Economic Feasibility of Vegetable Production, Marketing, and Processing in the Red River Valley of North Dakota
Department of Agricultural Economics
Agricultural Experiment Station
Agricultural Products Utilization Commission
Department of Agricultural Economics
Agricultural Experiment Station
Agricultural Products Utilization Commission
Table of Contents
Page
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................... . . iii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . .............. ....... .. . . ... ....... . . . . vi
Highlights . . . . .................................................. ix
Project Objectives .............................................. 1
M ethodology . . ................................................. 1
Horticultural Crop Survey Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Survey Results; Evaluation of Crops .................................. 3
Selection of Crops for Large Scale Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Storage of Less Perishable Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Storage Class A ...................................... 8
Storage Class B ...................................... 8
Storage Class C ................ ....................... 8
Storage Class D ...................................... 8
Choosing Among Less Perishables . ............................. 10
Analysis of Specific Root Crops ................................ 10
Red Beets . ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10
C arrots . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . 11
Carrots for Packaging . . . .............................. 11
Carrots for Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Garlic . . . . . ........................................... 13
Onions ... ............................................ 13
Parsnips . ... .......................................... 14
Radishes .................................. ..... .. . 14
Rutabagas . . . . ......................................... 15
Turnips . . .......................................... . . . . 15
The Most Feasible Root Crops for Large Scale Production . .. . . . . . . . . .. 15
Onion Production Potential for North Dakota ........................... 16
Seasonal Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Foreign Trade ............................................ 19
Seasonal Shipping ........................................ . 21
Seasonal Pricing and Returns to Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Market Competitiveness ..................................... 27
Carrot Production Potential for North Dakota .. ........................... 29
State Production .......................................... 30
Fresh Versus Processed Carrots ................................ 32
Foreign Trade ............................................ 34
Seasonal Shipments ........................................ 35
Seasonal Pricing and Returns to Storage .......................... 35
Market Competitiveness ..................................... 39
Case Study for the Red River Valley of North Dakota, 1987-1988 ... . . . . . . . ... .. 41
Carrots . . ........................... .................... 43
Carrot Crop of 1987 ...................................... 43
Carrot Crop of 1988 .................................... 45
Carrot Grade and Packout Percentages, 1988
Onions ........................
Transplant Onions ............
Direct Seeded Winter Storage Onions
Greentop Table Onions .........
Potato Crop for 1988 ...............
Broccoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary of Red River Valley Case Study .
Expanded Model..................... .
Carrot Enterprise ..................
Fixed Costs ............ . . . . .
Variable Costs .... . . . . . . . . . . .
Total Costs and Net Returns .....
Onion Enterprise ..................
Fixed Costs . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Variable Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary and Conclusions
Areas Needing Further Study
References
List of Tables
Table Page
1 North Dakota Horticultural Crop Evaluation
Summary, North Dakota, 1988 ................................. 4
2 Recommended Temperature, Relative Humidity, Approximate Storage Life, Highest Freezing Temperature, and Frost Susceptibility of Lesser Perishable Vegetable Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 U.S. Per Capita Consumption, Onions, 1970-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17
4 Seasonal Market Share, Onions ................................. 18
5 Onion Production and Market Share, Season and State, 1978-1987 ............................................... 19
6 U.S. Onions: Exports and Imports, 1970-1987 ....................... 20
7 Onion Imports by Country of Origin, 1986 and 1987 .................. 21
8 Onion Shipments by State, Origins, and Months, 1987 ............. . .. . 22
9 Wholesale-Chicago Prices for 50 lb. Sack of U.S.
No. 1 Idaho-Oregon and Yellow Spanish Jumbo
Onions, 1977-1987 .......................................... 24
10 Dry Onion Prices for 50 lb. Sack of Michigan Yellow Medium Onions, Wholesale-Chicago, 1977-1987 ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24
11 Return to Storage, Price Change 3 and 5 Months, Idaho-Oregon Yellow Spanish Onions, 1978-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12 Return to Storage for Michigan Yellow Medium Onions (3 and 5 Month Price Change), 1977-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13 Regional Market Shares For Production of Onions and Population, 1988 ........................................... 28
14 Estimated Transportation Costs for Onions From Selected Origins to Selected Markets, 1989 ......................... 29
15 Red River Valley's Estimated Transportation Cost Advantage (Disadvantage) in Supplying Selected
M arkets, 1989 ............................................. 29
16 U.S. Carrot Production, Harvested Acreage and Yields 1978-87 ......................................... 31
17 U.S. Carrot Production by State and Market Share by State, 5 Year Averages, 1978-1987 ............................. 31
18 Market Share of Fresh Carrots as Percent of Consumption and Production and Per Capita Consumption of Fresh and Processed Carrots, in U.S., 1970-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 32
19 Market Share of States Consumption as a Percent of States Production for Fresh Carrots, 5 Year Averages, 1978-82 and 1983-87 ...... . ...... .. .. 33
20 Market Share of Processed Carrots as a Percent of State's Production, 5 Year Averages, 1978-82 and 1983-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 34
21 U.S. Carrot Exports and Imports, 1970-1987 ......................... 34
22 Carrot Imports by Country of Origin, 1987 ......................... 35
23 Carrot Shipments by State-of-Origin .... ......................... 36
24 Monthly Wholesale-Chicago Carrot Prices for 48 lb. Film Bags, California Origin, 1977-1988 ............................ 38
25 Seasonal Chicago Carrot Price Changes, 1977-1988 ...... . ...... . .. . ... . 38
26 State Population and Carrot Production for Select States ...................................... ........ 39
27 Estimated Transportation Costs for Carrots from Selected
Origins to Selected Markets, 1989 ............................... 40
28 Estimated Red River Valley's Transportation Cost Advantage (Disadvantage) in Supply Selected Markets, 1989 .............................................. 40
29 Utilization of Equipment by Enterprise for a Central Red Red River Valley Vegetable Operation, 1988 ........................ 42
30 Vegetable Sales, Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, and Net Returns for Central Red River Valley Case Study,
1988 .. .................................................... 48
31 Carrot Operation Costs for the Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 .......................................... 49
32 Carrot Packout and Price Received for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 ................................. 52
33 Transplant Onion Operation Costs for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 ................... ................... 53
34 Onion Transplants, Production, and Price Received for Central Red River Valley, Case Study, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 56
35 Direct Seeded Onion Operation Costs for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 ................................. 57
36 Price Received for Sales of Direct Seeded Winter Storage Onions for Central Red River Valley Case
Study, 1988 .............................................. 60
37 Table Onion Operation Costs for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 ...................................... 62
38 Red Potato Operation Costs for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 .......................................... 63
39 Prices Received for Sale of Red Pontiac Potatoes for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 64
40 Broccoli Operation Costs for Central Red River Valley Case Study, 1988 .......... ........................ ........ 65
41 General Machinery and Equipment Costs for a Typical Farm Producing Carrots in Central Red River Valley North Dakota, 1988 ................ ........................ 67
42 Estimated Specialized Machinery and Equipment Costs for a 100-Acre Carrot Enterprise in the Red River Valley North Dakota, 1988 .............. ........................... 66
43 Estimated Land, General Buildings and Improvement Costs for a Typical Farm Producing Carrots in the Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ................ .................... 68
44 Fixed Costs Charged to the Carrot Enterprise Typical Farm Red River Valley, North Dakota ............................ 69
45 Estimated Variable Costs Per Acre for Carrot Production Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ............................ 70
46 Estimated Per Acre and Per Master Costs and Returns for Carrot Production Central Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ............................................. 71
47 Net Income (Loss) Per Acre at Various Prices and Yields Carrot Production, Central Red River Valley, North Dakota 1988 ... ................................................. 72
48 General Machinery and Equipment Costs for a Typical Farm Producing Onions in Central Red River Valley North Dakota, 1988 ......................................... 73
49 Estimated Specialized Machinery and Equipment Costs for a 100-Acre Onion Enterprise in the Red River Valley North Dakota, 1988 ...................... .................. 74
50 Estimated Land, General Buildings and Improvement Costs for a Typical Farm Producing Onions in the Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 .................................... 74
51 Estimated Specialized Buildings and Improvement Costs for a 100-Acre Onion Farm Central Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ......................................... 75
52 Estimated Fixed Costs Charged to the Onion Enterprise Typical Farm Red River Valley, North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 75
53 Estimated Variable Costs Per Acre for Onion Production Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ............................ 76
54 Estimated Per Acre and Per Bag Costs and Returns for Onion Production Central Red River Valley, North Dakota 1988 ... ................................................... 77
55 Net Income (Loss) Per Acre at Various Prices and Yields Onion Production, Central Red River Valley, North Dakota 1988 .............................................. 79
List of Figures
1 Acreage, Production, and Yield for U.S. Onions, 1978-1987 ............................................. 17
2 Monthly Price Indices for Idaho-Oregon Onions Using Wholesale-Chicago Prices .................................. 20
3 Monthly Price Indices for Michigan Onions Using Wholesale-Chicago Prices .................................. 25
4 U.S. Per Capita Carrot Consumption 1970-1987 .................... 30
5 Monthly Price Indices for California Carrots Using Wholesale-Chicago Prices .................................. 37
6 Carrot Grade and Packout Percentages From Case Study in Central Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ......... . . . . . . . . 47
7 Transplant Yellow Spanish Onion Packout From Case Study in Central Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ...... . ... . . 51
8 Direct Seeded Onion Packout Percentages From Case Study in Central Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 ................. .. .55
9 Red Potato Packout Percentage by Size and Grade From Case Study in Central Red River Valley, North Dakota, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 59
Highlights
The potential for competitive commercial production of vegetables in North Dakota was examined in this study. Production and marketing aspects were reviewed for 53 vegetables. The crops
discerned by local authorities as having the most production and marketing potential were onions, carrots, and red beets. Transportation costs from North Dakota and competing production areas
were compared to determine transportation advantages (disadvantages) for shipping carrots and onions to selected markets. North Dakota primarily had transportation advantages in local markets. A
case study of a small vegetable production/marketing operation was analyzed. The vegetable operation was started in the central Red River valley in 1987 and continued in 1988. Production
in 1987 concentrated on carrots while 1988 production shifted in favor of onions. Cost, yield and price data were collected from the case study. An expanded model was developed from the case
study data to evaluate the economic feasibility of a commercial-sized operation for producing either carrots or onions. Both carrots and onions were projected to have positive net returns under
specified cost, yield, and price assumptions.
