencies, has passed over 100
principal and subsidiary pieces of legislation to deal with all aspects of the
Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Mostly,
our study would concentrate only on Nigeria petroleum industry. But it
is an undiluted truth as asserted above or earlier that petroleum industry is
an international business, therefore we must of course while discussing some
concepts which has international notification, make reference to other legal
and institutional framework outside Nigeria. Such must include the
provisions/resolution of these international bodies/institutions United Nations
(UN) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Certainly,
there will be a comparison of the petroleum industry bill of oil and gas
industry in Nigeria
with room to examine Laws of that country as related to the petroleum industry.
1.7 Limitations of the Study
Legislation affecting the
oil and gas industry in Nigeria are not static; they are either amended or
promulgated as the government deems fit in the context of the complex
political, socio-ethnic and religious environment and the overall
techno-economic development, survival and independence of the country.
Successive
governments have cause to promulgate appropriate laws to take care of their
changing priorities, goals and aspirations as dictated by both local and
international politics.
It
is quite obvious that all these laws and
regulations are not found in single/particular petroleum (consolidated)
Act, our school library and many others libraries has not been up to date with
the laws relating to petroleum industry in Nigeria, it really limited my
research for this work.
Secondly,
because of the nature of work and my financial capacity, it really affected me
a lot to make research for the study of this work.
Thirdly,
time factor also limited my research for this works, because at first, we were
given from 29th April, topic
approval date to 31st May as
last date for submission of the complete
work, although it was later not followed, but still no clear date for
submission was given.
1.8 Research Methodology
The
approach to be adopted in this study is historical, comparative and analytical.
Nigeria’s
long history of oil and gas operations coupled with the marginalization of oil
producing communities makes the historical approach a preferred option.
The
comparative approach is a derivative of the need to draw from the experience in
other need to draw from the experience in other jurisdictions such as Britain, USA and other
OPEC member countries.
The
account is also analytical in its critical examination as well as appraisal of
the emerging issues and trends. It also adopts a multidisciplinary approach
which sees to draw from the principles and rules of international environmental
law, petroleum and law of the sea.
It
is equally prescriptive as it recommends equity in the distribution of oil
wealth through dividend transfers as one panacea of solving the Niger Delta crisis.
The
debate on the seaward, limit of littoral states26
and resource control in Nigeria
has gone on for a long time and is unlikely to end any time soon. Many papers,
articles and policy briefs have been written on this subject, both supporting
and rejecting the idea of extending littoral states seaward reach to the
continental shelf. Many expected the 200 meters isobaths granted littoral
states to finally address the issue. This was not to be.
To
date, this debate has not been conducted in a constructive manner. The venues
range from public speeches, newspapers, articles and conference proceedings to
articles in learned Journals.
These
articles and texts are found in diverse sources which make it difficult for
scholars in this field, students, practitioners or policy makers to study all
proposals together.
So
far, there has been no comprehensive text on the tripartite relationship
between the laws of tax in petroleum, environmental law and oil and gas
operations which the interested researcher or decision maker could turn to.
This
work is intended to fill that gap. The work draws on the findings of the
current debate and elaborates the issues further in the light of the emerging
trends.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Definition
of Terms, Concepts and Historical Background
In
this chapter (literature review) we critical review most of the terms which most
of the nature of our work one must in one point or the other come across, and
for a knowledge/understanding we decided to create the literature of it. Some
of these essential terms include the Meaning of Petroleum, Participation/Joint
venture Agreements, Production sharing Contracts and Risk Service Contract,
Farm out/ Marginal field. In brief, according to section 15(1) of the Principal
Act (Petroleum Act)1, it
defined it as a “mineral oil, in its natural state before refined or treated,
excluding water and other foreign substances.
More
also, it is an undiluted truth that one of most lingering issues in Niger-Delta
and Nigeria petroleum industry as a whole is the issue of ownership and control
of natural resources2.
However,
there are various legal authorities both national and international on who rest
the total ownership of state natural resources3.
This work also review, the Nigeria position on natural resources,
theories/methods ownership of natural resource, history and scope of state
ownership of natural resources in nigeria4,
and also the problems of ownership and control of natural resources in Nigeria5, which was not treated without bringing
out solutions to the problems, one from the United Nations and finally from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).6 Serious attention was given on the
concepts of oil and gas7, more
like the previous writers on this area.
2.1 Meaning of Petroleum
Petroleum is commonly a
compound composed of hydrogen and carbon. It is commonly called a hydrocarbon.
It can exist in gaseous, liquid or solid form. If found in solid form, it is
either coal, shale, tar sands or bitumen. In its liquid form, it is referred to
as, crude oil. Crude oil is hydrocarbon which is mainly referred to by many as
petroleum, but the name petroleum actually covers other types of hydrocarbons8.
The word “petroleum” derives from the Latin word, petra (rock, stone),and Ollium (oil).
Petroleum, in literal sense, therefore, is rock oil or stone oil. It has some
qualities of “Oxygen, Nitrogen, and sulphour as impurities. Petroleum is found
in sedimentary soft porous rock under the ground which could be deep oceans,
seas or under sandy or mangrove environment or vegetation. The S.15(1)9, defined it as “mineral oil” in its
natural state before it is refined or treated, excluding water and other
foreign substances”.
2.2 Participation and Joint Venture
Agreements
Participation agreements as
the name denotes refers to the practice of a country participating in the
development of its hydrocarbon resources with the foreign oil companies. As new
form of petroleum development arrangement, it was perceived as response to the
need felt by Nigeria
and other oil exporting countries in the late 60s and 70s to share in ownership
of and control over operation in their oil industries. Given that complete
control exercised by the early concessionaire was based on their ownership of
petroleum under traditional concessions. State participation was thus,
perceived by these countries as corollary to state ownership of petroleum
deposits.
The
first case of state participation in the international petroleum operation
dates back to 1914, in that year. The British Government acquired a controlling
share interest (about 56 percent) in Anglo-Persian oil company (now British
Petroleum Company). Similarly post World War II oil agreements in the Middle East provided for government equity participation
in the forms of either joint venture or optional participation conditioned on
discovery of commercial petroleum deposits. The adoption by OPEC of resolution
90 at its conference in 168 calling on member countries to actively
participation in existing oil concession in their states added scourers to the
member states to comply with such resolution. Since then, state participation
as a policy aimed at sharing ownership and control over exploitation of
petroleum resource has been adopted by many counties.10
Nigeria joined the membership of
OPEC in July 1971, that same year, the Nigeria National Oil Corporation (NNOC)
the forerunner of the present day Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)11 was established. In brief, it can be
stress that the desiderata of the government for establishing the (NNOC), was
for it to engage in industry. This is premised on the argument that the
government could receive, in addition to tax and royalties, dividends
proportionate to its interest in the venture. Thus following its membership of
OPEC and the formation of the NNOC in the same year, thing began to change Nigeria, along
with other OPEC member countries, at the same time. Sought to actively
participate and eventually exercise control over their oil industries.12
The first participation arrangement effected by Nigeria was
with SAFERAP (now ELF) in 197 Government acquired 35 percent participation
interest in ELF’s operation in Nigeria
after Civil War. In October of the same year its option to acquire 331/3%
interest in AFIP’s operation was implemented. The decision in 1971 to take
active part in the oil industry was prompted by two OPEC Resolution; the first
Resolution was passed in June 1968, which embodied a policy statement calling
for renegotiating of concession arrangement between members state and MNOCS and
the second Resolution in 1971 re-emphasized that members should takes steps to
acquire 20 percent participation interest by 1981. The first OPEC Resolution,
which urged participation by government state in the oil production operations
in old concession clearly state as follows:
Where
provision for Government participation under any of the concessions-holding
company under any of the present petroleum contracts has not been made, the
Government may acquire a reasonable participation (not equity shares) on the
ground of the principle of changing circumstances13.
In keeping with OPEC resolution participation,
government increased its participation interest from 51 to 55 and then to 60
percent in 1972, 1974 and 1979 respectively. As a result, today in all the ten
joint venture agreements operating in the country, government via in the agency
of NNPC has 60 percent interest. The most recent joint venture agreement in the
Nigeria Petroleum industry, however, is that between NNPC on the one hand and
SHELL, AGIP AND GULF on the other, which was signed in policy measures are
geared towards affecting Nigeria’s active participation in the oil industry and
ensuring that the government derives maximum benefits from its petroleum,
resources.14 As a result, the policy
of making participation agreement is formally embodied in the petroleum decree
1969 (as amended) in 1979 15.
2.2.1 The Equity Share Participation Agreement
This
refers to the one in which the government is a shareholder in the joint venture
company, and is entitled to dividends to the extent of its equity interest in
that company. This arrangement requires the formation of a separate legal
entity in the form of a joint stock company by the two partners. Such a company
is usually neutral of the parents and management board, representing is based
on parties’ participation interest. Most companies that fall within such
classification of participation agreement in Nigeria are the oil service
companies in which the NNPC owns 36 percent equity shares therein.
Example
of such oil service companies include: Board of Nigeria, Ltd. Baroid Drilling
and Chemical Products Nigeria Ltd., Dresser Nigeria Ltd., Baker Nigeria Ltd.,
to name but a few. Other companies in which NNPC has equity holding are
Liquefied Natural Gas Limited (LNG). Hanson Ltd., Calson Bermuda Ltd. and
national Engineering and Technical Company Ltd., (NETCO).16
2.2.2 Non- Equity Share Participation Agreement
Under
this form of arrangement, the government participation in the ownership and
authorized operation and shares in kind in the crude oil and other products.
That is to say that government does not own shares or stocks in the joint
venture operator company and is not entitle to dividend from the company. The
most common o this kind of arrangements is the formation of a working
association between a MNOC and a host country without the creation of a new and
separate company. Both agree to hold jointly all rights and interests under the
joint venture agreement and meet expenses in proportion to their participation
interests. In Nigeria,
this form of arrangements exists between NNPC and (1) SHELL, (2) MOBIL, (3)
GULF, (4) ELF, (5) TEXACO AND CHEVRON AND (7) PAN OCEAN COMPANY in which the
NNPC has 60 percent non-equity participation interests.17
Generally,
the nature of the operations of these non-equity and equity participation
agreements are the same in that in both cases, NNPC acts as the non-operating
partner. It has a say only in the management through its board representative
who see to it that government policies are dully carried out. Thus one can say
that the basic difference between the two lies in the fact that on the one
side, the government has equity share holdings, on the other, it has only a
participatory right to share in the operation of the agreement.
