POLITICAL
IDEAS
Anarchism considers the
state undesirable, unnecessary, and harmful, and instead promotes a stateless
society, or anarchy. Anarchists seek to diminish or even eliminate reliance
upon authority in the conduct of human relations, but thus have widely
disagreed on what additional criteria are essential or beneficial to anarchism
and human society. Anarchism is usually identified as the most
anti-authoritarian of all political ideologies.
Karl Marx wrote the
seminal works of this political ideology, which described the strengths and
weaknesses of the capitalist economic system and argued that it would
eventually be overthrown in order to bring about a more just and equal society.
This would mean first implementing a socialist system and inevitably a
communist society. According to Marx, all injustices and inequalities in the
world can be traced to the class struggle, or the inequalities inherent to the
capitalist system. Marxists may consider themselves socialists or communists as
there exists much overlap between these ideologies.
HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
MOSCOW TRAILS
Trotsky had received
comparatively good press in the West, especially since World War II, when the
wartime alliance with Stalin turned sour. Trotsky has been published by major
corporations,[1] and is generally considered the grandfatherly figure of
Bolshevism.[2] “Uncle Joe,” on the other hand, was quickly demonized as a
tyrant, and the “gallant Soviet Army” that stopped the Germans at Stalingrad
was turned into a threat to world freedom, when in the aftermath of World War
II the USSR did not prove compliant in regard to US plans for a post-war world
order.[3] However, even before the rift, basically from the beginning of the
Moscow Trials, Western academics such as Professor John Dewey condemned the
proceedings as a brutal travesty. The Moscow Trials are here reconsidered
within the context of the historical circumstances and of the judicial system
that Trotsky and other defendants had themselves played prominent roles in
establishing.
A reconsideration
of the Moscow Trials of the defendants Trotsky et al is important for more
reasons than the purely academic. Since the scuttling of the USSR and of the
Warsaw Pact by a combination of internal betrayal and of subversion undertaken
by a myriad of US-based “civil societies” and NGOs backed by the likes of the
George Soros network, Freedom House, National Endowment for Democracy, and
dozens of other such entities,[4] Russia – after the Yeltsin interregnum of
subservience to globalization – has sought to recreate herself as a power that
offers a multipolar rather than a unipolar world. A reborn Russia and the
reshaping of a new geopolitical bloc which responds to Russian leadership, is
therefore of importance to all those throughout the world who are cynical about
the prospect of a “new world order” dominated by “American ideals.” US foreign
policy analysts, “statesmen” (sic), opinion molders, and lobbyists still have
nightmares about Stalin and the possibility of a Stalin-type figure arising who
will re-establish Russia’s position in the world. For example, Putin, a
“strongman” type in Western-liberal eyes at least, has been ambivalent about
the role of Stalin in history, such ambivalence, rather than unequivocal
rejection, being sufficient to make oligarchs in the USA and Russia herself,
nervous. Hence, The Sunday Times, commenting on the Putin phenomena being dangerously
reminiscent of Stalinism, stated recently:
Joseph Stalin sent
millions to their deaths during his reign of terror, and his name was taboo for
decades, but the dictator is a step closer to rehabilitation after Vladimir
Putin openly praised his achievements.
The Prime Minister
and former KGB agent used an appearance on national television to give credit
to Stalin for making the Soviet Union an industrial superpower, and for
defeating Hitler in the Second World War.
In a verdict that
will be obediently absorbed by a state bureaucracy long used to taking its cue
from above, Mr Putin declared that it was “impossible to make a judgment in
general” about the man who presided over the Gulag slave camps. His view
contrasted sharply with that of President Medvedev, Russia’s nominal leader,
who has said that there is no excuse for the terror unleashed by Stalin.
Mr Putin said that
he had deliberately included the issue of Stalin’s legacy in a marathon annual
question-and-answer program on live television, because it was being “actively
discussed” by Russians.[5]
While The Times’ Halpin
commented that Putin nonetheless gave the obligatory comments about the
brutality of Stalin’s regime, following a forceful condemnation of Stalin by
Medvedev on October 9, 2009, it is worrying nonetheless that Putin could state
that positive aspects “undoubtedly existed.” Such comments are the same as if a
leading German political figure had stated that some positive aspects of Hitler
“undoubtedly existed.” The guilt complex of Stalinist tyranny, having its
origins in Trotskyite Stalinophobia, which has been carried over into the
present “Cold War II” era of a bastardous mixture of “neo-cons” (i.e.,
post-Trotskyites) and Soros type globalists, often working in tandem despite
their supposed differences,[6] is supposed to keep Russia down in perpetuity.