Economic Feasibility of Vegetable Production, Marketing, and Processing in the Red River Valley of North Dakota Hugh J. Dufner, Delmer L. Helgeson, Scott M. Wulff, Gary W. Rourke, and Joel
T. Golz"
The motivation for this study has been a desire to determine whether horticultural crops could be competitively produced and marketed in North Dakota. The purpose is to identify crops which hold
the greatest potential for successful production and marketing and to analyze the constraints to successful operations. Attention was given to the state's natural endowments of climate and soil
which define what vegetables can be successfully grown as well as the demand for these products on a local, regional, and national basis. Complementarity with existing production and marketing
was also analyzed, focussing on machinery requirements as well as storage and marketing synergies. Since market demand is key to any industry, the competitive environment was carefully analyzed
in view of existing production areas, time periods, shipping costs, and product differentiation.
Project Objectives
The objective of this study was to determine the economic feasibility of expanded vegetable production in North Dakota.
Specific objectives were:
a) To identify vegetable crops agronomically suitable for commercial production in North Dakota
b) To assess the economic feasibility of producing vegetables to be marketed in local, regional and national markets.
Methodology
Existing growers and specialists in the field of horticulture were interviewed to assess the constraints limiting production and marketing of vegetable crops in North Dakota. Tormer research
assistant, professor, former research assistants, and research assistant, respectively.
Since local vegetable processing facilities are currently non-existent, particular attention was given to crop perishability and storage characteristics that define the market window for each crop.
The possibility of mechanization was also considered an important evaluation criteria since labor availability is often a serious constraint during the short northern growing season. Assuming
processing facilities were available, a "what if' approach was taken when analyzing production potential for various crops. Information concerning the production and marketing feasibility of various
crops from a case study operation in the central Red River Valley was used as a basis for analyzing production and marketing costs for a small scale operation. The knowledge from this operation
was cited to provide insight into the practical difficulties associated with dry land vegetable production in North Dakota. Based on production coefficients derived from this operation, an expanded
operation was synthesized to determine estimated costs and project profitability of a commercial-sized operation. Data were then compared with production costs from other areas, with break even
yields and prices presented. Since market demand is key to profitability, free-on-board (FOB) point of origin and cost-insurance and freight (CIF) wholesale product prices were obtained for two
products, giving attention to point of origin and shipping costs. A standardized product was assumed to exist in either case. A transportation model was used to determine the low cost supplier by
season. Attention was given to seasonal price differentials to determine return to storage for Northern-grown products. Product differentiation and market niches were also considered as alternative
means of competing in the market. Local, regional and national markets were considered. Recommendations are provided for crops that offer the greatest potential for commercial production in
North Dakota, as well as the most likely constraints. Areas needing further study were developed based on information and findings resulting from this study.
Horticultural Crop Survey Design and Implementation
A short survey was conducted of two area growers, two NDSU horticulture department staff members, and the Fargo Farmers' Market coordinator to determine the production, marketing and
processing feasibility of various vegetable crops in North Dakota. Those interviewed were asked to rank crops according to various criteria on a scale of zero to five, with zero signifying the crop
had no potential and five signifying it had excellent potential. The rankings were then consolidated, accepting the most common rankings and rejecting those that deviated greatly (Table 1). Crops
for which some potential may exist, but with some uncertainty, were designated with a question mark (?).
Survey Results; Evaluation of Crops
The opinions of those surveyed were generally quite consistent, signifying a relatively high level of consensus for most vegetable crops. Survey results suggest perennials, rhubarb, asparagus, and
horseradish, are well adapted to production in North Dakota. The first two have good fresh market potential as well as potential for freezing and canning. It is uncertain whether these crops could be
marketed fresh in regional markets. Unfortunately, these crops do not appear to lend themselves to more than a low level of mechanization, a factor inhibiting their production on a large scale.
The survey further suggests root crops are viewed favorably for production, marketing, and processing potential, particularly beets, carrots, garlic, onions and potatoes. Other root crops deemed
feasible with less optimism and consensus are rutabagas, turnips, parsnips, and radishes. While most individuals felt the latter items could be successfully raised, they cited various problems which
may limit their production potential in North Dakota. These opinions are noted in the comment section of Table 1. All root crops cited above lend themselves to harvest mechanization. Among cole
crops, cabbage (excluding chinese) ranked highest in production and marketing feasibility. They offer excellent production potential as well as strong local 6 demand and potential for processing.
Brussels sprouts, broccoli, and cauliflower offer some potential but are inconsistent producers. None of the cole crops offer the possibility for a high level of harvest mechanization. Among
melons, muskmelon ranked highest, showing excellent potential for production and marketing, with some potential for freezing. Honeydew and watermelon were viewed with less favor. Limited
possibilities for harvest mechanization exist for melons.
Winter squashes and pumpkins ranked high in production and marketing and also seem to have excellent processing potential. Summer squashes were also viewed favorably. The potential for harvest
mechanization is limited in both cases. Everyone interviewed was enthused about sweetcorn, partly as a result of the short crop and premium prices paid for the product during crop year 1988, but
also in light of numerous years of experience with the crop. It was ranked as highly feasible in terms of production and fresh marketing, with some processing feasibility. Harvest mechanization
for the fresh market is questionable, since a mechanical harvester damages a high percentage of the ears. Cucumbers were deemed feasible to produce and local market potential seems good,
but again it is a labor intensive crop. Mechanical harvesting is possible, but it is a once over operation which limits potential yield. A processing plant for cucumbers is located in central Minnesota,
a reasonable distance for shipment. Past experience with commercial production for processing suggests labor availability and management is the key to success. Green peas and beans can be
mechanically harvested and produce well. The local market is limited, however, and dryland yields in North Dakota may be less than in Southern states where they are raised for processing. Under
irrigation, they might yield well in North Dakota. It is questionable whether local demand would be sufficient to justify the expense of a mechanical harvester. Harvesters could be justified if
processing were established.
Tomatoes are deemed a feasible crop, but North Dakota yields would be lower and less dependable than yields in Southern states where the growing season is longer and tomatoes are grown for
processing. If a plant existed, North Dakota-grown tomatoes might be processed on a small scale as one of a line of products or as an ingredient to other main-line products. The more succulent
greens such as lettuce are adversely affected by midsummer heat. If produced, they may offer the greatest potential in early spring. Selection of Crops for Large Scale Production The local market
for most perishable crops is restrictive, because large amounts of these products come onto the market in late summer or early fall, depressing local prices until the supply is consumed or the
product is spoiled. Although product quality may be high at harvest, the abundance is often more than can be consumed, and marketing of these items in distant markets is usually difficult because
fresh product is abundant most places during the fall season. In the absence of a processing facility or any method of product preservation, perishability becomes a major concern and an important
criteria in crop selection. Items with storage capacity can be marketed over their storage life, allowing for larger market windows. Less perishable crops permit establishment of regular delivery
schedules and penetration of distant markets, based on product quality criteria rather than on temporal availability.
North Dakota is currently a supplier of stored potatoes. Farmers are accustomed to storing and shipping them to distant points across the eastern half of the U.S. With slight modification in existing
facilities, new products could be stored, marketed and shipped, either together with or parallel with potato shipments. The additional investment required to adapt current facilities for storage of
lesser perishable crops would be considerably lower and less risky than the construction of processing plants.
Storage of Less Perishable Crops
Analysis of storage characteristics for less perishable crops reveals several items could be stored together, based on their storage temperature and relative humidity requirements. These less
perishable products have been grouped into four storage classes (Table 2).
Storage Class A.
Products in this class store best at 32°F and relative humidity of 90-95%.2 Items include jerusalem artichokes, beets, cabbage, carrots, horseradish, leeks, parsnips, radishes, rutabagas, and turnips.
Storage Class B.
Products in this class would be stored at 320F and relative humidity between 65-70%. Items to be stored include dry garlic, dry onions, and dry chile peppers.
Storage Class C.
Products in this class could be stored at 50-550F and relative humidity between 70-75%. Products include pumpkin, winter squash, sweet potatoes and dry chile peppers. Chipping potatoes might
also fit this category, although they ideally require higher humidity.
Storage Class D.