In
assessing these agreements, three points may be made. First although
participation agreement are perceived by host countries as vehicle for exerting
control over the exploitation of their hydrocarbons, the reality of the
situation is that participation or equity ownership does not mean control for
these countries. In practice, it only helps to boost the political image of the
host government for real control with the MNOC, because the country lacks the
technical know-how and management skill to effectively project government’s
interest. Despite the majority equity position of the host country in the joint
venture, the effective powers are in hand of the MNOC. Because as operators
they are in charge of exportation, maintenance programmes, supplies of
equipment, the employment of expertise and all operational matters. For
instance, in the case of Nigeria,
even though the NNPC has a built-in majority on all the boards of the joint
venture companies, the fact that all proposal emanate from the operators leaves
no doubt that the letter’s representatives may have a fore-knowledge of such
proposal and readily approve of them. Since the Nigeria representatives do not have
the same foreknowledge because of their distance from the operational
management of the joint “venture plus their lack of knowledge in oil matters,
the likelihood is that they will go to approve it without full grasp of its
implications.
In
addition by leaving all technical and economic matters including, programme,
etc. to the operators, it builds no foundation for NNPC to acquire skills for
operation. In a sense, with the agreements limiting Nigeria’s involving in managerial
task to the exclusion of operation matters, attainment of independent operational
capacity is being frustrated. As one commentator remarked in respect of a
similar subject, “…that unless the host country has the skill and expertise,
the control is rather political’.18
Secondly, the nation that by concluding joint
participation agreements a host country will enhance its revenue earning
position merits some comment. This hypothesis is founded on the premise that
under participation agreements, the government could receive in the venture.
For example, if the government 60 percent equity interests the operation it
takes an equivalent divided while at the same receiving the normal tax plus any
dues payable under fiscal laws. However, it has been argued by Ogunlami, in his
work or, the ‘Nigeria Petroleum Taxation’ that this may not be always true
because for instance, a 50 percent divided may not bring more revenue than 50
percent tax.19 This, he maintains is
so because all cost and expenses including interest on loans, debt and
investment funds are deducted before dividends are paid but not before tax. As
a result, a government having contributed its share of investment and other
necessary payments can suffer a proportionate loss in the event of the joint
venture company or joint venture agreement were, at the beginning, more
favourable to the host countries compared with the traditional concession
regime, they have not remained static. Because of the changed circumstance and
the improved bargaining position of some host countries (notably OPEC
producers), many adjust disparities as they arise under the earlier agreements.
It is in the light of this too that Nigeria negotiated new kinds of
petroleum development countries, vic, Production sharing and risk service
countries, which are the subject for our discussion in the ensuring paragraphs.
2.3 Production Sharing Contracts/ Risk Service Contract
This
type of contract originated in Indonesia
in 1960s when it was first used in the agriculture sector, and then the oil
industry. Since then it has become very popular in the oil industries the world
over. It refers essentially to arrangement where the MNOC and the host
governments share the output of the operation in predetermine proportions. This
contract is regarded by some writers as being a substantial departure from the
concession and joint venture regimes in that host government is theoretically
the undisputed owner of the petroleum.20
The MNOCs are engaged as contractors to perform certain specified task in
return for as fee in kind. One other distinguishing feature of the
Production-sharing contract is that the government receives revenue from the
beginning of Production Company. Under the contract, Ashland is to provide all the technical and
financial requirements unit oil is discovered in commercial quantity. But in
case no oil is found, the company (Ashland)
bears all the risk. Ashland
is in charge of management and operations. The contract’s duration is for an
initial term of 20 years. Like most contractual agreement between NNPC and
MNOCs, the contract with Ashland
contains provisions on employment training of technology to local personnel.
Such training is regarded as an essential component the process of acquiring
and absorbing oil technology. All the expenses of training of Nigeria
personnel under the contract are included in the production.
The
Nigeria
experience with the production sharing contract has however been singularly
unsuccessful. The contract from the start has attracted a lot of adverse
comments. One of such criticism came from the Crude Oil State Tribunal, which
was set up in 1980 to investigate an alleged lost of N 2.8 billion from the
accounts of NNPC with the Middle Bank in London
between1978-79. The tribunal found no sum missing/nevertheless, it was highly
critical of the contract. It described the clause on the sharing of oil between
NNPC and Ashland
as being “too lop-sided in favour of Ashland”.21 It posited that after the Ashland
Company has taken its 50 percent for amortization of its investments and
operating expense, what remains therefore is hardly anything to go for Nigeria. As a
result of this, the tribunal state that the contract “certainly has no benefits
whatsoever to the NNPC and hence concluded that the NNPC can therefore
ill-afford to continue this contract a day longer”22
However
subsequent inquiries since have indicated that the Tribunal had not obtained
the full facts, and hand therefore been too harsh in its conclusion. It is
thought that the Tribunal was probably led to believe that 55 percent of the
total production was assigned to tax oil, with only 5 percent to the production
split.23 Again others opine that the split
between the two parties was 27.5 percent and also Nigeria through the FBIR receives
at least 60 percent of the total crude oil production.
The
difficulty has been blamed on the looseness of the drafting of the contract,
which differs from the production sharing contracts founds in order counties
such as Indonesia,
Libya,
Egypt,
and Peru.
Thus the Tribunal’s contract than Nigeria has meant that to date this
remains the only contract of its kind in Nigeria.
The
Risk Service Contract (Herein called service contract) is a variant of the
production-sharing contract. The only exception between two is that the
duration of the service contract, is shorter and the operator or contractor
under a service contract has no till to oil production as exists under a
production-sharing contract. That is it undertakes the exploration as
production at its own risk. The main characteristic features of the service
that MNOC provides the technical services and risk capital for petroleum
operations in return for remuneration in cash or kind. The risk service
contracts, currently operating in Nigeria, were designed as
improvements on the production sharing arrangements. In 1979, the government
entered into eleven service contract with ELF, AGIP has been operational while
the others were unsuccessful discovering oil.24
The service contract between
NNPC and AGIP (AFRICA) Ltd., was formally entered in to on September 24th, 1979. The
initial exploration period is three years. Under the contract, NNPC retains
title and ownership of all data obtained from the operation conducted by AGIUP.
AGIP also has the right to take crude oil produced from the contract area
equivalent in value to the total payments due to it from NNPC as its
remuneration. The contract spells out that NNPC is the sole owner of all
petroleum and any hydrocarbons produced from the service contract. It also
carries detailed provision for the rendering of accounts of the operations
conducted by AGIP. Provision for the employment and training of Nigeria who
will later take over the operation of the oil industry are contained in the
NNPC/AGIP contract.25
From
the foreign, one may express the view that the Risk service contract seems to
be the most progressive of all the contractual forms currently in operation in
Nigeria. As compared to the traditional concession, production-sharing contract
or joint venture, risk service contract makes it possible for the state to
received higher financial return. The short of the contract might be another
contributory factor. The three or five years duration compared with the pre
1969 old concession granted for over forty years and twenty years under
production sharing contract enables a state to resume its ownership interest of
contracted areas in much shorter period.
Another
good aspect of the service contract is that it is limited to just one
prospecting block at a time. This will restrict a MNOC’s activities to just a
single thereby encouraging it to explore the area quickly. Worthy of mention
too are the provision on insurance policies in the contract. Such policies are
with respect to equipment, materials as well as the costs associated with
pollution control.
In
spite of the widespread accolade the service contract received and hopes it has
raised for a complete control and 100 percent benefit to Nigeria, it may
still not have fulfilled that goal. By leaving management and operation solely
in the hand of the MNOC’s (contractors), it amounts to an implied investor ownership
of mineral resource reminiscent of the old concession regime, which it wanted
to avoid. A study of all these contracts, however, indicate that transfer of
control from MNOC’s to host government is assured not so much by recourse to
sophisticate contractual forms as by effective supervision of operations.
Similarly, where the supervisor authority lacks the requisite technical
financial and managerial skill, such supervision tends to be ineffective and
government control becomes largely illusory. Thus the meaningful way out for
NNPC is to intensify efforts and see that the clauses on “Nigerianisation” and
transfer to technology is effectively implemented so that when commercial
production start NNPC may take over operations in the shortest possible time.26
2.4 Marginal Field/Farm Out
Another
contractual arrangement which involves the indigenous companies is the grant of
marginal field. Many small oil fields discovered by multinational oil companies
under concession may not have been put into production by the companies as a
matter of fact. The reason may be due to the field having high and low
reserves, field has been left un-produced for a considerable length of time,
low gravity and high viscosity, economic and technical criteria used to
classify such fields, and insignificant discovery which made the field
incapable of commercial production.26a
In
some cases, the fields are of marginal economics in that potential production
from the field the minimum percentage of profit margin which any project is estimated
to attain before the company may fall into the category of marginal field by
reasons of declining productivity. Similarly, a given profit margin may not be
high enough for investment by a multinational oil company, but it may
attractive to a small oil company with small size, management, no refinery, and
with small overhead.
The
pressure for the development of marginal fields in recent times stems from the entry
by many small unpopular oil companies, i.e., the independents into the
exploration and production phases of the Nigerian petroleum industry and the
policy of the federal government on the enhancement of the national reserve and
the encouragement of indigenous oil companies to participate in the upstream
sector of the petroleum industry. As such, both the federal government and some
indigenous companies felt that since such fields can be profitably produced by
small indigenous companies with considerably lower overheads, they should
farmed out to indigenous companies which have the necessary expertise rather
than left un-attended to.
Farm
out means an agreement between the holder of oil mining lease and a third party
which permits the third party to explore, prospect, win, work, and carry away
any petroleum encountered in a specified area during the validity of the lease.
This
policy began in 1989 during the regime of the military president, General
Ibrahim Babangida when certain prospects were specifically reserved for
Nigerian entrepreneurship. The concessions granted under this policy were those
that were relatively easy to exploit based on seismic data and other
information.
It
should be noted that (in accordance with guidelines to farm out the operation
of marginal fields issued by the government through the department of petroleum
resources), un-produced discoveries in open leases do not qualify for farm out
as they would constitute part of the whole average that would be awarded in a
new licensing round, so as to further encourage exploration activities in such
leases.27 many of the marginal fields
are jointly owned by parties to various joint operating agreements pursuant to which the fields were
discovered. Accordingly, assignment of interest contemplated under a farm our
agreement, carries. Interest, net profit, or overriding royalty agreement which
must be made with each co-owner as a party to the extent of its undivided
percentage field in the license or lease comparing the marginal field in
question. The assignment cannot be validly made by the operator of the joint
venture in to capacity as operator.
Furthermore,
prior approval in writing by the minister is a pre-requisite to a void
assignment under the agreement the area of the license or lease to be assigned
must be clearly demarcated in such a way that the joint operations will not
interfere with the agreements for the development of the marginal fields.
2.5 The Concept of Oil and Gas
It
is shown in the work that petroleum, in one form or another, has been used
since ancient times, and is now important across society, including in economy,
politics and technology. The rise in importance was mostly due to the invention
of the internal combustion engine, the rise in commercial aviation and the
increasing use of plastic.