Should Russia rise again, however, the specter of Stalin is there to frighten
the world into adherence to US policy in the same way that the “war on
terrorism” is designed to dragoon the world behind the USA. Just as
importantly, The Times article commented on Putin’s opposition to the
Russian oligarchy, which has been presented by the Western news media as a
“human rights issue”:
During the
television program, Mr Putin demonstrated his populist instincts by lashing out
at Russia’s billionaire class for their vulgar displays of wealth. His comments
came after a scandal in Geneva, when an elderly man was critically injured in
an accident after an alleged road race involving the children of wealthy
Russians in a Lamborghini and three other sports cars. “The nouveaux riches all
of a sudden got rich very quickly, but they cannot manage their wealth without
showing it off all the time. Yes, this is our problem,” Mr Putin said.[7]
This all seems
lamentably (for the plutocrats) like a replay of what happened after the
Bolshevik Revolution when Stalin kicked out Trotsky et al. Under Trotsky, the
Bolshevik regime would have eagerly sought foreign capital.[8] It is after all
why plutocrats would have had such an interest in ensuring Trotsky’s safe
passage back to Russia in time for the Bolshevik coup, after having had a
pleasant stay with his family in the USA as a guest of Julius Hammer, and
having been comfortably ensconced in an upmarket flat, with a chauffeur at the
family’s disposal.[9] In 1923 the omnipresent globalist think tank the Council
on Foreign Relations, was warning investors to hurry up and get into Soviet
Russia before something went wrong,[10] which it did a few years later. Under
Stalin, even Western technicians were not trusted.
Of particular
note, however, is that well-placed Russian politicians and academics are still
very aware of the globalist apparatus that is working for what is frequently identified
in Russia as a “new world order,” and the responsibility Russia has in
reasserting herself to lead in reshaping a “multipolar” world contra American
hegemony. This influences Russia’s foreign policy, perhaps the most significant
manifestation being the BRIC alliance, despite what this writer regards as the
very dangerous liaison with China.
What is dismissed
as “fringe conspiracy theory” by the superficial and generally “kept” Western
news media and academia, is reported and discussed, among the highest echelons
of Russian media, politics, military, and intelligentsia, with an analytical
methodology that is all but gone from Western journalism and research. For
example, the Russian geopolitical theorist Alexander Dugin is a well-respected
academic who lectures at Moscow State University under the auspices of the
Center for Conservative Studies, which is part of the Department of Sociology
(International Relations). The subjects discussed by Professor Dugin and his
colleagues and students feature the menace of world government and the
challenges of globalism to Russian statehood. The movement he inspired, Eurasianism, has many
prominent people in Russia and elsewhere.
Perhaps the best
indication of Russia’s persistence in remaining resistant to globalist and
hegemonic schemes for world re-organization is the information that is
published by the Ministry of International Affairs. Despite the disclaimer, the
articles and analyses are a far cry from the shallowness of the mainstream news
media of the Western world. Articles posted by the Ministry as this paper is
written include a cynical consideration of the North African revolutions and
the role of “social media;” and an article pointing to the immense
socio-economic benefits wrought by the Qaddafi regime, which is now being
targeted by revolts “backed by Western intelligence services.” Political
analyst Sergei Shashkov theorizes that:
Recent events
perfectly fit into the US-invented concept of “manageable chaos” (also known as
“controlled instability” theory). Among its authors are: Zbigniew Brzezinski,
a Polish American political scientist, Gene Sharp, who wrote From Dictatorship to Democracy, and Steven Mann, whose Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought was published in Washington in 1992, and who was involved
in plotting “color revolutions” in some former Soviet republics.
The only place one
is going to get that type of analyses in the West is in alternative media
sources such as Foreign Policy Journal or Global
Research. What Western government
ministry would have the independence of mind to circulate analyses of this
type? Russians have the opportunity to be the most well-informed people in the
world in matters that are of real importance. Westerners, on the other hand, do
have that essential freedom – to watch US sitcoms and keep abreast of the
tittle-tattle of movie stars and pop singers. Clearly, Russia is not readily
succumbing to the type of post-Cold War world as envisaged by plutocrats and US
hegemonists, expressed by George H W Bush in his hopes for a “new world order”
after the demise of the Soviet bloc.[19] Beginning with Putin, Russia has
refused to co-operate in the establishment of the “new world order,” just as
Stalin did not go along with similar schemes intended for the post-World War II
era.