Potato table stock has its own unique storage requirements of 38-400F and relative humidity of 90%. This temperature is too high for class A items and too low for Class C. However, this is close
to the normal temperature (i.e., 40-42°F) which most shippers and common warehousers store product in transit or for proximate use.
Some of the products designated for the above storage classes have recommended storage characteristics which differ slightly from other items in their class. The differences are small and
probably inconsequential, particularly if the storage period is short. Few warehouses would have enough rooms with independent temperature and humidity control to ideally fit each product.
An alternative to independent storage for each product might be to package or cover products with high humidity requirements (e.g., class A items) and store them with uncovered items requiring
the same temperature (e.g., class B items), thereby reducing the number of storage areas. Air circulation around the packaged product ensures removal of internal heat generated by the product.
Choosing Among Less Perishables
Most of the less perishable crops mentioned may offer some potential for success in North Dakota. Some crops are more readily mechanized than others and fit North Dakota climate and soil
types better. North Dakota farmers in the Red River Valley are accustomed to root crop production. Potatoes and sugarbeets prosper well in the black, potassium rich soils of the Valley where
organic matter is typically around 5 percent. Some of the equipment required to produce and store alternative root crops is identical or similar to what farmers currently use. Other equipment for
certain root crops is specialized, but nearly all the root crops lend themselves to mechanical harvesting. Thus, the production of alternative root crops represents a relatively easy transition for
producers.
Analysis of Specific Root Crops
Red Beets
Red Beets offer potential for production in North Dakota. They are similar to sugar beets, which have proven their production feasibility in the state. They appear to have no major production
constraints. Their local market demand is reported to be moderate, but fresh beets could be shipped with potatoes in mixed loads to distant regional or national fresh markets. The mechanical
harvester commonly used for carrots can also be used to harvest beets.
Carrots
Carrots thrive in Northern cool climates. Large volumes of carrots for processing are raised in southern Minnesota, and several large packaging operations have been producing carrots in the Anoka
area for many years. A large carrot packaging operation has started recently in Traill, Minnesota and the same firm has started a carrot dehydration operation at Foston, Minnesota. The production
around Anoka and Traill is largely on organic peat or muck soils, although carrots are also grown around Traill on mineral soils.
Carrots for Packaging Major constraints to the production of carrots for packaging in North Dakota are the relative absence of peat soils. Production of carrots for packaging in mineral soils poses
certain problems:
a. Spring emergence - Carrot seedlings have difficulty penetrating a crusted soil surface.
b. Carrot length - The production of long carrot varieties, which have become the norm for packaged product, is more difficult in mineral soils than in peat, requiring carrots be grown on raised beds
to permit root penetration and development. Harvesting long carrots on mineral soils with a mechanical harvester is also more difficult, since the soil clings to the roots and results in a higher
percentage of misses and broken product.
c. Wet conditions -- Harvesting in wet conditions on mineral soils is not feasible. Rainfall at harvest is a greater problem in mineral soils than on peat.
The problem of spring emergence can be partially overcome through early spring planting or irrigation. The problem of misses and breakage can be overcome by loosening the carrots prior to
harvest and planting shorter varieties, but market acceptance of a short carrot is a serious constraint for regional and national markets. The problem of harvesting in sticky soils can be addressed by
timing harvest during dry periods.
Carrots for Processing
Since short carrot varieties are typically used for processing, the processed carrot market appears to offer excellent potential for North Dakota. However, the closest carrot processing plant
currently operating is United Foods Company at Fairmont, Minnesota, some 280 miles from Fargo. Carrots grown for processing in Minnesota are raised on beds and are crowned (i.e., the stem is
cut off) prior to harvest to reduce the need for hand labor. It appears crowning machines used for sugarbeets would also work for carrots. Next, carrots are mechanically dug and hauled to the
processing plant where they are purchased on the basis of proper crowning. Deeper crowning represents yield loss to the producer but a higher product grade, since less post-harvest labor is
required to trim the roots after the carrots arrive at the plant. Yields of processed carrots in southern Minnesota were reported to be as high as 30 tons per acre. Grower contract prices in 1988
were around $43 per ton, based on normal percentages of 75% properly crowned and 30% oversized product. This amounts to gross returns of $1,290/acre.
Garlic
Garlic has storage characteristics similar to onions. Area growers have reported success with both fall and spring planted garlic. However, no local grower has mechanized production of this crop.
Garlic has limited local demand but could be marketed regionally or nationally and could also be dehydrated.
Onions
Onions were a significant crop in the Fargo-Moorhead area during the 1940s and 1950s. Farmers are said to have reached a total acreage in excess of 1700 acres. The major onion producers around
Fargo-Moorhead gradually dropped out of onion production due to price instability and competition from Western growers who popularized the mild Spanish onion types. Onions were also raised
on a large scale in the Grand Forks area and farther north. Currently, one major onion grower remains in the Fargo-Moorhead area with an annual production of about 50 acres. Smaller amounts
are raised by a limited number of farmers in the northern Red River Valley. Commercial onion prices continue to be volatile. Local market demand for onions is strong, but volume requirements are
not enough to support a massive expansion in acreage. Regional marketing may be feasible, so the potential for onion production and marketing appears quite good. This is because the product
keeps well and lends itself to mechanized harvesting. Existing potato storage facilities can be adapted for onion storage. Production of direct seeded onions can be accomplished by planting early in
the spring, particularly when planting fast-maturing types. Direct seeding of Spanish onions is risky due to the long growing period required for this type and the difficulty in curing them under wet
harvest conditions. Transplanting greenhouse or Southern grown Spanish onions is feasible for small acreages, as it permits producers to enter the market at least one month earlier than with direct
seeded onions. Fast maturing winter storage varieties are recommended for large acreages rather than transplants which are too expensive. Weeds are a serious problem for onions, but chemical
methods of weed control are available. For small acreages, onions can be hand harvested into burlap sacks and allowed to dry in the field. This is particularly appropriate for large Spanish onions
which suffer bruising from mechanical harvesters. For large commercial acreages, specialized equipment is recommended including a rod weeder for uprooting the bulbs, a windrower to gather the
bulbs after they are dry (can use an adapted two-row potato digger), and an onion harvester to lift them into trucks after curing. Onions (depending on variety) can be stored for up to eight months at
320F and rather low humidity. The continual movement of air around and through them is important to keep them dry to avoid sprouting. Commercial onion markets continue to be volatile.
Parsnips
Parsnips, closely related to carrots, grow well in the heavy soils of North Dakota. A major problem with their production appears to lie in seedling emergence. The seeds, when planted 1/2 inch
deep at a soil temperature of 500F, require 27 days to emerge compared to 17 days for carrots (Lorenz, p. 56). Like carrots, parsnip seedlings have difficulty penetrating crusted soils. Parsnips,
depending upon variety, require 100 to 130 days from planting to reach maturity compared to carrots requiring 60-85 days. Parsnips are a slow mover in supermarkets, and since they desiccate
rapidly, they are waxed prior to sale.
Radishes
Spring radishes planted in early spring reach maturity within 22-40 days of planting, while winter radishes require 50-60 days. Radishes are quick and strong germinators requiring moist growing
conditions to avoid bitterness. Radishes are susceptible to attack by flea beetles. They can be hand harvested, bunched, and sold as greentop radishes or mechanically topped and harvested. Spring
radish harvesters are highly specialized and can be seen in the Anoka, Minnesota area where considerable production occurs on peat soils. While production on black mineral soils of North Dakota
seems feasible, it is questionable whether demand for the product would be sufficient to justify purchase of harvesting equipment. Irrigation is important for radishes.
Rutabagas
This crop grows best in Northern cool climates on virgin soils. Like the radish, it is also a strong germinator and its leaves are highly susceptible to attack by flea beetles. Its roots are susceptible to
attack by root maggots. Either chemical applications or careful plot selection is required to avoid maggot problems. Irrigation is not required for successful production. Common varieties mature
in 90 days, and roots tend to enlarge quickly in cool fall weather. Rutabagas can be harvested with carrot harvesting equipment. Local growers have at times noted a problem of bitterness in locally
grown rutabagas which limits market acceptance. Rutabagas are waxed prior to sale, and local demand is moderate.
Turnips
Like rutabagas and radishes, turnips are strong germinators and susceptible to flea beetles and root maggots. They grow rather quickly, reaching maturity between 40-75 days after planting. They can
be harvested with a carrot harvester, but demand for turnips in the North appears quite limited. Like rutabagas and parsnips, they are waxed prior to sale.
The Most Feasible Root Crops for Large Scale Production
Of the above mentioned root crops, red beets, onions and carrots appear to hold the best potential for large scale commercial production in North Dakota. All can be processed and have some fresh
market demand. Onions can be marketed fresh on a large scale, both locally and regionally. Beets can be marketed fresh but have a limited fresh market demand, which may require penetration of
distant markets. Carrots have a strong fresh market demand, but their large scale success in North Dakota appears to depend upon consumer acceptance of a short highly flavorful carrot. Rutabagas,
garlic and turnips offer less feasible production/marketing opportunities. Not enough is known about parsnip production to reliably assess feasibility, although local demand is known to be quite
limited. Large acreages are not required for production and marketing of a crop to be feasible for a farmer. Smaller niche markets can be profitable for a limited number of individuals. For this
reason alternatives with production potential but restricted market demand should not be ruled out for individual growers.