As
long as 5000 years ago, people were already using crude oil as a resource for
the purposes.28 They were also aware of
natural gas. It was just that they did not know how to use it. They did not dig
for oil either. The quantities seeping through to the surface of the earth were
sufficient.29
In
one of the earliest civilization-Mesopotamia-bitumen, or Asphact, was used for
construction purposes. The ancient Greeks and Romans used petroleum as a
lubricant and for sealing.30
Natural History of Oil
Petroleum
is a naturally occurring liquid found in rock formations. It consists of a
complex mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights plus other organic
compounds. It is generally accepted that oil is formed mostly from the carbon
rich remains of ancient plankton after exposure to hear and pressure in the Earth’s
crust over hundreds of millions of years overtime, the decayed residue was
covered by layers of mud and silt, sinking further down into the earth crust
and preserved there between hot and preserved layers gradually transforming
into oil reservoir.
Early History
Petroleum
in an unreformed state has been utilized by humans for over 5000 years. In
fact, the consensus of opinion is that oil predates man. This, oil in general
has been used since early human history, to keep fires ablaze and also for warfare.
Ancient Persian language tablets indicate the
medical and lighting uses of petroleum in the upper elections of their society.
Ancient china was also known to burn skimmed oil for light.
An
early petroleum industry was established in the 8th century when the
streets of Baghadd were packed with far directed from petroleum through
destructive distillation. In the 9th century, oil fields were
exploited in the area around modern Baku,
Azerbaijan, to
produce naphtha. These fields were described by AI-masudi in the 10th
century, by Marco polo in the 13th century who described the output
of those oil wells as hundreds of ship loads. Again, petroleum was distilled by
AI-RAZ in the 9th century, producing chemicals such as Kerosene in
the alembic, which he used in the oil lamp industry.31
The
importance of petroleum in the world economy evolved slowly, with whale oil
used for lighting into the 19th century and wood and coal used for
heating and cooking well into the 20th century. A petroleum industry
emerged in North America in Canada and the United States of America.
32
The
industrial revolution generated an increasing need for energy which was fueled
mainly by coal, with other sources including whale oil. However, it was
discovered that kerosene could be extracted from crude oil and used as a light
and heating fuel. Petroleum was in great demand and by the twentieth century
had become the most valuable commodity traded on the world market.
Modern History
Imperilment
Russia’s
output of oil, at the turn of the 20th century, accounted for half
of the world production and dominated international market. Their output was
almost entirely from the Aspherson Peninsular.
By
1884, nearly 200 small refineries operated in the suburbs of Baku. As a side effect of these early
developments, the Apsheron peninsula emerged the world oldest legacy of oil
production and environmental negligence. In 1818, Ludrie Nobel and his Branobel
Company revolutionaries oil transport by commissioning the first oil tanker and
launching it on the Caspian sea.
The
first modern oil refineries were built by Ignacy, Lukasiewicz near justo,33 poland from 1854-1856. These were
initially small as demand for refined fuel was limited the referred products
were used in artificial asphalt, machine oil and lubricants, in addition to
Luka-siewirs kerosene lamp. As Kerosene lamps gained popularity, the refining
industry grew in the area.
The
first large soil refinery was opened at Romania, in 1856. The first oil
drilling in the United
States began in 1859, when oil was
successfully drilled in Titusville
Pennsylvania.
In
the first quarter of the 20th century, the United States of America
overtook Russia
as the world’s largest producer of oil. By the 1920’s oil fields had been
established in many countries including Canada, Poland, Sweden, the Ukraine, the United States
and Venezuela.
In the early 1930s, the Texas Company developed the first mobile steel barge
for drilling in the brackish costal area of the Persian
Gulf.
In
1937, pure oil company34 and
its partner superior oil company used a fixed platform to develop a field in 14
feet of water, one mile offshore of Calcasien parish, Louisiana.
After
the world- war II ended, the countries of the middle- East took the lead in
production from the united
states of. Oil was discovered in a great
many places in the middle-East Arabian Peninsula,
beneath the Caspian seas, beneath what would become the nations of Iraq, Kuwait, the
United Arab emirate, and others. This marked the begging of middle -Eastern
petroleum’s ascent to its current domination of the global petroleum markets.
Lastly,
the organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960 by
Iran,
Iraq,
Kuwait,
Saudi-Arabia and Venezuela
primarily in retaliation for price cuts made by the oil companies.35 At that time, most oil wells were
owned by petroleum companies who had been granted concessions by the nations on
whose territory the wells lay. These companies paid only attraction of their
proceeds to the countries.
When
prices dropped, the oil producing nations lost a grant deal of money. OPEC was
organized to raise and stabilize the price of crude oil.
By regulating the amount of oil produced, the price
could theoretically be maintained artificially high increasing revenue for
these nations. Of course, the price too high could encourage less energy
consumption, the recovery of otherwise marginal reserves, or both. So setting
out production and pricing became an intricate balancing act.
History of Natural Gas
Although
naturally occurring gas has been known since ancient times, its commercial use
is relatively recent. In about 1000 BC, the famous oracte at Delphion Mount
Parnassus in ancient Greece
was built where natural gas seeped from the ground in a flame. Around 500 BC,
the Chinese started using crude bamboo pipelines to transport gas that seeped
to the surface and to use it to boil sea water to get drinkable water. However,
the first commercialized natural gas occurred in Britain. Around 1785, the British
used natural gas produced from coal to light houses and streets. In 18 1B, Baltimore, Maryland
used this type of manufactured natural gas to become the first city in the United States
to light its streets gas.36
Again
naturally occurring natural gas was discovered and identified in America as
early as 1626, when French explorers discovered natives igniting gas that were
seeping into and around late Eric. In 1825, William Hart dry the first
successful natural gas well in the United States, in Fredonia, New York.
Eventually, the Fredonia Gas Light Company was formed becoming the first
American natural gas distribution company.
In
1836, the city of Philadelphia
created the first municipally owned natural gas distribution company. During
most of the 19th century national gas was used almost exclusively as
a source of light, but in 1885, robber Bunsen’s invention of what is now known
as the Bunsen burner open vast new opportunities to use natural gas. Once
effective pipelines began to be built in the 20th century, the use
of natural gas expanded to home heating and cooking appliances such as waster,
heaters and even ranges, manufacturing and processing plants, and boilers to
generate electricity.
Today,
natural gas is a vital component of the world’s supply of energy. It is one of
the cleanest, safest and most useful of all energy sources.
2.6 History of the Nigerian oil and Gas
Industry
The
search for crude oil began in Nigeria as far back as 1908, when a German
company the Nigerian Bitumen corporation explored for oil in the Araromi area
between Ijeby Ode in the present Ogun state and Okifipupa in the present Ondo
state. This pioneering effort was terminated at the outbreak of hostility
between Britain and Germany in the first world- war in 1914, given the fact the
Nigeria was under the territorial control of the United Kingdom, and Germany’s
loss of the war, the German Company’s Operations were not resumed after the
war.
Consequently,
the British colonial administration enacted the Mineral oil Ordinance No 17 of
1914 to regulate the right to search for win, and work mineral oil rights in
the area. The Law provided that:
No lease or license shall be granted except to a
British company registered in Great Britain or in a British colony having its
principal place of businesses within her majesty’s dominion, he chairman and
the managing Director (if any) and the majority of the order directors of which
are British subjects.37
This
discriminatory legislation had a very adverse effect on the development o the
oil sector as it discouraged competition from outside Britain when it
was manifestly clear that British companies lacked the requisite capital and
manpower for exploration of the vast reserves in Nigeria.
Oil-prospecting
activities are resumed in Nigeria
in 1973, when shell D’Arcy, an Anglo-dutch consortium and subsidiary of the
Royal Dutch shell group, obtained an oil exploration license covering the
entire country. This initial monopoly gave shell D’ARcy , the forerunner of the
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) the leading position,
which the present day SPDC Maintains over the other oil majors of the
exploration and production (E&P) companies operating in Nigeria today. The
operations of the company were interrupted by the Second World War, but were
resumed in 1947 culminating in the spotting of the first exploratory well
(Ihuo) in Eastern Nigeria in September, 1951.38
However,
it was not until 1956 that oil was discovered in commercial quantities at
Oloibiri near Port Harcourt
in the present day Bayelsa
State. The year of 1958
witnessed the first export of Nigeria
crude to Europe, when production clicked 5,000
barrels per day (bpd).
The
quantity doubted the following year. By the mid-sixties, production had gone
past the 500,000 bpd mark and the other foreign oil companies had rushed in to
secure exploration acreage.39 The
exploration rights, which were formerly granted to shell alone, were now
extended to the newcomers’ in line with the government’s policy of increasing
the pace of exploration in the country. There was a steady increase in Nigeria’s oil
production 0.90 million b/d in 1970 to 2.9 million b/d in 1992, and it reached
a peak of 2.4 million b/d in 1979. The steady increase in oil product on
fetched Nigeria
the position of the major oil producer, and she has grown to become the
sixth-largest oil-producing country within OPEC.
The
earlier-mentioned increase in the number of active oil companies existing
petroleum (oil and gas) laws.
The
trail structure of the Mineral oils ordinance of 1914 with its amendments could
not sustain the modern pressure and trends in the industry.
Therefore
an attempt to produce a detailed and comprehensive law for the grant of rights
to search for and win oil in Nigeria
and the conditions connected therewith was made in the promulgation of the
Petroleum Act 1969 and the Petroleum (Drilling and Regulations 1969).
Government’s
awareness the importance of oil in the national economy culminated not only in
the enactment of laws but also in direct involvement in oil exploration and
exploitation. Government’s interest in petroleum was further awakened when it
gradually replaced agricultural products as the main export commodity. In order
to strengthen and establish government control in the industry, the Nigerian
National oil Corporation was established in 1971 by Act No 18. This
metamorphosed into Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NNPC established by
Act No. 33 of 1997.
2.7 Ownership and Control of Natural Sources
In
quite a number of develop and developing countries of different and differing
legal and constitutional cultures, the ownership of all or some natural
resources is vested in the state by law. In some such countries, especially
amongst the developing countries, the natural resources yields appreciate
fractions of the natural income. In all cases of state ownership, the
underlining principle or philosophy is or normally ought to be, for the state
to property harness the natural resources for the benefit of the guaranty of
the people in the particular country.40
Incidentally,
in underdeveloped or developing political cultures, political maturity and
social fairness are not hallmarks of statecraft. Governance and management of
public property are often characterized by nepotism, sectionalism and outright
meanness. Tribes and sections of the people in power enjoy state attention and
prime proportions of public funds white the other tribes and sections are often
left in neglect. It is so even if much of the national wealth derives from or
is produced from those other tribes or sections. The men of power who ensure
for themselves and their families in exhaustible wealth embezzle much of what
is not spent on the favoured tribe(s) or sections.41
It
almost always happens that foreign investors in such countries, especially in Nigeria
indirectly, even if unwittingly, hide behind and take sides with the government
since the relevant concessions are normally grant them by the government in the
first place. The effect is that the investors are held in contempt by the
neglected areas especial I the natural resources derive from those neglect
areas. When the neglected people rise in struggle against the government” it is
for all intents and purposes a struggle against the investors. In many cases
the investors incur untold but avoidable loss in the people’s struggle to right
the wrong of the government. The investors, guilty or innocent of misconducts,
suffer for the injustice engendered and practiced by the government. Nigeria is a
country of about 250 nations/tribes and suffers the twin burdens of political
and economic underdevelopment. It suffers in remarkable proportions the
problems of nepotism, sectionalism; tribalism and crude chauvinism based on
language differences, in the exercise of state power. These have been worsened
over the decades by unmitigated militarization of the society.42
This is very often manifested in brazen arrogant
abuse of state power in favour of sectional and personal interests and the
traumatisation of all of all or almost all principles of civility, polish and
social justice.