POLITICAL
CLASSIFIFCATION
In many contemporary
national political systems the forces of history and administrative necessity
have joined to produce regional communities at an intermediate level between
the local and the national community. In some cases—the Swiss canton, the
English county, the German Land, and the American state—these regional
communities possess their own political institutions and exercise governmental
functions. In other cases, however, the territorial community is a product of
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, physiographic, or economic factors and maintains
its identity without the support of political structures.
In
many contemporary national political systems the forces of history and
administrative necessity have joined to produce regional communities at an
intermediate level between the local and the national community. In some
cases—the Swiss canton, the English county, the German Land, and the
American state—these regional communities possess their own political
institutions and exercise governmental functions. In other cases, however, the
territorial community is a product of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, physiographic,
or economic factors and maintains its identity without the support of political
structures.
As
subnational political systems, regional communities are sometimes based in
tradition, even tracing their origin to a period prior to the founding of the
country; in other cases, they are modern administrative units created by
national governments for their own purposes. Examples of both types may be
found in the history of regionalism in France and its complex pattern of
internal territorial divisions. Before the French Revolution, France was
divided into ancient provinces—Burgundy, Gascony, Brittany, Normandy, Provence,
Anjou, Poitou, and others. After the Revolution, in what seems to have been an
effort to discourage regional patriotism and threats of separatism, the
Napoleonic government superimposed a new regional structure of départements
on the old provincial map. More than a century and a half later, in the era of
rapid communications and national economic planning, the French national
government announced a regrouping of the Napoleonic départements into
much larger Gaullist régions. Recognizing, perhaps, the continuing
strength of the provincial attachments of Gascon, Breton, Norman, and Provençal
and the survival of old regional folk cultures with their distinctive patterns
of speech, the new régions were given boundaries similar in many cases
to the traditional provincial boundaries of pre-republican France.
The
history of the French regional communities is not a special case, for
political, administrative, economic, and technical forces have led many other
national governments to replace traditional territorial divisions with new
regional units. In England, for example, the traditional structure of county
governments was replaced in the late 19th century by a system of administrative
counties, many of which in turn lost area to other units of local government in
the 1970s and the 1990s. Attempts have also been made to use older regional
communities as the infrastructure for new systems of regional government. Thus,
the Italian constitution provides for a number of regions, five of which—Valle
d’Aosta, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino–Alto Adige, and Friuli–Venezia Giulia—enjoy
a special autonomous status and which, in different ways, are historically distinct
from the rest of Italy.
In yet other cases the fear of competition from regional governments or of
separatist movements has led national governments to make various efforts to
resist the development of regional political structures. Again, Italy provides
a convenient example, for Italian governments refused to establish all the
regions provided for in the 1948 constitution until 1970. It should be noted
that the Italian republic of 1870–1922 and its fascist successor state also
made similar efforts to combat regional political development, the former by
the creation of a large number of administrative provinces and the latter by
establishing corporazione to represent occupations regardless of
geographic location.
In
several modern states the growth of vast conurbations and the rise of the
megalopolis have prompted the development of other kinds of regional governmental
structures. The Port of London Authority and the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey are examples of regional systems designed to serve the needs of
urban communities that have outgrown the boundaries of existing city
governments. Other regional structures have also resulted from the increased
responsibility of national governments for the administration of comprehensive
social and economic programs. The Tennessee Valley Authority, for example, is
both a national agency and a regional government whose decisions affect the
lives of the inhabitants of all the states and cities in its sphere. Further
examples of such regional administrative structures include zonal councils
established in India for social and economic planning purposes, as well as
governmental and economic units established in Britain to deal with the
problems of industrially depressed areas.
Issues of classification
Types of classification schemes
The
almost infinite range of political systems has been barely suggested in this
brief review. Confronted by the vast array of political forms, political
scientists have attempted to classify and categorize, to develop typologies and
models, or in some other way to bring analytic order to the bewildering variety
of data. Many different schemes have been developed. There is, for example, the
classical distinction between governments in terms of the number of
rulers—government by one man (monarchy or tyranny), government by the few
(aristocracy or oligarchy), and government by the many (democracy). There are
schemes classifying governments in terms of their key institutions (for
example, parliamentarism, cabinet government, presidentialism). There are
classifications that group systems according to basic principles of political
authority or the forms of legitimacy (charismatic, traditional, rational-legal,
and others). Other schemes distinguish between different kinds of economic
organization in the system (the laissez-faire state, the corporate state, and
socialist and communist forms of state economic organization) or between the
rule of different economic classes (feudal, bourgeois, and capitalist). And
there are modern efforts to compare the functions of political systems
(capabilities, conversion functions, and system maintenance and adaptation
functions) and to classify them in terms of structure, function, and political
culture.