Onion Production Potential for North Dakota
U.S. onion production has gradually increased over the past 10 years from 35.9 million cwt. in 1978 to 45 million cwt. in 1987 (Figure 1). Increased yields rather than additional acreage is
primarily responsible for additional production. The 1978-1982 average yield was 309 cwt. per acre compared to 369 cwt. for the 1983-1987 average. The growing demand for onions is driven by
two factors, population growth and increased per capita consumption of onions. From 1978 to 1987 U.S. resident population increased 21 million to 243 million, a 10 percent increase. Per capita
consumption during the same period increased from 13.7 pounds in 1978 to 16.3 pounds in 1987, a 19 percent increase, (Table 3).
Seasonal Production
The USDA classifies onion production into four categories; spring, summer-nonstorage, summer-storage, and summer-California. Although onion production has increased dramatically over the
past ten years, relative market share between USDA categories has remained fairly constant. Spring production accounts for 16 percent of total production, while summer non-storage onions
account for 7.8 percent of production. Summer storage onions account for 54 percent of production and summer California onions account for 22 percent of production. Comparing 1978-82
averages with 1983-87 averages indicates spring and summer California production has remained constant while summer non-storage onions experienced a slight downward trend. Summer storage
onions have experienced an upward trend (Table 4). Unlike seasonal production groups where market share is constant, there are distinctive trends in individual states' market shares. California's
share of spring onions is growing at the expense of Arizona and Texas. Market share of Texas' summer onions has also decreased. Colorado, Idaho, and Oregon have increased their market share of
summer storage onions. Washington also marginally increased its market share. The primary loser of market share was New York, and to a lesser extent Michigan. Minnesota, Ohio, Utah and
Wisconsin each decreased slightly in market share (Table 5). California is the largest producer of onions, accounting for 28.99 percent of production during the five-year period from 1983-87.
Oregon is second at 14.76 percent followed by Texas at 10.75 and Colorado at 10.52 percent, Idaho fifth at 7.82 percent, and New York sixth at 7.75 percent. These six states accounted for over 80
percent of U.S. onion production.
Foreign Trade
The U.S. was a net exporter of onions prior to 1982. In five of the six following years the U.S. was a net importer (Table 6). Exports marginally exceeded imports in 1984, but by 1987 a net trade
deficit of 1.75 million cwt existed, approximately 4.3 percent of domestic consumption. Import prices are seasonal and are generally lowest during August and September. Price increases occur
monthly until peaking in March or April (Figure 2). The majority of onion imports are from Latin America with Mexico being the largest Latin American supplier. Canada is the next largest supplier
accounting for 14.7 and 8.4 percent of the imports in 1986 and 1987 (Table 7).
Seasonal Shipping
Shipping seasons vary in time and length depending on production and climate of the producing states. Arizona, California, and Texas typically do not store crops as refrigeration is too expensive in
these climates. Production in these states is generally planned to supply fresh products when Northern states cannot meet supply requirements. Arizona generally ships products during May and
June, New Mexico from June to August, Texas from April to August, and California all year round with most products shipped from May to August. Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Oregon, and
Washington generally begin shipping in August when harvest begins and continue until March or April as onions are removed from storage (Table 8). Eighty percent of onion shipments were by
truck during 1987, 13.5 percent were by rail, of which 3 percent were by piggyback rail.
Seasonal Pricing and Returns to Storage
Chicago wholesale prices were used as the basis in determining seasonality of prices and returns to storage. Major terminal market prices were used because they would clearly reflect the overall
U.S. market condition and not be subject to individual local factors not indicative of the U.S. industry during a specific year. The USDA only publishes comprehensive wholesale prices for two
major markets, New York and Chicago. Chicago was chosen as this would most likely be a major market for North Dakota produce. Analysis was limited to a September through March time period
because the primary market season for summer storage onions would most likely be produced in North Dakota. Consequently, prices are generally not reported from April to August for summer
storage onions as not enough produce is shipped to establish a price series. Also, market is generally supplied with spring season production from Southern states. The price series used were
Idaho-Oregon Yellow Spanish Jumbo onions and Michigan Yellow Medium onions as reported by the USDA. Monthly prices are reported in Tables 9 and 10. Onion prices tend to be variable from
year to year, ranging from $5.35 for pounds in November 1979 to $11.25 in November 1981 for Idaho-Oregon Spanish onions. Five-year (1983-1987) and ten year (1978-1987) indices of
monthly onion prices are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Both indices indicate traditional price behavior with prices lowest during harvest and increasing thereafter. Higher prices reward the producer
for additional costs associated with storage of the commodity. Both classes exhibit the same behavior. Prices actually are higher at the beginning of harvest and then drop and then rise throughout
the season. Prices generally increase throughout the year, but every year is unique. Idaho-Oregon onion prices have historically had a higher probability of increasing. Prices during the ten-year
period 1978-1987 increased eight of ten years for both three-month and five-month storage periods. Michigan prices increased only four years when storing three-months and six years when
storing five-months. During the recent five-year period, 1983-1987, there has been a positive return to storage in every year for Idaho-Oregon onions and for four years for Michigan onions.
Production in 1984 increased significantly
over the previous year, 43.7 versus 38.8 million cwt. This large increase in production may have prevented prices from rising. Average increase in price was $1.62 and $2.44 per 50 pound sack of
Idaho-Oregon onion for three- and five-month storage periods from 1978-1987. Price increases were greater during the five-year period from 1983-1987, averaging $2.83 and $3.87 for three- and
five-month storage periods (Table 11). Price behavior has been similar for Michigan onions; however, prices have not increased to then extent of Idaho-Oregon onions. Price increases averaged
$.42 and $1.78 for three- and five-month storage periods from 1983 to 1987. This is less than half of those for Idaho-Oregon (Table 12)
Market Competitiveness
The market competitiveness of North Dakota depends upon one major factor; the ability to deliver products to a market at equal or less cost than other suppliers assuming acceptable quality
standards are maintained. Production and shipping costs are the major components in determining final cost. Published data are not available on production costs for major producing regions in
the U.S. However, North Dakota's advantage (disadvantage) in shipping cost can be estimated. For the market where North Dakota has a shipping cost advantage, the state can be a competitive
supplier providing the differential in production costs does not exceed the shipping cost advantage. Since primary production of storage onions is located in the West, the potential market for North
Dakota production would be markets east or southeast of North Dakota. These would include Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, and North Dakota. Although
many of these states also produce onions, they still remain net importers, including North and South Dakota. The exception is Michigan, which is a net exporter of onions. This eight state region is
a net importer based on historical production and population estimates. The eight state region accounts for 19.52 percent of U.S. population but only 7.26 percent of U.S. onion production (Table
13). Assuming regional consumption is similar to U.S. consumption, the eight state region produces only 38 percent of what it consumes. In reality this may overstate market potential. The eight
states, during late spring and summer, are supplied by Southern states when regional produce is not available. However, since North Dakota is in a deficit region and has a transportation advantage
over Western producing states, it has the potential to be a market supplier. Transportation costs were estimated for six markets in estimating North Dakota's transportation advantage (disadvantage)
relative to three other supply points. The markets selected were Fargo, Minneapolis, Chicago, New York, Atlanta, and Sioux Falls to represent local, regional, and national markets. Major competing
supply regions would be Colorado, Oregon-Idaho-Washington, Michigan, and Grand Forks, representing the Red River Valley of North Dakota. Transportation cost advantages (disadvantages) were
estimated for the Red River Valley (Tables 14 and 15). The Red River Valley has a transportation advantage serving all markets over the Pacific Northwest. The transportation advantage ranges from
$1.75 per 50 pounds to Minneapolis to $1.33 to Atlanta. The Red River Valley also has a cost advantage over Colorado in all markets. Michigan has a cost advantage in supplying Atlanta, New York,
and Chicago markets. Onions are also shipped by rail from the Northwest. A comparison of rail and truck costs for the Northwest indicated rail reduced costs by approximately $.40 to $.80 per 50
pounds. This cost reduction reduces the Red River Valley transportation advantages. Rail also incurs additional costs including longer delivery times, potentially higher inventory costs, and greater
handling costs. Non-cost considerations include less control over shipping once shipment occurs, potential car scheduling problems, and more restrictive planning horizons.
Carrot Production Potential for North Dakota
U.S. carrot production has increased from 20.6 million cwt. in 1978 to 25.5 million cwt. in 1987. Both increased yield and acreage have been responsible for the additional production. The 1978-
1982 average yield was 273.8 cwt. per acre compared to 289.4 cwt. for the 1983-1987 period (Table 16). Harvested acreage averaged 76.1 thousand acres between 1978-1982 rising slightly to
78.8 between 1983 and 1987. The growing demand for carrots is driven by two factors, population growth and increased per capita consumption. From 1978 to 1987 U.S. resident population
increased by 21 million, a 10 percent increase. Per capita consumption of carrots during the same period increased from 9 to 11.8 pounds. This increase slightly exaggerates the increasing
trend as 1978 consumption was abnormally low and 1987 abnormally high. Nevertheless, an increasing trend is apparent (Figure 4).
State Production
Collection of seasonal production data was discontinued by the USDA in 1978. The largest carrot producing state was California, accounting for 50 percent of total U.S. production from 1983 to
1987 (Table 17). The second largest producing state was Texas at 32 9.4 percent, followed by Washington at 9.3 percent. Wisconsin was fourth at 7.2 percent and Michigan was fifth at 6.9 percent.