Meanwhile,
the state ownership of natural resources had been a legal prescription even
before the country’s independence in 1990. before independence, protests
against the ownership of natural resources by the colonial British government
formed part of the larger campaign for poetical independence, the position
seemed to have been accepted or acquiesced in by the generosity of Nigerians
but for a few (sometimes strident) criticisms here and there. Indeed many
Nigerians. Including the owners of the lands in or on which the natural
resources occur, have generally placed a lot of confidence and hope in the idea
of a fair and just Nigerian state.
It
has however dawned on Nigerians in recent years much more than ever that the
little power mongering cabal in Nigeria, which has been mainly wasteful abused
and raped such collective confidence of Nigerians. Nigerians of all creeds and
language groups (especially of the south and the middle Belt) have therefore
seriously questioned the desirability of maintaining the present political and
economic structure of the country including the state ownership of natural
resources. It has been particularly with respect to oil and gas which account
for well over 90% of the country’s income.
These
questions, which came to a head after the invalidation of the June, 1993
presidential election results, have nearly even red to the breaking up of the
country into different countries.43 To
avert this, even the north revised the imperative of a political power shift to
the south.
This
work seeks to examine the issues involved in state ownership of natural
resources like oil and gas in different countries. This is done with a view to
showing that may have similar circumstances in the exercise of control and ownership
over their natural resources, now. It examines the price that foreign investors
have paid and are paying for being perceived as partners of the Federal
government in the neglect of the natural resources yielding parts of the
country. It is hoped that discussion will also be instructive for raters and
citizens of even those other countries (especially third world countries) where
the underlying philosophy of state ownership of natural resources may currently
be handled more in abuse and breach, and for foreign investors who operates in
those environments. The idea is for investors, armed with this necessary
information, to reposition themselves in the social psyche of the people
through appropriate action to avoid such losses.
The
topic first examines the importance of natural resources to the Nigerian state
and tracts the history of state ownership of natural resources in the country.
It examined the three theories or methods of ownership of natural and
social-political developments and perspectives in control of natural resources.
2.7.1 Nigeria and Natural Resources
Nigeria is abundantly blessed with such natural resources as oil and
gas, coal, bauxite, gold, germs tones, copper, iron etc. the resources are
spread across the different parts of the country especially the south.
Petroleum
(oil and gas) occurs mostly in the Niger Delta, which spans across the
South-South geopolitical zone as well as some part of the South- East and the
South –West. Since the 1970 oil revenue has constituted over 90% of the
country’s national annual income.44
The petroleum industry constitutes in practically
every way the most important sector of the economy at the present time. It
practically controls life and business in Nigeria, and since successive
governments have rather persisted in paying more of lip service to economic
reengineering, it (petroleum) promises to retain such importance in the
foreseeable future.45 The
petroleum yielding parts of the country have therefore appropriately been
described as the goose that lay the golden eggs, the providers of the economic
and financial muscle on which the very idea of a Nigeria state completely rests46.
Local mining began, in Enugu in the southeast
very much early in the last country. Between then and the 1960s coal was a
major export commodity that earned a lot of income for the country. Coal made
Nigeria rich in those days and is still capable of earning tremendous income
for her if not that following the oil boom of the early 1970s coals like other
sources of incomes was neglected.
The
country has gold reserves in the southwest and middle Belt zones. It has
bauxite, copper and iron in the other regions. Gold, Bauxite, copper etc, are
yet to be exploited in a serious commercial quality while the mining of iron
ore is mired by corruption and in necessary political calculations and
considerations47.
The
country hardly makes industrial exports. Except for the period of the first
Republic (1960-1966) when agricultural produce earned a bulk of national income
she has indeed depended on income from natural resources to meet her national
financial obligations within and without her borders. The bulk for the money
that some thieving rulers and other economic rodents have stolen over the years
has come from those natural resources. So also the funds used to maintain such
awesome state instruments, defence, law and order but which are often early
turned into rulers as the late General Sani Abacha and the present. They
include such things as the state security service.
The natural resources the ownership of which will be
discussed are liquid and solid minerals. Farm produce and such other things as
cocoa, palm produce, groundnut etc, are not included. Such things are subjects
of private ownership and are rather product of efforts in farming.
2.7.2 Theories/ Methods of Ownership of Natural
Resources
There
are three discernible pattern or theories of Ownership of natural resources
across countries.48 On is
complete state Ownership while the second is the vesting of complete ownership
rights in the individual landowner. The third is a hybrid of the first two,
whereby the state owns the resources to an extent but reserves some rights in
the individual.
The
idea, theory or pattern of state ownership seems to be dominant. Under the Venezuela
mining Law 1944 as amended, all mines, sea beds and mineral deposits are public
utilities under the country’s constitution and can only be exploited under
concession granted by the government. Its petroleum Laws more categorically
place property in all petroleum, in its natural state in the hands of the
country, and prohibit any mining without a concession or permit.
In
Mexico, the 1917 constitution makes the state the sole owner of sub-soils i.e
“all minerals or substances which is veins, ledges, masses or pockets, form
deposits of a nature distinct from the components of the earth itself, such as…
petroleum and all solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, solid minerals
fuels”.
Article
27 paragraph 26 makes the country ownership of such deposits” inalienable and
imprescriptibly” meaning that though under the same article the country “has
had, and has, the right to transfer title thereof to private persons, thereby
constituting private property” no investor, individual or corporate, indigenous or foreign, can at
quire the title to any of the country’s natural resources49.
The
Petroleum Act, 1985 of Norway
vests sovereign rights over sub-sea natural resources in the state.
The
1997 defunct Soviet Union Constitution50
vested ownership of the land, its minerals, water, forests, rails, factories
etc in the state, in the traditional totalitarian communist fashion. The 1992
Russian Law on subsurface Resources Decree and art 72 of the current Russian
constitution also have the same effect even though communism has been
jettisoned.
The
Zambian Mines and Minerals Act51 and
the 1978 minerals Act of Botswana each have provisions vesting the minerals in
the state. In the USA,
ownership varies from state to state but Alska is the only one that completely disentitles
the individuals landowner. In Argentina,
Law 24, 145 or 1992 entrust the state with authority and indeed the only
available legislative competence to deal with hydrocarbon deposits.
Section 2 of the petroleum (Exploration and
Production) Act, 1991, declares state ownership over all petroleum in Nambia.
The same pattern holds for the other major natural resources of that country
such as diamonds, copper and lead.
In
the UK,
when in 1917 there was a move to vest ownership of petroleum in the crown it
was stoutly resisted on the ground that the idea of private ownership of
property, including petroleum, had become so established as not to be upset.
The government solved the problem by a more or less wise devise. It enacted the
petroleum production Act of 1918, which ex facie set out to address some
competitive drilling problems and waste.
It
provided that nobody might undertake any search for or boring for oil within
the territory unless the person or company was acting on behalf of the
government. In the 1930s, favourable nationalistic favour flowing probably from
the experience of the First World War had thawed the opposition and the
government was able to pass the Petroleum Production Act, 1934. The latter Act
vested ownership of Petroleum in the British crown this was extended to Northern Ireland
in 1964 by the Petroleum Act of that year.
As
already stated, this theory rests on the premise that the state would home the
natural resources for the common good of all citizens. The government ploughs
back the proceeds of the exploitation of the natural resources into the
provision of social amenities, equitable development of the different segments
of the country and execution of the common enterprise of state.
This
is a very trite principle not normally found worth repeating in statutory form
in most countries or in fact any country. It is clearly stated or in fact any
country. It is clearly stated in the Directives of the European parliament and
of the council52 to the effect that the
exclusive right to prospects, explore and exploit hydrocarbons belongs
unprincipled to the state and is to be exercised with the aim of serving public
interest.
Under
the second theory of natural resources ownership the individual landowner owns
the resources found under, in or upon his land. The popular theory of law, quicquid
platatur solo, solo cedit (which runs across, practically all
Jurisdictions, of all constitutional models, except totalitarian communist or
social states) that he who owns their land owns what is on it is allowed to run
its full course. This is operated in are states of Tocas, Tennessee,
Mississippi
and Ohio of
the USA.
Of course, as is the case with all other property rights, the individual owner
is bound by the rules that forbid unlawful use or enjoyment of property. There
is also the qualification on the right put on by the rule of capture. As
amplified in the old English case of Action V. Bundeu53 the rule is o the effect that the
owner of a land through which water flows in a subterraneous course (A) has no
right or interest in it such as to enable him maintain an action against
another landowner (B) who, in carrying on mining operations in his own landing
the usual manner, draws way the water from A’s land and lays A’s well dry. In
the context of petroleum it implies that petroleum cannot be owned in because
of its migratory nature i.e since a land owner may, in drilling and exploiting
a well on his land, draw out not only the petroleum under that land but also
those under adjoining kinds. This is so because no one can determine a
definite, permanent and inviolable boundary for those substances underground.
It
was applied in the USA
case of Bernard v. Monongahela, where
a prayer for an injunction to prohibit drilling by the owner of an adjacent and
was refused. The court reasoned that considering the nature of hydrocarbons,
the court would not be able to determine the extent or nature of draining from
the plaintiff land. This ownership theory also obtains in Canada and
Australia Nigerian courts are likely to follow this trend if the matter arises
before them.
The
third ownership theory reserves some of the ownership rights for the state
while allowing the individual some rights in the natural resources. The us
states of Pennsylvania
and California
have one form of quantified ownership arrangement or the other.
2.7.3 History/Scope of State Ownership of Natural
Resources in Nigeria
Before
the advent of colonialism and the modern state structure, ownership of lands
and resources in, on or order that land vested in the individual, the extended
family or the community. If an individual owned a piece of land he also owned
and could exploit every useful or profitable thing in, under or on the land54.
Streams,
rivers and water course were generally considered capable of being owned by
individuals or even extended families and normally belonged to the community.
Each indigene or authorized foreign resident could exploit the resources of
such waters.