When comparing 1978-82 averages with 1983-87 averages, certain state production trends were detected. Comparing the two period averages indicates California, Wisconsin, Arizona, and
Washington increased their market shares, while Florida, Oregon, Texas, Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio/New Jersey lost market share.
Fresh Versus Processed Carrots
Carrot production and consumption are comprised of two major market components, the fresh and the processed markets. These two markets have different characteristics. Although per capita
carrot consumption has increased, the consumption of processed carrots has actually declined. Throughout the 1970's the fresh market accounted for 62-64 percent of production. By the 1980's
the fresh market accounted for about 70 percent of all consumption (Table 18). Consequently per-capita consumption of carrots has increased. Although 67 percent (1983-1987 average) of total
carrot production is for the fresh market, this varies widely among states. Three states, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, produce entirely for the fresh market (Table 19). Over 80 percent of
production in California and Texas was for the fresh market. Production in Wisconsin, Ohio, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Washington, was primarily for the processed market. Michigan's
production was similar to the national average with 64 percent of production sold in the fresh market. Wisconsin/Ohio/New Jersey production was almost entirely for the processed market (Table
19). Increased consumption of fresh carrots is due to (1) a shift away from processed carrots, (2) an increase in overall per capita consumption, and (3) an increase in population. Total production
of processed carrots has not decreased as population increases have more than offset declining per capita consumption. This has resulted in a 64 percent increase in fresh market production since
1970, from 10.95 million cwt. to 17.9 million cwt. in 1987. A market shift to the fresh market is occurring in California, Oregon and Texas, while Michigan, Minnesota, and New York are shifting
production from fresh to processed. California, Washington, and Wisconsin/Ohio/New Jersey account for 75 percent of all processed carrots with five-year market shares of 23, 22, and 30
percent, respectively (1983-1987 average) (Table 20). Likewise two states, California and Texas, account for 75 percent of the fresh market with 63 and 12 percent of the market, respectively.
Foreign Trade
Prior to 1979 the U.S. was a net exporter of carrots. Two exceptions were 1970 and 1974 when the U.S. was a net importer. Since 1980 the U.S. has been a net importer of carrots. In 1984 the trade
deficit peaked at 1.3 million cwt. or 5.6 percent of domestic product. By 1987 the trade deficit was reduced to .44 million cwt. or 1.7 percent of production (Table 21).Imports are seasonal in
nature. The majority of imports in 1987 were during the period from September to December. Canada is the major supplier, accounting for over 80 percent of the shipments in 1987 (Table 22).
Seasonal Shipments
Carrot shipments are greater from January to June than from August to December. Data do not exist to determine whether carrot consumption is seasonal in nature. However, one possible
explanation for seasonal shipments is that during late summer and fall homegrown produce and local truck farms may supply a significant portion of the demand. Shipping seasons also vary among
states. Although central California ships yearlong, southern California and the Imperial Valley are major suppliers from December through May (Table 23). Arizona, Florida, and Texas also ship
mainly from December through May. Michigan and Washington's primary shipping season is from August through November. Shipments are primarily by truck, 77 percent in 1987, with rail
accounting for 23 percent of which 5 percent was by piggyback rail.
Seasonal Pricing and Returns to Storage
Chicago wholesale prices were used to determine seasonality of prices and returns to storage. A major terminal market was chosen as prices there would more clearly reflect the overall U.S.
market condition and not be subject to individual local factors not indicative of the U.S. industry during a specific year. The price at Chicago is the result of all local supply and demand factors. The
USDA only publishes comprehensive wholesale prices for the major markets of New York and Chicago. The Chicago market was used as the most likely major market for North Dakota produce. A
monthly index of Chicago wholesale prices was completed for a ten-year period from 1978 to 1987. These prices were based on a calendar year basis; a distinctive crop production and marketing
year does not exist, because production occurs throughout the year. Carrots from Northern states generally are marketed during late summer and fall while carrots from Southern states are
marketed from late winter to spring. Central California markets throughout the year. A ten-year index (1978-1987) of Chicago wholesale carrot prices (Table 24) is presented in Figure 5. The index
has two price peaks, a major peak in January, price index of 1.09, and a minor peak in July, a price index of 1.02. These correspond approximately with seasonal production of Northern and Southern
states.
Prices are lowest during and shortly after harvest of the winter crop, April and May, and then rise as supply decreases. Prices rise until the Northern states start to supply the market place in late
summer. Prices then drop during the harvest of the Northern states and rise until winter production is marketed in January and February. The price index summarizes monthly price behavior over the
ten-year period. However, monthly prices may behave differently within individual years. To check accuracy of the index, monthly prices from individual years were analyzed to determine if they
followed predicted patterns. In nine of the ten years prices declined from January to May. The average decline was $1.59 for 48 lbs. for the period 1978-1987. Although prices on average incrased
from May to August, prices actually only increased in five of ten years. Prices decreased from August to October in seven of the ten years, while prices decreased an average of $.59. Prices
increased from October to January during eight years and decreased in 1980 and 1986. The average change in price was $1.50 (Table 25). In general, the strongest price pattern was the decrease
from January to May and the increase in prices from October to January. This price behavior indicates that a positive return to storage does exist for carrots harvested in the fall and marketed during
the winter but storing carrots until spring may result in either higher or lower prices as compared to marketing earlier.
Market Competitiveness
The market competitiveness of North Dakota depends upon the ability to deliver product to a market at equal or less cost than other suppliers, assuming acceptable quality standards. Production and
shipping costs are the major components in determining final cost. Published data were not available on production costs for major producing regions in the U.S. However, North Dakota's advantage
(disadvantage) in shipping costs can be estimated. North Dakota, assuming a standard product, can be a competitive supplier provided the differential in production cost does not exceed the shipping
cost advantage. Because primary production of fresh carrots is in the Southwest, primarily California, potential market areas for North Dakota would be population centers near North Dakota and those to the east. This would include the states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Although many of these states also produce carrots for the fresh market, they remain net importers; exceptions are Minnesota and Michigan. The eight-state region accounts for 19.5 percent of the population but only 9 percent of the fresh carrot production (Table 26). However, because carrots from Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are marketed during the late summer, fall, and early winter, this region may remain a net importer. Since
some of Michigan's production would likely move east, limited market potential may exist for this region. In estimating North Dakota's transportation advantage (disadvantage) in supplying specific
markets, transportation costs were estimated for six markets and four supply points. The markets selected were Fargo, Minneapolis, Chicago, New York, Atlanta, and Sioux Falls to represent local,
regional, and national markets. Major competing supply regions would be California, Minnesota, and Michigan. Estimated transportation advantage (disadvantage) for the Red River Valley (RRV) is
presented in Tables 27 and 28. The RRV has a transportation advantage over California in supplying all markets and an advantage over Michigan in supplying Fargo, Minneapolis, and Sioux Falls.
Both Minnesota and Michigan have an advantage in supplying the Chicago, New York, and Atlanta markets. Additionally, Minnesota has an advantage in supplying the Minneapolis and Sioux Falls
Markets.
Case Study for the Red River Valley of North Dakota, 1987-1988
A case study of vegetable production and marketing in the Red River Valley of North Dakota was used to develop an expanded model of a commercial operation. A description of the farm and size of
the operation is covered first followed by production costs and marketing results. A case study of a small vegetable production and marketing operation in the central Red River Valley was made to
assess practical difficulties and profitability of a beginning enterprise. The operation was carried out on an existing farm, using traditional farm equipment when possible and specialized production
and handling equipment when required (Table 29). A potato warehouse and used potato production and handling equipment were utilized for production, storage, and packaging of the product to the
extent possible. The soil is classified as "Beardon loam" and is representative of the type of soil used for the production of potatoes, sugarbeets, dry beans, small grains, and other crops in the Red River Valley. Average yearly rainfall in the area is 21 inches. No irrigation was available. The operation began in 1987 with the planting of 20 acres of several varieties of carrots and 1.5 acres of a broad range of other vegetables. Included were winter squash, summer squash, melons, cabbage, broccoli, and tomatoes. Most of the 1.5 acres of sundry vegetables were successfully harvested, and about 15 acres of carrots were harvested although the carrot yield was low due to poor seed emergence. The 1987 harvest was encouraging because high quality products were produced and
successfully marketed. It was discouraging from the viewpoint of profitability. Net returns were below variable production costs due to producer inexperience and lack of preparation which resulted
in a series of production, storage, and marketing difficulties. Products were marketed locally, primarily in Fargo and Grand Forks. Total product sales for 1987 were only around $5,000. The two
major accomplishments in 1987 were gaining production and marketing experience and opening market channels for a short, sweet, locally grown carrot product. Production in 1988 was considerably better, with returns, in most cases, above variable production costs. However, returns were negative when operator labor and fixed costs were considered. The scale of operations was
larger with 33 acres planted and 20.7 acres harvested. The product mix during 1988 changed with a major shift toward onions. All products harvested in 1988 were organically grown, and most of
the products were certified and marketed as organically grown. The major accomplishments for 1988 were achieving organic certification and opening market channels for organic products on
local, regional, and national levels.