The
advent of colonialism introduced the idea of complete state ownership. Even
before mooting the idea at home in 1917 :55
the British (colonial) government hand in 1889 enshrined it in the Nigerian
petroleum ordinance of that year and in the Mining Regulation, Ordinance of
1907. Later, the oil minerals ordinance 1914 was enacted56 if vested ownership of minerals oils in
the British crown in the ordinance is now referred to as the Oil Minerals Act,
1914. The two earlier statues of 1889, and 1907, are very often not referred to
by commentators or Nigerian petroleum law because of the difficulty in sighting
those legislations now it is believed that the 1889 Ordinance is what 1918 the
Petroleum Act was enacted and in 1946 as the Minerals Act57 was enacted. Presently constituted it
provides at S. 3 thus.
(1) the entire property
in and control of all minerals, in, under or upon any lands in Nigeria, and of
all rivers, streams and water courses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be
vested in the state, save in so fares such rights may in any case have been
limited by any express grant made before the commencement of this Act
(2)
Except as in this art provided no parson shall prospect or mine on any lands in
Nigeria
or divert or impound water for the purpose of mining operations.58
In 1950, the oil mineral (Amendment)
Act introduced a Section 10 into the 1914, by virtue of which state ownership
was extended to oil under submarine areas of the country’s territorial waters.
In 1959 this was further extended to such submarine
areas of other waters that the federal legislature might decide to legislate
upon in the future with respect to mines and minerals.
In
1969 the Petroleum Act59 replaced the 1914 ordinance. At 8.1 the new
Act now provides that the “entire ownership and control of all petroleum in,
under or upon any lands to which this section applies shall be vested in the
state” subsection(2) makes the provision applicable to all lands (including
land covered by water) that is in Nigeria or forms part of the continental
shelf. Section is defines petroleum to includes mineral oil (crude oil) and
gas. This legislation was made during the civil war of 1967-1970. It removed
petroleum recourses from the principle of derivation60 thereby take away from petroleum
yielding parts of the country the right to some percentage of the income from
petroleum.
The matter
was taken further by S. 40(3) of the 1979 Constitution (S. 42(3) 1089
Constitution and 47(3) of the 1995 Draft Constitution) which is now S. 43(3) of
the 1999 Constitution and provides;
Notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of all minerals,
minerals oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in,
under or upon the territorial zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of
the federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the
Nigeria Assembly.61
Both the petroleum Act and the constitution have
been silent on the surface rights, which were preserved for the landowners by
the 1946 Act. This should ordinarily have serious legal implications.
However,
when the provisions are read together with the Land Use Act62 which requires the payment of
compensation for crops on land even differently from compensation for the land
itself it seems quite obvious to that extent that surface rights still vest in
the landowner. A landowner in this context is now the holder of an actual or
deemed right of occupancy, whether evidenced by a certificate of occupancy or a
right of occupancy certificate.
The
country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, under S. 1(1),63 that area of the sea extending from
the external limits of the territorial waters water of Nigeria to 200
Nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
waters is measured.
When
the figure 200 nautical miles is converted on the USA conversion rate of I USA
nautical mile = 1.853 kilometers, a figure of 370.65km is arrived at, which is
the figure prescribed by the United Nations conference on the Law of sea
aforesaid.
A
necessary corollary of this state ownership and control of these resources is
that nobody can carefully engage in the exploitation of nay of them unless he
is granted or given a licence or concession by the Federal Government64. The Federal Government, which stands
between investors and the owners of the land on which the resources occur,
grants those investors-foreign and local-the rights of operation.
The meaning of all this is that whatever may turn in
the Nigerian law, ownership and control of natural resources up to the offshore
deposits vests in the state.
2.7.4
Problems of Ownership/Control of Natural Resources in Nigeria
In
Nigerian, the Federal Government allocates rights in natural resources such as
mineral oil through concessions. Under the petroleum Act of 1969 65 concessions are granted to Nigerians
who wish to explore, prospect for and mine oil in Nigeria. The Act defines the rights
to licences, and describes the rights to mining as a lease. The licenses
created contractual relations between the federal government or the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), its agency, on the one hand and the
concessionaire on the other.
Concession
agreements are agreements are agreements between host countries and
international oil companies, with the host countries conceding a large area of
land to the company to explore for natural resources, and if discovered, to
produce, market and transport the oil and gas. Concession agreements are
normally for periods ranging from forty and ninety-nine years on the average66. The concessionaire is not only a
foreigner but a powerful economic giant whose assets in some instances are
bigger than those the host state.
A concession strictly speaking is in fact not a
license.67 It is not also a treaty
because the concessionaire is to a state68.
Although it is a contract, it is an unusual type of contract. It is an
agreement between a state and usually a foreign company. The parties normally
exclude disputes arising from the contract form the jurisdiction of the courts
of the territorial sovereign and may subject the law to govern the concession
to the municipal law of a third party, or to general principles of Law69. The contract is concession because
the host country being a subject of international law and exercising
sovereignty over the mineral oil resources, concedes a right to a legal
inferior, the concessionaire, to do or refrain from doing certain acts within
its territory as understood in international law and exercising sovereignty
over the mineral oil resources, concedes a right to or legal inferior, the
concessionaire, to do or refrain from doing certain acts within its territory
as understood in international Law.
The
effect of the general Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 70 notwithstanding, the concept of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources form a strictly legal point of
view is a circumlocution. In international law, states have sovereignty over
their mineral oil resources. Implied in the concept of sovereignty is precisely
the ability to dispose of the mineral oil resources through concessions, if
need be, to whomever the state so desires. This is part of the indices of
sovereignty. It connotes the opposite of
the resolution i.e. ability to dispose of its minerals oil resources permanently.
Not to be able to do so, is a negation and not an assertion sovereignty.71 It then means that a concession
contract which passes over ownership of mineral oil resources in a state for an
indefinite duration or for a given period of time, does so legally and the
parties are apparently subject to the contract. A contract between a company
such as the N.N.P.C and a government binds the company and the state (not this
or that government) since in international law, a government is an agent of
state. Besides, it has been argued, that the General Assembly Resolution cannot
be law, and being binding, the host state cannot rely on it72.
Furthermore, permanent
sovereignty is invested not on states as such but on “people” and “Nations73”. The resolution assumes that
governments are agents of the people whether elected or not. It follows what
the government has no mandate to alienate in any permanent from the mineral oil
resources of the people. The question of ownership of the resources must first
be determined because the people’s sovereignty that is exercise per-supposes
ownership of the resources.
As has already been said
international law vests ownership of mineral oil resources on the states not on
the people who are mere objects not subjects of the law. The resolution has
however invested the “people and Nations” with a peculiar type of ownership.
There is thus a new dual ownership of mineral oil resource is not vested in the
people, but on the state, which being sovereignty according to international
Law can divest itself of some or all its rights over its mineral oil resources.
The resolution assumes that governments are agents of the people whether
elected or not. It follow that the government has no mandate to alienate in any
permanent from the mineral oil resources of the people .The question of
ownership the resources must first be determined because the people’s sovereignty that is exercised
presupposes ownership of the resources.
As has already been said international law vests
ownership of mineral oil resources on the states not on the people who are mere
states not on the people who are mere objects not subjects of the law. The
resolution has however invested the “people and Nations” with a peculiar type
of ownership. There is thus a new dual ownership over mineral oil resources. The
first is the state which is derived from international law, the second is the
“peoples and Nations” which is derived from the general assembly Resolutions. Nigeria’s
practice conforms with the international law rather than the provisions of the
1962 Resolutions on permanent sovereignty. In Nigeria’s municipal Law ownership
of mineral oil resource is not vested in the people, but on the state, which
being sovereignty according to international Law can divest itself of some or
all its rights over its mineral oil resources.
The
whole concept of permanent sovereignty is suggestive of the inability of the
local sovereign to force a fundamental change in the concession because the
concessionaire is a foreigner. On the face of it, it will be very difficult to
convince anyone that shell petroleum Development company; Mobil producing; gulf
oil company; Texaco Oversea; Elf; Agip; e.t.c are Nigerian nationals simply
because they have prefixed the word “Nigeria before or after their names.
It
is of paramount importance to be clear on the real nationality of these
companies because that would determine the application or non-application of
rules of international law. As has been point out nationality is the sole basis
of diplomatic protection in International Law74.If
these companies are Nigerian nationals then they would have no Embassies; High
commission or consults to protect them from serious violations of their
property rights by the Nigerians state.
If however their Nigerians, international law
scinnds, and municipal Law would govern their operations to the exclusion of
rules of international law. As a matter of fact, no single Nigerian, whether
private or government own a single share in any or the soil mining companies
operating in Nigeria.
On
the issue of dispute resolution in respect of dispute arising between host
country and foreign companies, it is painful to note that foreign oil companies
often insist on removing their disputes form the territory of the host state
for determination by the parties it is viewed that the tribunals is a negation
of the sovereignty of the host state75.
This
is an attempt by the investor to tie the hands of the host state form tampering
with the property rights of the oil investors.
*Solutions to the
Problems: (a) The Role of The United Nations Organization (UNO)
The strangling hold by the
developed nations on the natural resources of developing countries led to
serious struggle, which were spearheaded by Africa,
Arabian and Asian countries.
Their efforts paid off on 2nd December,
1953 when the united Nations General Assembly, at its 7th session,
adopted Resolution 626 (vii), affirming the right of the peoples freely to use
and exploit their natural wealth and resources76.
Similarly, the problem
associated with concession was addressed by the national Assembly through the
introduction of the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
The major breakthrough in this regard was achieved by the passage of the
General Assembly resolution 1803(1), (2) & (3)77 in 1962. The resolution thus asserts
that peoples and nations have permanent sovereignty over their mineral
resources and that oil concession contracts must promote the economic
development of the host state, that the operations of the companies especially
as regards their profits must now be governed by municipal Law of the host
state and by international law; that expropriation is a right of states in
international law, and when exercised must be accompanied with payment of
adequate compensation; by dispute arising from adequacy or otherwise of
compensation should again be settled by the municipal law of the host state and
by international law78. This
concept of permanent sovereignty has become entrenched in international
relations by various other resolutions of the General Assembly that if can be
said to partake of a new international economic order.
In
addition, resolution 2158 (xx i) of 1966 :79 stipulates
in clear terms that the activities of foreign capital must conform to the
interest of development of the host country and host country is to participate
actively in the management of such enterprises.
The
main object of these resolutions resolution was to encourage underdeveloped
countries to use their own natural resources as a solid foundation for their
independent economic development, and to present their depletion by the action
of the other states particularly the developed ones.
Many
developing countries appreciated the provisions of the above resolutions by
demanding equity sharing participation in the enterprises using foreign
capitals in the exploitations of their natural resources. For example Nigeria
acquired initial 331/3% equity in Agip, Phillip Petroleum Company and 35%
equity in some of the major oil companies operating in Nigeria with a
view to participating in the management of such enterprises.
Her
Arabian counterparts, in response to Organization of petroleum Exporting to
countries (OPEC) directives, acquired initial 255 equity in the oil companies
in their countries which enabled them to participate in the management of the
enterprises.
(b) The Role of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC)
The
origin of the organization of petroleum exporting Countries (OPEC) dates back
to 1949. At the inspiration of Venezuela, the first consultative meeting of the
oil-producing Nations met to discuss the need for closer communication the
actual formation of the organization did not take place until September, 1960,
in Saghded, Iraq in response to the oil companies? Further reduction of the Middle East posted prices for crude oil from $0.18 to
$0.14. It is significant to note that the five oil-producing states (Venezuela, Iran, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq) that
participated at the 1949 crucial meeting were later to be foundation members of
OPEC. Its membership has since risen to 13, with Qatar, Indonesia. Libya, Abu- Dhabi, Algeria,
Ecuador,
and Gabon,
joining later. Ecuador
withdraws its membership in 1964.80
OPEC
was formed as a result of the unilateral cuts in the posted Tax reference price
of crude oil by the main companies in 1959 and 1960.81 At the time oil industry was almost
vertically integrated, the major multinational oil corporations, controlling
every stage of the process form exploration to transportation, refining and
retail, marketing.82
It
is against this background that OPEC was formed in 1960 as a permanent,
intergovernmental Organization to secure the interests of its members in the
oil industry, to co-ordinate and unity the petroleum polices of member
countries, and to safeguard their interest; to devise ways and means of
ensuring stable prices in the market; to secure a steady income for the
producing countries; and on efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum
to consuming countries, and a fair return on their capital to those investing
in the industry.83
OPEC
like Ollius International Organizations such as the United Nations, play a
major role to save developing nations like Nigeria from the petroleum created
under the old regime of concessions.
It
is significant to note that under the old regime of concessions, the
concessionaire enjoyed near-monopoly right over the oil resources and in source
instance claimed ownership of the concession area. The concessionaire this
competed with the government as regards ownership of minerals resources and he
area, which he concession was granted. Where in some instances concession was
given for example 70 years, the concessionaire relied on the sanctity of
contract in refusing renegotiation, or unilateral aeration of the contract. The
regime of municipal Law of contract afforded the concessionaire a formidable
protection whilst the government seemed bound by a contract given out by
previous regimes and which has now become after to the nation’s economic
development.
OPEC
in response to appeals from the affected states provided solutions to the
problem in its attempt to rescue the mineral producing states out of this
economic bondage Nigeria,
like all member nations of OPEC is being assisted by the organization to
participate in the ownership and management of foreign oil companies operating
in member territories. The organization as it were, transferred power from the
oil companies to itself84 apart
from that, it has minimized divided rule the oil producing countries. The new
dimensions in world oil prices and politics emboldened OPEC member countries
into stiffening their demands for active participation in the oil and allied
industries.
Also
OPEC, approach to the issue of how to achieve participation with foreign
multinational companies without an open bench of the concession contract
deserves commendation. Thus the guideline developed by OPEC had urged members
to achieve a minimum of 25% participation by 1973 and 51% by 1982. Through
participation, OPEC envisaged a greater control by members of the product the
behaviour of the foreign multinational, and with consequent transfers of
technology. OPEC’s approach is founded on the recognition that ownership
without control eroded the economic sovereignty of the host state.
OPEC’s
Major area of trial and success is in the field of quota and price. The
resolutions affect not only the internal programmes of its members but also
their municipal Laws. It is the duty of the state members to ensure however
that the resolutions of OPEC prevail in their municipal laws. Skeptics had
imagined in the 70s that the question of posted price for crude oil would break
OPEC, but events have proved them false sooth Sayers. As has been observed oil
is a major revenue earner for members, and an uncontrolled price determination
would play into the hands of consumers states. OPEC has since inception
institutionalized a system of “posted” prices which have brought more revenue
to the coffers of its member. It is also responsible for terminating the
payment of royalties as a credit against income tax liability. The higher taxes
which members now enjoy are also traceable to OPEC.85
CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 Observations
Firstly,
in this study we observed that in Nigeria oil and gas, and other Natural Resources
based on the statutory authority both national and international as already
discussed in detail above are completely owned by the state parties (i.e as
regards to members of OPEC) and Federal Government if it is a country, to the
actually objective in this field. This is because in this study we were able to
discover that there are some other countries in the world which does not have
absolute ownership over its natural resources.
Secondly,
this study as we have repeatedly stated is on the examination of the legal
framework for the regulation of oil and gas industry in Nigeria, and during the
course of study of this research topic we also observed that the oil producing
communities in Nigeria Niger Delta has not been favoured by Federal Government
in issuance of licenses and lesses to the Nigerian marginal fields. The
Nigerian Government instead of assisting communities who are the owners of these natural resources,
and has remain perpetual victims to environmental degradation cum pollution,
rather prefer indigenous company on the
reason that it was based on who has the capital to stand it.
Most
of these indigenous companies with such required capital are owned by some of
our public servant leasing it to themselves for personal enrichment, without
considering these communities God have enriched them with these gifts.
Thirdly,
we also observed during the this study that existing laws regulating the
Nigeria Petroleum Industry though not completely poor to standard, but lack
some factor like, proper closure of room for corruption in the industry, poor
implementation, environmental sustainability principles cum protection and out
dated fiscal system.
Finally,
under Petroleum Industry Bill, we see the document as a good example of
professional drafting. It leaves little or no room for manipulation, partisan
or exploitative interpretation. Its main strengths include the forthright
tackling of the long-testering community affairs, unequivocal specifications on
the local content development (regarding men and material), and clear
provisions for environmental restoration and conversation.
When
passed into law, it would constitute an easily adaptable temperate for use in
near or far future, for addressing potential issues in the exploration for, and
exploitation of other earth materials resources. Wherever located within Nigeria and her
territorial waters, that may in due course surge into prominence, as is
predictable for some solid minerals.
5.2 Recommendations
It
has been rightly observed that any research may be useful in providing new
forms of enlightenment about the subject matter, but it would not be of real
value without proposing specific ideas as solutions to the problems discussed.1
In
keeping with the need to propose solution to the identified problems, the
following recommendations indicated above, the following recommendation made.
First in view of the recommended repeal of the Petroleum Act, the law that
shall govern the oil and gas industry must recognize and affirm the community
ownership of resources, or otherwise create an institution through which Funds
can be release to these communities independently from Federal and State
Governments. Accordingly, the provisions of the deep offshore and inland basin
production sharing contracts Act2 should
be reviewed to reflect the interest of the various parties that are involved in
oil and gas production (federal, state and local Government producing companies
and the communities).
There
is no question that certain off related statutes, especially the Land Use Act3, have contributed immensely to the near
crisis situation in the Nigeria Delta region Before its promulgation 1978,
there was no evidence of any serious against the government and oil company
activities notwithstanding that the Petroleum Act vested the entire ownership
of oil in the Federal Government.
The
pre-existing land tenure (customary land law) enabled the local people to participate
to a certain degree in petroleum operations. The Land Use Act ended this
important position. More than this, the Act has brought about a denial of
compensation to persons as a result of oil operations. So the Act operates unfairly
on the local people, compelling protests especially from person who have lost
their means of livelihood as a result of oil operations. Accordingly, in order
to end the protests, it is highly advisable to repeal that the Act which the
people consider obnoxious and oppressive, and this is hereby recommended, it is
further recommended that in the interim, until the said laws are repealed the
oil and gas royalties should be paid to the such-producing communities. Gas
flaring should be completely prohibited. The various operating companies should
be made to adopt and implement technology I force in the other jurisdictions
where they operate without flaming gas. The Gas Re- injection Act and
subsidiary regulations made there under should be repealed accordingly.
Henceforth, submission of a viable scheme for gas utilization must be a
condition precedent to the grant or
renewal of licenses or leases to any oil and gas- producing company seeking to
continue or commence operation in the region.
In the interim, the gas flare penalties should hence forth be paid to the
respective communities where the “criminal but state condoned” act is
perpetrated. This is the only equitable treatment one could reasonably expect
to have while gas flaring persists.
It
is an undiluted truth that most of the points recommended above have taken care
in the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill, where in the proposed petroleum
industry bill, where the bill has a clear list of some of enactment to be consolidated
into one single legislation. But still, following the poor move shown or
expressed by the National Assembly over this bill, we cannot wait and fold our
hand and allowed these injustices and environmental degradation to continue.
We
call for an interim legislation by the Federal Government through the national
assembly to address these issues pending when the controversial Petroleum Industry
Bill will become a Law in Nigeria.
Still
on Petroleum Industry Bill, we recommend to the Federal Executive Council and
the National Assembly through a proper research and study cum examination of
this bill(Petroleum Industry Bill) the following; (a)That the Nigerian
Geological survey Agency, a parastatal of the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development
is the organ of the Federal Government of Nigeria charged with the acquisition,
collation packaging, achieving, administration, dispensing of global data for multifarious developmental
and academic/research purposes. The new law should provide that the agency be
availed of all subsurface data acquired by petroleum companies operating in all
the acreages covering the inland basis.
(b) The
Nigerian Mining and Geosciences Society (NMGS), and Nigerian Association of Petroleum
Explorationists (NAPE) are two professional associations whose memberships consist
of geologists, geophysicists, geochemists, petroleum and mining engineers,
practicing in the Upstream Petroleum Industry.
It is strongly recommended that these two geosciences associations be represented
on the Board of the Upstream petroleum Regulatory Agency.
Indeed, by the Council of Nigerian Mining Engineers
in Nigeria
except he is registered by the council. Registered mining engineers and
geoscientists are all embers of the NMGS.
(c) Under part
III, section 204 of the Bill: Abandonment, decommissioning and Disporal, a part of the provisions
should stipulate that extra care must be taken to ensure that after a well has
been decommissioned, there is no chance, due to depressurization, that the oil rises in the well to pollute the
ground water. Should such pollution occur any time after the decommissioning,
the responsible operating company shall be called to repair the damage. In the
event that the said company has left Nigeria, the Upstream Petroleum Inspectorate
shall have the responsibility of making good the damage.
(d) The new act should make specific provision on a terminal date
for gas flaring and venting. We recommend/suggest not more than one year from
the effective date of the Act. Penalty for violations should be the current market
price of gas flared places 25%. Where a company is fined
for a third time, the chief executive of the company should in addition to the
penalty be sentenced to six months imprisonment without the option of fine.
5.3 Conclusion
At
the outset, the study attempted to find out as between the Federal Government
and the littoral oil producing states, who owns not only the land but also oil
and gas located onshore and in the beds of the territorial sea and the
continental shelf of Nigeria.
It
sought to carry out this task by analyzing the various customary, legislative
and constitutional provisions relevant to the subject. There is little doubt
that as the law stands today, ownership over hand as well as oil and gas
located both onshore and offshore is vested in the Federal Government of
Nigeria.