Carrots
The following will discuss the carrot crop produced in 1987 and 1988, with emphasis on production techniques and problems encountered with the carrot crop. A discussion regarding the yields and
returns for carrots is also presented as well as an evaluation of the carrot crop.
Carrot Crop of 1987
Carrots were the primary crop in 1987 and were grown on three fields without the use of chemical fertilizers. Weed control and seedling emergence were the primary obstacles to overcome. An application of pre-emergent herbicide (treflan) was used on a 12.5 acre field, but due to its granular form and lack of rainfall, the herbicide was only partially effective in preventing weed growth. Due to slow carrot germination, weeds gained a head start on carrots, making use of postemergence herbicides questionable. As a result, hand weeding of the entire field was required, and 2.5 acres were abandoned due to excessive weed problems. A second planting of carrots was attempted on 3 acres of certified organic land. Slow emergence and weed competition, especially foxtail, was so severe the entire field had to be abandoned. A third field of carrots was planted on 4.5 acres with no prior herbicide application. Weeds again emerged ahead of the carrots and became so advanced a postemergence herbicide was deemed unfeasible. The weed density was low permitting hand weeding, which was an enormous task. The entire field was harvested. Due to late planting and continued drought conditions, carrot seedlings failed to germinate, and those that did germinate after a short rain were trapped beneath crusted soil until they withered. The crop was watered extensively with tanks mounted on a tractor, applying one eighth to one quarter inch of water per pass. Watering this large acreage with tanks was tedious and proved to be inadequate in coping with drought and early summer heat. The soil surface quickly became hardened by the baking summer sun after each watering. For the most part, only the seedlings that penetrated through cracks in the earth managed to survive. Carrot seedlings which reached their third leaf stage became well rooted and survived the drought. Successful germination ranged between one and 50 percent, depending upon field and location. Larger seeds appeared to emerge more readily than smaller seeds. An extended period of rain around July 1 germinated the balance of the seedlings in the soil, many of which successfully penetrated the soil surface. Despite their late emergence, most of these seedlings developed adequate sized roots for the fresh market prior to the late fall harvest. The product was harvested with a mechanical harvester late in the fall and stored on trucks until a cooling bin and wash line could be installed in the potato warehouse. Prior to unloading, mold developed so part of the product never reached storage. The balance of the product on the trucks was unloaded and stored in a cooler and adjacent storage bin set up for this purpose.
Despite the fact carrots were stored in a temperature and humidity controlled environment, the temperature could not be kept cool enough to prevent the continued growth of mold on the stored
product. Approximately one-half of the stored product was discarded early in the spring with the balance of the product marketed through mid-April. Although quantity of the product was limited,
quality was good. However, sales were slow, since the carrots were washed and sold in bulk 50 pound sacks. It became apparent in late November that consumer sized packaging would be required to
move the product faster. Packaging scales were purchased and paper labels produced to meet legal marketing requirements (i.e. net weight, name of packer, and place of origin). The product was
packaged in standard freezer bags and accepted by local supermarkets, and sales volume increased considerably as local consumers discovered the products homegrown flavor.
Carrot Crop of 1988
In 1988 a 3.2 acre field of carrots was planted in late April on certified organic land. Several later plantings were carried out on 11 acres of land using chemicals. Only the first planting was
successful. The later plantings either did not germinate or the seedlings failed to penetrate the crusted soil surface. Drought was a major problem in 1988. Watering the germinated seedling was
unsuccessful. Carrots on the 3.2 acres weathered the drought well. Weed growth on the field was moderate, so hand weeding was done, albeit with considerable expense. Since the carrots were
planted early, they reached saleable size for harvest around August 1. Over one-half of the carrots were dug and sold prior to final harvest. Sales were primarily in Fargo and Grand Forks. After
organic certification was obtained they were promoted as organically grown, with negligible impact. A portion of the product was sold to regional organic markets where flavor is of prime concern.
Because of limited acreage, supplies began to run low by the end of November. Some local sales 46 were curtailed in an effort to supply organic markets. By the end of January nearly all of
the product had been sold.
Carrot Grade and Packout Percentages, 1988
Carrots were washed and packaged in several different package sizes to satisfy consumer demand. After carrots came out of the washer, they were lifted by a conveyor belt to a packaging belt where
jumbos were manually taken off for 25 and 50 pound bulk packages. Smaller carrots were removed by workers and placed on packaging weighscales and put into 1.5 or 3-pound packages. The
packages were consolidated into master6 containers or bales. Each master contained packages of 24 or 32 oz. or 16 or 48 oz. Mini-carrots were packaged at 16 ounces per bag and sold in master
containers or bales of 20 bags per bale. Greentop carrots were mostly mini-carrot size and were sold in bunches, with anywhere from six to 20 carrots per bunch, depending on carrot size. No.
2 grade product, which consists of broken and crooked but otherwise sound product, was normally sold at half price or delivered to charitable organizations for packaging costs. Waste product, too
inferior for human food, was returned to the field as organic matter. Carrot packout and grade percentages are shown in Figure 6. The carrot operation yielded gross returns sufficient to cover all
variable growing, harvesting, packaging, marketing, and delivery costs, but not enough to cover fixed costs (Tables 30 and 31). Therefore, the operation at thTotal harvesting costs, considering
mechanically harvesting, handpicking, and hauling product to the warehouse, came to $2 per cwt. This high cost is due largely to the small scale of the operation which required weekly digging for
only a few carrots. It is also the result of harvester misses which resulted in hand picking 25 percent of the product.is scale could not be considered profitable. Carrot growing costs on a per master
basis came to $1.55 per master, which is not unlike growing costs reported in Michigan or other areas (Table 30). Variable postproduction costs including harvesting, grading, packaging, marketing,
and delivery came to $11.72 per master, which is extremely high when compared to other large scale operations.
Grading, packaging and packaging materials were $3.75 per master. This high rate is largely due to the physical constraints of the simplistic washing and packaging line which requires a high amount
of labor. Warehouse utilities were $.90 per bale. This is rather high due to the low volume of product in the warehouse. Telephone/marketing and delivery were $4.00 per cwt. This rate is high, not
only because product volumes are low, but also because the product was often marketed and delivered directly to local retail markets, bypassing wholesale houses which might have taken large
volumes at lower prices. Regular large deliveries of product would result in lower per unit prices. Based on field experiments, the production and marketing of sweet carrots in North Dakota
appears feasible, but a larger scale operation is required to make this venture profitable. One of the most serious constraints in producing carrots in North Dakota is the problem of spring seedling
emergence. This problem can best be solved by early spring planting, irrigation, or through application of an anti-crust substance to the row's surface. Marketing of sweet short carrots as a packaged
product may represent a serious problem in terms of market acceptance. Although flavor is excellent, product appearance may be unacceptable for a clientele accustomed to a long carrot. The
future of producing carrots for packaging seems to hinge upon market acceptance of a short but sweet carrot.
Onions
Transplant onions, winter storage onions, and greentop onions will be discussed along with production and cost data for each type of onion crop. The problems and benefits of each type of onion
will also be presented.
Transplant Onions
Spanish onion transplants from Georgia were air-freighted to Minneapolis and hauled by pickup truck to North Dakota in 1988. The plants were transplanted using a four row transplanter requiring
six workers, one worker for each row, a tractor driver, and a worker to monitor planting depth and reset plants. Onion plants were set 5 1/2 to 6 inches apart in 20-inch rows, for a total of about
50,000 plants per acre. A tractor planting speed of 1/4th to 1/5th mile per hour was required to permit workers sufficient time to feed the transplanter. Water from tanks mounted on the tractor was
applied as the plants were transplanted. Drought conditions required an additional two or three waterings to enable transplants to set roots. The transplanted crop was organically grown with no
application of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, or insecticides. Inoculants were used on onion roots to ensure abundant bacterial life in the soil. Liquid fish emulsion was applied with water as a
source of nitrogen. Planting began in late May and continued through the third week of June, despite the drought. A transplant catch of around 90 percent was obtained with the help of irrigation. The
onion transplants were cultivated and hand weeded twice. The seedlings developed large bulbs, most of which were hand-harvested into burlap sacks in September. Harvest began when about 75
percent of the tops had weakened and fallen over. Workers with knives or scissors gathered onion tops in handfuls, pulled the entire plant, and cut the bulbs from the tops, allowing the bulbs to fall
into pails or baskets. The onions were then dumped into burlap sacks and allowed to dry in the field for up to one week. When the onion leaves were dusty and rustled in the bags, they were
transported to a warehouse where they were air stacked on rows of pallets. Ventilation was allowed to penetrate the sides and center of each pallet. Fans were used to circulate air around the onions
to facilitate the evaporation of transpired moisture. The onions were then hand graded into five sizes and marketed in 50 pound mesh bags. Packout percentages are shown in Figure 7. The variable
cost of growing transplant onions in 1988 came to $4.81 per 50 pound master, which is about equal to an FOB price of commercial onions grown in Western states (Table 32). The transplants alone
cost nearly $2.00 per master. Variable harvest and packaging costs came to $3.90 per master, which was double most commercial rates. Despite high growing costs, which consisted primarily of
seedling purchase and transplanting, the transplant onion operation was profitable (Tables 32 and 33). This was largely because fixed costs were low ($1.70 per master). The onions were shipped
early, requiring only temporary indoor storage.