Oil
production in Nigeria
started about fifty years ago many years after the search for it began. Since
this time there has been consistent growth in the operation and the laws.
Because all the companies operating in Nigeria at the initial stage were
foreign, the establishment of the National Oil Company was meant to improve Nigeria’s
interest in oil exploration in the country. Also the utilization of natural gas
changed the lands /scope of the industry in Nigeria with major steps being
taken to through the liquefied natural gas project.
A
number of statutes have bee made to regulate the petroleum exploration in Nigeria form
the colonial period. It is seen however, that the laws at the time were discriminatory
against the indigenous peoples of Nigeria in whose places these oil
were found. These provisions similarly made discovery of oil exclusive reserve
of the British companies and therefore delayed discovery of oil in commercial
quantity in the country as only the companies of British origin were licensed
to conduct exploration activities in the country. Since the enactment of the Petroleum
Act there have been fundamental changes by the vesting of the ownership of
petroleum found in Nigerian in the state.
There are some deficiencies in some issues that
affect the industry which has called for a reform in statutory regulations.
The
result is the introduction of the Petroleum Industry Bill still under
consideration in the National Assembly.
The
fact that petroleum is capable of being owned is a truism. It is only the form in which it can be owed that has
generated a variety of opinions form experts each of the theories is subject to
peculiar circumstances of the country and the governments who are responsible
for the management of the national resources of that particular country. From a
general view oil is capable of absolute ownership while on the other hand it
may be said that it is not capable of absolute ownership because of its
unstable character.
The
vesting of ownership of petroleum and natural gas in the state as demonstrate
under certain Nigerian statutes have a far reaching effect on the rights of the
citizens. It is an exercise of domanial right over the resources in the state.
The government assumes full and total control to the
exclusion of any other person. While this may be a desirous position when
viewed from the point that mineral resources explored would be jointly used for
the over all benefit of the entire country, it is to be noticed that the
communities and clans that have direct linkage to the land in which these
resources are four are more often neglected in the sharing of the income from
these resources.
Traditional
concession being the earliest type of concession was able to assist the
international companies to ride brought shod on the oil producing countries who
are usually wildling and ready to hand over large areas of land to the
companies for exploration often for a long period of time. Under this system
also the terms of contract were mere favouable to the oil companies and their
parent countries.
However
with the changing times and awareness by the oil producing countries,
concession began to include more favourable terms under the modern concession,
which often come in different modes.
Petroleum
Production Contracts are discussed in this work highlighting their various
features. These arrangements are meant to apply to production of oil in the
countries, most of which are not advanced in technology to engage in direct production
of oil by themselves. This is also due to the fact that oil production requires
huge sums of money that mostly only the international oil companies supported
by their home countries are able to finance.
Apart
from the production contacts the participation agreements depict the quest of
the country to have some level of control on the oil production. In Nigeria like
many other oil producing countries, NNPC is the vehicle by which the country
engages in oil production with the international oil companies. The objectives of
the parties are of paramount consideration in determining which type of
participation agreement to enter into. Each of the licences and lesses have
certain elements common in them. The holder of an oil prospecting licence after
making the necessary prospecting activities monthly on the surface of the
ground, proceeds to apply for the oil exploration licence and then the oil
mining lease. Each of these licences or lease is granted subject to the
fulfillment of the requirements laid down by law.
The
study advocates the establishment of ‘Fund’ with a set of rules and principles
such as the prudent investor rule, insulation form political pressures and accountability
to the public. The fund which should be independent of the governor, and the
legislature, should be politically neutral. The people must be given an
opportunity to participate in policy development and management of the fund.
We
advocate direct and equal distribution of dividend paid form the fund to all
citizens of the Niger Delta region. This will not only raise the incomes of
many rural families, but would give each citizen a stake in oil revenue and
thus give them an incentive to oppose empty treasury syndrome.
The present state of the
Niger Delta environment is evident of the inability of both the government and
the industry to effectively handle environmental problems. This calls for an
enhanced and formalized role for NGOS and civil society in environmental
governance through a strategic partnership involving through a strategic
partnership involving the government, the industry and the civil society.
Furthermore,
the various environmental, oil and gas laws and regulations have been
identified as the root cause of the current environmental problems in the
region. This study actually x-ray aims and objectives introduced by the
Petroleum Industry Bill, which focused much on settling the lingering crisis is
Nigerian Petroleum Industry. The introduction of the PIB is a step in the right
direction that the Bill will come out of the National Assembly legislative
process the way or as it was set in by the president of Nigeria.
Stakeholder input and world-wide best practices are expected to guide the
National Assembly in passing a petroleum industry legislation that meets the demands
of this century and also satisfies the strategic interest of the nation. Our expectation
is that they National Assembly will treat the Bill as urgent and very important
and ensure that it is passed and take effect before the end of 2013.
1 Ikein,
T.A., The Impacts of Oil on a Developing
Country; the Case of Nigeria, 1st ed, New York
university
press, 19990) at p.179.
2 Deep
Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act cap D3 IFN 2010.
3 Land Use Act Cap L.5 LFN 2010.
[1] However,
over 100 primary and subsidiary Laws and legislations passed by the successive
governments in Nigeria have now been consolidated into 16 standard Laws in the
Petroleum Industry Bill (“PIB”) now awaiting ratification, before the National
Assembly.
[2] Elsevier E.I., The Petroleum Handbook, 6th ed., (Netherland; Shell
International Petroleum Ltd, 1993) PP. 5-8.
3 Mineral Oil
Act Cap P.120 1914.
4 Duru,
Onyekachi Wisdom, History of Oil and Gas, [www document] URL http://www.ssrn.org visited 03-06-2012.
5 Ademuyi D.H.,
“Ownership and control of Natural Resources”, Vol. 2 , (2004), Nigerian Bar Journal, PP. 419 – 422, p.
423
6 Ajomo M.A., “Ownership of Oil and the Land
Use Act” Vol.2 (1982) Nigerian Current
Law Review, PP. 330-339.
7 Ibid. P. 340.
8 Worika I.L., “Environmental Law and Policy of
Petroleum Development”, Vol.3, (2003),
Anpez Centre for Environment and Development, P. 23.
9 Etiserentse, G., Nigerian Petroleum Law, 2nd (Benin; Dedrew Publishers, 2004),
P.35.
10 Ike, O.,
The Lingering Crisis in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta and Suggestion for a Peaceful
Resolution, http://www.cddorg.uk/resources/workingchapter/nigerdeltaCng.htm visited 08-10-2011.
11 Petroleum Industry Bill, 20012 http://www.nnrs.org
visited 23-03-2013.
12 Atsegbua
L., Oil and Gas in Nigeria,
Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., (Benin; New Era Publishers,2004)
P.45.
13 UNEP and
E&P Forum, “Guidelines on Environmental Management in Oil Exploration and Production”
Vol.5(1997), E&P Forum, P.5
14 Petroleum Industry Bill,2012.
15 Ibid, Part II.
16 Efikerentse
G.K., Nigeria Petroleum Law, 1st ed., (Lagos;
Macmillan, 1985), P.43.
17 Frynas,
G.M., Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation
between Oil Companies and Villages Communities,
2nd
ed., (London;
Transaction Publishers, 2000), P. 9.
18 Ahmand K.
S., Nigeria: The Political Economic of Oil, 1st ed., (London; Oxford
University Press, 1994),
P.76.
19 Akpan, G.
S. “Nigeria’s
LNG Problems and Prospects” vol.70, (1997) .
G. T. L. R. P. 264
20 Omoregbe,
Y. “The Question of the Ownership of Natural gas in Nigeria” Vol.3, (1988/89) , O. G. L. R.
P.75
21 Omotola,
J. A, “Environmental Laws in Nigeria
including Compensation” Vol.2,(1990) (Lagos:
Faculty
of Law, University of Lagos), p.23.
22 Abiama
G., The Challenges of Democracy and
Natural Resources Management for Sustainable
Development, http://www.earthrights.net
visited 03-07-2010.
23 Aluko, M.
E. On the Resource Control Battle: From Dichotomy to Quartonomy, from Isopatial
to Isobaths in Nigeria, http://www.ngex.com/personalities/voices/mweozi903baluko.html,
visited 26-08-2010.
24 N’ang’a,
S. M., S. N. Nichols and D. Monahan, The Role of Bathymetry data in marine
Cadastre: Lesson
from the
Proposed Muequash marine Protected areas , htt://www.thsoa.org/hy03/9a 1.pdf
visited 27.06.07
25 N’ang’a,
S. M., S. N. Nichols and D. Monahan The Role of Bathymetry data in marine
Cadastre: Lesson
from the
proposed Muequash marine protected areas, htt://www.thsoa.org/hy03/9a 1.pdf
visited 27.06.07
26 Attorney General
of the Federation v. Attorney General of
Abia State &35 ors (2002) vol4.,FWLR,
(Prt.102) P.1
1 Petroleum Act Cap P.10 LFN 2010.
2 Section
44 (3) of 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
3 Sections 1,2&3 of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Cap.116 LFN 2010.
4 Chukuermerie
A.I., New Dimension in Commercial and Oil & Gas Law,1st e.d., (Port Harcourt, Law House
Books,
2007) PP. 684 -704.
5 Ademuyi
D.H., ‘’Ownership and Control of Natural Resources’’, vol.2 N0.4(2004) Nigerian Bar Journal.
Vol. 2 No. 4
(2004), pp. 419 – 422, p. 423.
6 Nwankwo G.O., OPEC and Nigeria:
To be or not to be, 1st ed., (:Lagos; African University Press,1983),
P.5.
7 Duru,
Onyekachi Wisdom, History of Oil and Gas [www document] URL http://www.ssrn.org
visited 10-
05-2013.
8 Mgbolu
K.A., Petroleum Act, with some basic
concept in oil and gas law in Nigeria,
1st e.d., (Abakaliki;
Wiilyrose
& Applied Publishing Co., 2011), PP.51&52.
9 Petroleum Act Cap P.10 LFN 2010.
10 Obi C.I., “ The Impact of Oil on Nigeria Revenue
Allocation System ; Problems and Prospects for
National
Reconstruction ,in Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria”, Vol.
1 (1998), Spectrum
Journals, P.22.
11 See Gidado M. M. “A look at the Legal and Management
Structures of the Newly, Commercialized
NNPC”, Vol.
3.(1994) UMLJ, P.3.
12 Aja C.O., Should
Nigeria
Quit OPEC? 1st ed.,(Abakaliki, Itua Press, 2003), PP.1-9.
13 OPEC,
Resolution XVI, 90 of June25, 1986 OPEC Resolution Vol. 2. P. 12
14 Kemper K., “The Concept of Permanent
Sovereignty and its Impacts on Mining Contracts”, Vol.
2(1982), Mining Journal Books, P.31.
15 See
Section 34(a) of the Petroleum Act Cap 350 LFN 1969, Now Cap P. 10 LFN 2010.