The major advantages of transplant onions over direct seeded onions are:
a) they permit an early harvest of late maturing varieties (eg. spanish type) which normally implies higher prices.
b) they facilitate weed control in an organic production system where chemical weed control cannot be used.
The major disadvantages are the increased cost of seedlings over seed and the slow transplanting process.
Direct Seeded Winter Storage Onions
These onions were planted in 20-inch rows at a rate of 3.2 pounds per acre (slightly above the 2.5 pounds per acre recommended for 20 inch row spacing) on 5.3 acres of certified organic land in
mid April 1988. The major concerns in planting the crop were emergence and weed control in an organic production system. Seedling emergence was good, resulting in optimal plant density,
causing onions to remain small in size. Weed control using a beet cultivator and hand-weeding within the rows was manageable. The unavailability of migrant labor during weeding season
resulted in some weeds going to seed before they were pulled. Variable growing costs were $427 per acre, with seed and hand weeding accounting for 85 percent of this amount. Due to high plant
density, 1.3 acres of the field was harvested as table onions when the plants reached pencil size. The remaining four acres of onions were hand harvested in early October before a hard frost. Half of
the onions were picked by the tops. A small home made one row onion digger was used to lift the balance of the onions. A pull type rod weeder was effective to lift the onions in some parts of the
field, but where the ground was packed and hard, it skimmed over the soil surface. Inadequate moisture resulted in a large percenatge of small or "prepack" onions (Figure 8). Variable harvesting,
packaging, and marketing costs were exceptionally high due to inadequate harvest equipment and unavailabilty of grading equipment. As a result, this operation had a net loss (Tables 34 and 35). The
production of quality winter storage onions in North Dakota is feasible; however, and has been proven by area growers in the past and present. The production of direct seeded onions using organic
methods is troublesome in light of weed control. Onions are poor competitors against weeds. A heavy weed growth which might occur in normal years could make hand weeding economically
infeasible and result in loss of the crop. Chemical herbicides are an effective means of weed control for the conventional grower and can be used effectively in North Dakota. The major advantage
of direct seeded onions over transplants is the considerably lower up-front cost required to establish a seedbed. In an organic system this advantage may be offset by the higher cost of hand weeding
direct seeded onions during their longer life cycle. Since onion seedlings are extremely fragile after emergence, soil cannot be pushed against them during cultivation. They can be readily damaged
or cut off by drifting soil on windy days.
Greentop Table Onions
A winter storage variety of greentop table onions were planted and harvested from 1.3 acres. Due to high plant density, a decision was made to harvest the onions prior to bulbing for sale as table
onions. The greentop table onion operation consisted of hand-pulling, gathering onions into baskets, and transferring them to a warehouse where they were spray-washed with water. Washed plants
were then bunched and tied with rubber bands with six to eight plants per bunch. Forty-eight bunches were packed in cartons lined with plastic coated paper for moisture resistance. The onions were
marketed to supermarkets in Fargo and Grand Forks during July. Onion tops were left intact and no ice was applied due to lack of icing capability. Deliveries were made biweekly. The major
problem encountered was that onion tops quickly lost their fresh appearance, especially if held over from one delivery day to the next. Onions not sold quickly in supermarkets soon lost their
market appeal. It was apparent only quality fresh products were acceptable to consumers. Approximately one-third of the onions which had been hand harvested were discarded due to lack of
freshness. Revenue from the sale of greentop onions basically covered all variable costs but was insufficient to cover fixed costs (Table 36). Fixed costs, when allocated on the basis of equipment
usage, were substantial, although the facilities were underutilized during midsummer and alternative opportunity costs were therefore quite low. Greentop onions have market potential for local
fresh markets. Local demand for onions in the summer was strong, but varieties which retain their fresh appearance would need to be selected. The operation is labor intensive and labor demand is
greatest in mid-summer when school-aged youth are available to work. Irrigation, while not essential, is desirable to ensure a mild onion product.
Potato Crop for 1988
Conventionally grown North Dakota red potatoes are currently produced on a large scale and marketed across the entire eastern half of the U.S. Certified organic production of red potatoes in
North Dakota is as yet a novelty. Red Pontiac potatoes were planted on 4.6 acres in late May at a rate of 16 cwt. of seed per acre. No chemical fertilizer was used and mechanical means of weed
control were effective and adequate. Organic methods of insect control were only partially effective due to producer inexperience. As a result, considerable plant defoliation occurred. Ten percent
of the harvest was lifted and hand-picked for early marketing with the balance mechanically harvested. Due to drought and plant defoliation, yield was only about 80 cwt. per acre, compared to
typical yields of 160 cwt. per acre for commercial growers. As a result a high percentage of the product was small. The mechanical harvester badly bruises the potatoes due to the presence of dirt
chunks in the soil, so an unusually high percentage of potatoes were graded out as culls (Figure 9). Given the high percentage of culls and #2 product, coupled with reduced yield and a small scale
operation, revenues were only sufficient to cover variable costs. However, prices for the product were favorable. Volume per shipment was generally small, resulting in high packaging, delivery, and
marketing expense per master (Tables 37 and 38). Potato production using organic production techniques is feasible, especially if mechanical methods of weed control are effective. Major
problems associated with organic production are soil fertility to assure high yield and control of insects using organic methods. Temperature controlled storage is also a consideration, since sprout
inhibitors used on conventional potatoes cannot be used on organic products.
Broccoli
This section presents case study data on broccoli. The production problems and cost data will be discussed and problems with the crop will also be presented. Approximately 200 broccoli plants
were transplanted around July 1, 1987, and harvested in mid-September. The crop established itself with some watering and was of excellent quality and flavor. Based on the 1987 experience,
approximately 8,000 Southern-grown transplants were set out in early June of 1988 and watered numerous times with a tractor mounted tank. Only 75-80 percent of the broccoli plants took root as
a result of continued drought, hot temperatures, and strong southerly winds. Flea beetles, together with drought conditions, took a severe toll on the broccoli. Most of the plants were stunted and
production was poor. Head flavor was strong, making the product nearly unsaleable. Adequate insect control using organic products was time consuming, as weekly spraying or dusting was
required.Broccoli heads were hand-harvested with knives in early morning hours and placed into vented baskets. The baskets were transported to a warehouse where they were placed in a cooler
over flumes or air ducts in the floor. Thirty-six degree air was then forced through the product. After cooling, the broccoli was trimmed and bunched with two to three heads per bunch and packed
14 bunches per plastic paper coated box. Small spears of broccoli were packaged in plastic freezer bags, 1.5 pounds per bag. The broccoli was marketed in supermarkets in Fargo and Grand Forks.
The broccoli operation was the least profitable of all during 1988. Because of the product's strong flavor, broccoli harvest was suspended prematurely. Sales revenue was not enough to cover
variable and fixed costs (Table 39). Production of broccoli is very labor intensive and when done without irrigation is risky, especially during the summer when temperatures soar and southerly
winds desiccate the succulent stems. A late fall crop may fare better if plants can be successfully established. Two year's experience indicates irrigation is required to reduce risk of crop failure and
avoid strong product flavor resulting from drought and plant stress. With irrigation, broccoli production could be successful in North Dakota using organic or commercial production methods.
Summary of Red River Valley Case Study
Returns for each crop, except broccoli, and green table onions, covered variable production costs (Table 40). Overall profitability was, in most cases, negative when operator labor and fixed costs
were considered. Only potatoes and transplant onions had 65 a return above variable and fixed costs. Carrots, green table and seeded onions were unprofitable because of high labor costs. Broccoli
was not profitable due to poor production caused by flea beetles and drought conditions. Transplant onions were profitable because their shorter life-cycle reduced both weeding and storage costs.
Potato yield was low, with a high percentage of potatoes graded as culls. Poor potato yield was a result of drought and ineffective organic control of insects. A small profit was achieved due to
favorable product prices.
Expanded Model
The expanded model for this study is based on a study done by the Agricultural Economics Department of Michigan State University. The study entitled "Costs of Producing Carrots" addressed fixed
and variable costs associated with a commercial sized carrot farm and profitability of carrots under alternative yield and price assumptions. The same methodology used for the Michigan study was
used to develop a commercial vegetable operation for North Dakota. Carrots and onions were selected for this study. These vegetables were selected because the case study and horticultural crop
survey indicated North Dakota had favorable conditions for successfully producing the two crops. Although North Dakota does not have a commercial vegetable operation, this model presents the
opportunities available to individuals interested in starting an operation specializing in the production of carrots and/or onions
The following assumptions were made for this model: 1) the farm would consist of 300 acres with 250 acres tillable, 2) 100 acres would be planted to either carrots or onions, 3) the remaining
150 acres were used for grain or other vegetable crops, 4) carrots would be irrigated to help alleviate the emergence problem, and 5) there would be wells available to provide sufficient water for
irrigation of carrots.
Carrot Enterprise
This section addresses the profitability of growing 100 acres of carrots. Both fixed and variable costs for this operation were taken from the Michigan study. Price and yield used to determine gross
receipts are from the case study presented in this paper. Various prices and yields are presented to illustrate how losses/returns vary with variations in price and yield.