16 See Gidado M. M. Petroleum
Development Contracts with Multinational Oil Cooperation.
17 Gidado
M.M.,”The Legal Framework for Energy Resources Development in Nigeria”, University of
Maiduguri
Law Journal, Vol.7(2004), pp.159-164.
18 Zakariya I.
S. “State Petroleum Companies”, Vol.12(1998)
JWTL at P. 28.
19
Focus on the Nigeria
oil Industries. Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis-UNIVERSITY Warwick, England,
1992
Ch. 4.
20 See
Ogunlami, G. K. N., An Analysis of Nigerian Petroleum Profits Taxation,
htt://www.ssrn.org, visited
27.06.07.
21
See The Report of the Tribunal of Enquiry into Crude Oil Sales,1978, Federal
Government Press Lagos
p. 6
22 Subroto.
Business Times, Tueday September
23, 1990, p.14.
23 Omorogbe, U., “Legal Frame Work for Petroleum
Production in Nigeria,
Vol.5(1987), JENRI, p. 283
24 Etikerentse, K.G., Nigeria Petroleum Law,1st ed.,
(PortHarcourt,Macmillian,1985), p.4.
25 See
NNPC/AFIP Risk Service Contract Clause 8 (9)
26 Kupolokun
F., (2006), “Challenges and Future Prospects of
Oil and Gas Industry”, The Guardian,
Lagos, Wednesday, may 31,
2006.
26a Mogbolu
A.K., Petroleum Act, with some other basic concepts in oil and gas law
in Nigeria
1st
(Abakaliki;
Willyrose& Appled Publising Co., 2011), P. 51.
27 Mgbolu
K.A., op. cit, P.52
28 Olisa M., Nigerian Petroleum Law and
Practice, 1st ed., (Lagos: Jonia Ventures Ltd., 1978), P.67.
29 Olisa M.,
op. cit, P.68.
30 Oilsa
M., op. cit, P.71.
31 Akintola R., Oil In Nigeria –A Study In Political
Economy of Development, 2nd
ed., (Lagos:
Macmillan
Publishers
Ltd., 1978) P. 34.
32 Akintola
R., op. cit p36.
33 Duru, Onyekachi Wisdom., History of Oil and Gas [www document] URL http://www.ssrn.org visited
on 09-11-2013.
34 Now part
of Chevron Corporation
35 Membership also includes Qatar 1961, Indonesia& Libya 1962,
Abul Dhabi 1967, Algeria1969,Nigeria
1971 and Ecuador 1973.
36 Diamond
L., Building a System of Comprehensive Accountability to Control Corruption.
http:www.stanford.edu/idiamond/papers.html visited 20-03-2011.
37 Section
6(1) of the Mineral Oil Ordinance N0. 17 of 1914.
38 Ajomo M.A., “Law and Changing Policy in Nigeria’s Oil
Industry”, Vol.2(1987), University of Lagos
Law Journal,p.54.
39 This was
made possible by the repeal in 1925 of the said Restrictive and Prohibitive
Section 6(1) (9) of
the Mineral
Oil Ordinance.
40 Section. 1(1) Minerals and Mining Act
1999 cap M12, Laws of the federation of Nigeria, 2004 (formerly
Minerals and Mining Decree No. 34 of 1999)
Now Cap 162 LFN 2010., stated that all minerals are held
by the federal Government “for and on behalf
of the people of Nigeria”.
41 Sometimes a Head of State is Sectoral
times richer than the entire country through such embezzlement.
This was the relationship of poor democratic
republic of Congo and President Sese Sekou. While
Nigerian weaned in absorcate poverty and a
debilitating debt burden the late Head of State Gen. Sanni
Abacha was bleeding the courtly through
corruption and stashing away millions in foreign currents, in
foreign bank accounts. Since his death his
family is said to have returned well over & 10 bn dollars to
state coffers following a shallow probe
which may not even have covered up to one tenth of the man’s
financial atrocities
42
For 52 years that Nigeria
has been independent, she has suffered unmitigated military dictatorship for
about 30 of those years. Even the present
civilian government manifested serious military and dictatorial
tendencies in the first four years. The
country in several respects still has a military hangover.
43 The only other things that has, after
the civilian war, had a negative impact on the peace and unity of the country
as much as or almost as the Annulment of the 1993 Presidential Elections was
the recently defeated constitutional amendment calculated to secure a third
form for President Obasanjo. It is instructive that both events just like many
other thing that have plagued Nigeria,
nay Africa, were traceable to the I. selfish and indeed evil sit-tight ambition of some
people in power.
44 For instance in 1988 oil exports
earned US & 6,319m while non-oil earned only US & 612.7m. See table 1
in E.U. Olisadebe, the Management of Nigeria’s Balance of payments under the Structural
Adjustment programme: Problems and Prospects in CBN’s Financial Rev. Vol. 31 no
4. Dec. 1993 P. 351. 364.
45 Omorogbe Y., ”The Legal Framework for
Oil Production in Nigeria”,
Vol.2(1986), Journal of Economic
and Resources Law, P.10.
46 If with the enormous sums Nigeria earns
form oil revenue (including a completely unanticipated & 12bm
Windfull during the gulf
crisis of 1991), and another substantial windfall ins 2001) the country is as
poor as she is (the 16th Poorest country in the world), Mainly due
to economic mismanagement, it is fearful to imagine what would have been her
experience if she did not have oil and gas resources. It is reasonable to
wonder if by now there would indeed still have remand any corporate entity
called Nigeria.
It may well be however that if the oil boom and inn accountable military
regimes did not occur. The country would not have experienced the level of
ignorant leadership or rulership, corruption, impunity and management with
which she has been afflicted since the 1970s.
47 See Tell
Newsmagazine of June 4, 1998.
48 Ajomo M.A. “Ownership of Oil and the Land Use Act” Vol.2(1982), Nigeria Current Law Review, P.331.
49 This is also notwithstanding the fact
that under the same article, ‘private property shall not be expropriated except
for reasons of public use and subject of payment of indemnity”. Subsection (1)
of the article equally provides that only Mexicans have “the right to acquire
ownership of lands” etc.
50 Article
11 of Soviet Union Constitution.
51 Mines and Mineral Act No.32 of 1996.
52
Hydrocarbon Licensing Directive 94/22/Ec(1994) QTL 1640/3.
53 Bernard v. Monongahela(1918) 12m & W 324:
152 ER 1223.
54 Eshingbayi Eleko V. Government of Southern Nigeria (1931 ) AC. 662.
55
I.e preparatory to the enactment of the Petroleum Act, 1918.
56 This was
reenacted as the Petroleum Act of 1918 or provided the material for the later.
57
Mineral Act Cap. 226 law of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, repeated by the
Minerals and Mining Act Cap 162 LFN 2010.
58
The Act, including the Section, had been amended or extended severally between
1946 and 1990, by such Legislations as Act No. 2of 1948, of 1954, 13and of 1956, 1 and 76 of 1955, 120 of 1957, and 4
and 52 of 1958.
59 Petroleum Act Cap. P.10, Laws of the
Federations of Nigeria,
2004. Formerly the Petroleum Decree No 51 of 1969. Now Cap P.10 LFN 2010.
60 I.e the federal revenue sharing
formula by which the people from whose place a particular revenue devices is
given a proportion of the revenue while the other governments of the Federation
share the rest with the federating units. This is what the Niger Delta people
are asking for with respect to oil and gas resources.
61 Under the military regimes a country
of military people constituted themselves into the executive and legislature thereby
assuming the role of the National Assembly under the section. The over bearing
right of the federal government to all natural resources in line with the
constitutional provision was recently affirmed in the celebrated case of Attorney General of the Federation v.
Attorney General of Abia State & 35 Ors [2 002] FWLR (pt.102) 1.
62 Land Use Act Cap. L5, Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria,
2010.
63 Exclusive Economic Zone, Cap. E17 LFN
2010.
64 See S. 2
Petroleum Act Cap P.10 LFN 2010 and S.
16 and 164 Nigerian Mining Corporation Act cap 317 Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria,2010.
65 Supplement
of Official Gazette N0. 62 Vol. 56,1969.
66 For
Instance Nigerian Shell Company was
granted concessionary rights in respect of the entire mainland of Nigeria in 1938.
67 For
Instance Nigerian shell Company was granted concessionary rights in respect of
the entire mainland of Nigeria
in 1938.
68 Cattan H.
The Law of oil concessions in the Middle East
and North Africa (1976) P. ix.
69 Chukwuemrie A.I., New Dimension in Commercial and Oil & Gas in Nigeria, 1st
ed.,(Port Harcourt:
Law House,2004), p.653.
70 General Assembly Resolution 1803(xvii)21st
Session Supp. No.17 (1962).
71 Uchegbu A.U., The Doctrine of
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Processing’s of the
National workshop on petroleum Law,
Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, University
of
Lagos (1981) p.18.
72 Sloan, “The Binding Force of a
Recommendation of the General Assembly of the united Nations”. Vol. 25 British
Year Book of International law. (Byil) (1948) P. 1; see also Fitzmaurice, the
Law and procedure of the ICJ 1951-1954, 34 BYIL (1958) C/F Bowett, the law of
international institution, Steven (1975) p. 28; Murghraby m. permanent sovereignty
of the Middle East oil concussed (1966) p. 161.
73
Subsequent Resolutions referred to States, see for example the Resolution 3171,
1973 p. 328.
74 Akinsanya A., the Expropriation of
multinational property in the third world, Praeger (1980) P. 101, it is
observed that Nigerian citizens do not own any equity, shares in any
foreign-oconed oil producing companies in Nigeria today inspired of the Nigerian
enterprises promotion Act,
75 Theodoropoulos C. “The Role of
Arbitration in settlement of oil an divestment
Disputes”, vol. 1(1984) Proceedings
of the National Workshop on Petroleum Law, Department of Jurisprudence and
International law, University of Lagos, P. 18.
76 Starke
J.G., Introduction to International Law ,8th
Ed.,(London; Butterworths,1984), P. 121.
77 General
Assembly Resolution 1803 (xvii) iii, 17th Session Supp. No. 17
(1962)
78 General
Assembly Resolution 2259 (xi) at the 23th Session, December, 1966.
79 General
Assembly Resolution 2159 (xxi) at the 25th Session, December 1966.
80 Akinbobola, A., Should Nigeria
be in OPEC? 1st ed.(Lagos;,Nigeria Institute of Internaitnal Affairs, 1979), P.I.
81 Suboro. Business Times,. Monday September 17,1990,
P. 11.
82 Suboro. Business Times,. Monday September 17,1990,
P.12 .
83 Ibid p.
13S
84 Okeke C.N., The Theory and Practice of International Law in Nigeria(Enugu, Fourth Dimension
Publishers,1968), P. 54.
85 Aja C.O., Should
Nigeria
Quit OPEC? 1st ed.,(Abakaliki; Itua Press, 2003), P.9.
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