Fixed Costs
Fixed costs do not vary with the acres planted or yield of the crop (once committed to the production of the crop). They include such items as depreciation, interest, repairs and maintenance, land
rental, and insurance. Machinery and equipment are a considerable portion of fixed costs. General machinery and equipment costs needed to operate the 300 acre farm are provided in Table 41. The
sum of general machinery and equipment costs amounted to $217,550 with an annual depreciation of $16,030. Specialized equipment costs amounted to $113,000 with annual depreciation of
$10,800 (Table 42). Land, building, and improvement costs necessary for the 300-acre farm are listed in Table 43. Land cost is disregarded since it was assumed land would be rented. Most
vegetable operations use the percent of income producing acreage method to allocate costs. This method was used in the Michigan study and is used for this study. Since the carrot enterprise uses
40 percent of the income producing acreage, 40 percent of all fixed costs for operating the farm are charged to carrots. Fixed costs that occur specifically with the carrot enterprise are allocated at
the rate of 100 percent.
Variable Costs
The variable costs are those which vary with production of the crop. These include seed, fertilizer, the various chemicals used for the crop, labor, and other costs. The variable costs incurred in a
typical carrot operation were $2,079 (Table 45). The variable inputs are presented on a per acre basis for both the amount used and cost.
Total Costs and Net Returns
Gross receipts, variable and fixed costs, and net returns for both a per acre and per master basis were provided (Table 46). The carrot operation was profitable at a yield of 350 masters per acre and a
price of $7.00 per master (Table 46). This was assumed to be a possible price and yield given conditions presented in the case study. The price received for carrots can vary depending on the
targeted market and regional location of markets. Price can also vary depending on whether the farmer uses irrigation. The price used for computing gross receipts in Table 46 was the price
received for organically grown carrots in the Red River Valley case study. It should be noted the price of carrots would be less if not organically grown. Net returns per acre for various prices and
yields are provided in Table 47. A wide range of prices were used to represent both organically and non-organically grown carrots. Organically grown carrots generally command a higher price in
the marketplace. Organically grown carrots were represented in Table 47 by prices of $9, $11, and $13 while non-organically grown prices were represented by prices of $5 and $7. Net returns
(Table 47) were determined using the following assumptions. First, variable costs expended to prepare the land and grow carrots would not vary with yield. However, it was assumed harvesting,
packaging, and promotion costs would vary directly with yield. Active vegetable producers should compute their costs of operatrion using cost and yield estimates pertaining to their enterprise.
Onion Enterprise
Like the carrot enterprise, both fixed and variable costs of onions were used from the Michigan study. Some fixed and variable inputs used differ between the carrot and onion enterprises. Some
additional inputs were added which specifically pertain to the production of onions. Price and yield used to determine gross receipts are from the case study presented in this paper. Various price
and yield scenarios are presented to illustrate how losses/returns vary with price and yield. Fixed Costs General machinery and equipment costs totaled $206,400 with an annual depreciation of
$16,820 (Table 48). Costs for specialized equipment are listed in Table 49. Specialized equipment costs totaled $24,000 with annual depreciation of $3,400. Land, building, and improvement costs
necessary for a typical 300-acre farm are provided in Table 50. Again land was rented rather than purchased. Specialized building and improvement costs amounted to $77,500 with annual
depreciation of $3,800 (Table 51).
Total Costs and Net Returns
Variable and fixed costs were subtracted from gross receipts to arrive at per acre and per master net returns for onion production (Table 54). The onion operation was profitable at a price of $7.00
per bag and a yield of 400 bags per acre. This was perceived to be a possible price and yield given conditions presented in the case study. The price received could possibly be higher, depending
upon targeted markets and regional location of markets. Price can also vary depending on whether the farmer uses irrigation. Net returns for a range of possible prices and yields are presented in
Table 55. These values were computed assuming only harvesting, packaging, and promotion costs varied directly with yields. A yield of 300 bags and a price between $6 and $7 would have to be
received to just break even (Table 55). The results presented are hypothetical and will vary depending on a producers' situation.
Summary and Conclusions
The potential for competitive commercial production of vegetables in North Dakota was examined in this study. Production and marketing aspects were reviewed for vegetables. Vegetable crops
having the most agronomic potential were: rhubarb, asparagus, horseradish, red beets, carrots, garlic, onions, cabbage (excluding chinese), muskmelon, winter squash, summer squash, pumpkins,
sweetcorn, cucumbers, green peas, and green beans. Root crops such as red beets, onions, and carrots had the most production and marketing potential. Potential for North Dakota onion and carrot
production was examined. First, total and seasonal U.S. production and foreign trade statistics were presented. Onions and carrots were divided by type (spring, summer non-storage, summer
storage, and California for onions; fresh and processed for carrots). Market shares, seasonal prices, monthly shipments and returns to storage were presented. Regional market share (production)
and population along with per capita consumption were used to determine regional demand. Results indicate North Dakota lies in a net import region for both crops. This would suggest production
potential exists for North Dakota production of carrots and onions. Transportation costs from North Dakota and competing regions were introduced. North Dakota's advantage (disadvantage) in
transportation costs versus other production regions were determined for the Fargo, Minneapolis, Chicago, New York, Atlanta, and Sioux Falls markets. North Dakota onions have a transportation
advantage over the Pacific Northwest and Denver origins for all the markets. Michigan onions enjoy a transportation advantage over North Dakota for the Chicago, New York, and Atlanta Markets.
North Dakota carrots have a transportation advantage over California for all the destination markets studied. A transportation advantage also exists for North Dakota carrots over Michigan and
Minnesota carrots for the Fargo market and over Michigan for the Minneapolis and Sioux Falls markets. North Dakota's competitiveness in any market is determined by production and
transportation costs relative to production and transportation costs for other originating regions. However, since production costs for each region were not available, competitiveness comparisons
were unobtainable. A case study of a small vegetable production/marketing operation was analyzed. A vegetable operation was started in the central Red River Valley in 1987 and continued in
1988. Production in 1987 concentrated on carrots while 1988 production shifted in favor of onions. Red potatoes, broccoli, winter squash, summer squash, melons, cabbage, and tomatoes were
also grown. Results of the operation including machinery utilization, production, sales, variable and fixed costs, packout, prices and net return data were analyzed for each enterprise. Operational
problems encountered were made an integral part of the analysis. An expanded model was developed from case study data and followed the methodology of a study done by Michigan State
University. The expanded model evaluated economic feasibility of a commercial-sized operation producing either carrots or onions. Assumptions used in the expanded model included a 300 acre
farm with 250 tillable acres (100 acres of either carrots or onions). Carrot acreage was irrigated while onion acreage was not. Carrot yields were estimated at 350 masters per acre and priced
at $7.00 per master (based on case study data). Onion yields were estimated at 400 bags per acre using a $7.00 per bag market price. Carrots were estimated to have positive net returns. Carrot
production in the central Red River Valley of North Dakota was estimated to have per acre fixed and variable costs of $489 and $2,079, respectively. Carrot receipts were estimated to be
$2,850 per acre. Net return for carrots was $282 per acre. Various price and yield scenarios presented indicate net returns for carrots. Under the assumed cost structure, carrots were profitable at a
yield of 250 masters per acre and a price of $9 per master. Onions were also estimated to have positive net returns. Onion production in the central Red River Valley of North Dakota was estimated
to have per acre fixed and variable costs of $448 and $857, respectively. Onion receipts were estimated at $2,800 per acre and estimated net returns of $494 per acre. Net returns under various
price and yield scenarios were also presented. Positive net returns were indicated for yields of 300 bags per acre and $7 per bag. Feasibility studies can estimate costs and returns, but, anyone
considering vegetable enterprises should use the estimates in this study as a guide, remembering that his/her costs and returns may differ.
Areas Needing Further Study
This study has focused on the fresh vegetable market with little attention given to the vegetable processing market. Interviewing vegetable processors of the Upper Midwest could be valuable in
identifying constraints and opportunities for expanded vegetable production and marketing in North Dakota.
References
Edward E. Judge and Sons, Inc. The Almanac of the Canning, Freezing, Preserving, Industries, Maryland, U.S., 1988.
Lorenz, Oscar A., and D.N. Maynard. Knotts Handbook for Vegetable Growers, 2nd edition, p. 56.
Lutz, J.M., and R.E. Hardenburg. "The Commercial Storage of Fruits, Vegetables, and Florist and Nursery Stocks." USDA Handbook No. 66; p. 20 and pp. 37-53, 1968.
Romkey, Bud. Onion Grower and Packager of Moorhead, Minnesota, Interview, Spring 1989.
Shapley, Allen E. and Thomas A. Dudek. January 1989. "Costs of Producing Carrots."
Agr. Econ. Rpt. No. 520, Dept. of Agr. Econ., Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI.
USDA, Agricultural Marketing Services, Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Prices, 1978-1988, Washington, D.C.
USDA, Agricultural Marketing Services, Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Shipments, Washington, D.C., 1988.
USDA Agricultural Statistics Board, Vegetables, Various Annual Summaries, Washington, D.C., 1970-1988.
USDA, Economic Research Service, Food Consumption, Prices, and Expenditures, 1966-1987.
Statistical Bulletin No. 773, Washington, D.C., January 1989.
USDA, Economic Research Service, Vegetables and Specialties, Situation and Outlook
Yearbook, Washington, D.C., November 1988.
Voyles, Jerry. Agricultural Manager for United Foods Company, Fairmont, Minnesota,
Interview, March 25, 1988.