Although
none is comprehensive, each of these principles of analysis has some validity,
and the classifying schemes that are based on them, although in some cases no
longer relevant to modern forms of political organization, have often been a
major influence on the course of political development. The most influential of
such classifying schemes is undoubtedly the attempt of Plato and Aristotle
to define the basic forms of government in terms of the number of power holders
and their use or abuse of power. Plato held that there was a natural succession of the forms of
government: an aristocracy (the ideal form of government by the few) that
abuses its power develops into a timocracy (in which the rule of the best men,
who value wisdom as the highest political good, is succeeded by the rule of men
who are primarily concerned with honour and martial virtue), which through greed
develops into an oligarchy (the perverted form of government by the few), which
in turn is succeeded by a democracy (rule by the many); through excess, the
democracy becomes an anarchy (a lawless government), to which a tyrant is
inevitably the successor. Abuse of power in the Platonic typology is defined by
the rulers’ neglect or rejection of the prevailing law or custom (nomos);
the ideal forms are thus nomos observing (ennomon), and the
perverted forms are nomos neglecting (paranomon). Although
disputing the character of this implacable succession of the forms of
government, Aristotle also based his classification on the number of rulers and
distinguished between good and bad forms of government. In his typology it was
the rulers’ concern for the common good that distinguished the ideal from
perverted forms of government. The ideal forms in the Aristotelian scheme are monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (a term conveying some of the
meaning of the modern concept of “constitutional democracy”); when perverted by
the selfish abuse of power, they are transformed respectively into tyranny,
oligarchy, and ochlocracy (or the mob rule of lawless democracy). The concept
of the polity, a “mixed” or blended constitutional order, fascinated political
theorists for another millennium. To achieve its advantages, innumerable
writers from Polybius to St. Thomas Aquinas experimented with the construction
of models giving to each social class the control of appropriate institutions
of government.
Another
very influential classifying scheme was the distinction between monarchies and
republics. In the writings of Machiavelli and others, the tripartism of
classical typologies was replaced by the dichotomy of princely and republican
rule. Sovereignty
in the monarchy or the principality is in the hands of a single ruler; in
republics, sovereignty is vested in a plurality or collectivity of power
holders. Reducing aristocracy and democracy to the single category of
republican rule, Machiavelli
also laid the basis in his analysis of the exercise of princely power for a
further distinction between despotic and nondespotic forms of government. In
the work of Montesquieu, for example, despotism, or the lawless exercise of
power by the single ruler, is contrasted with the constitutional forms of
government of the monarchy and the republic. As a result of the decline of
monarchies and the rise of new totalitarian states terming themselves
republics, this traditional classification is now, of course, of little more
than historical interest.
Modern classifying systems
The usefulness of
all the traditional classifications has been undermined by the momentous
changes in the political organization of the modern world. Typologies based on
the number of power holders or the formal structures of the state are rendered
almost meaningless by the standardization of “democratic” forms, the deceptive
similarities in the constitutional claims and governmental institutions of
regimes that actually differ markedly in their political practices, and the
rise of new political orders in the non-Western world. A number of modern
writers have attempted to overcome this difficulty by constructing classifying
schemes that give primary importance to social, cultural, economic, or
psychological factors. The most influential of such schemes is the Marxist
typology, which classifies types of rule on the basis of economic class
divisions and defines the ruling class as that which controls the means of
production in the state. A monistic typology that also emphasized the
importance of a ruling class was developed by an Italian theorist of the early
20th century, Gaetano
Mosca. In Mosca’s writings all forms of government appear as mere facades
for oligarchy or the rule of a political “elite” that centres power in its own
hands. Another classification, which distinguishes between “legitimate” and
“revolutionary” governments, was suggested by Mosca’s contemporary Guglielmo Ferrero. Using a sociopsychological approach to
the relations between rulers and ruled, Ferrero held that a legitimate
government is one whose citizens voluntarily accept its rule and freely give it
their loyalty; in revolutionary systems, the government fears the people and is
feared by them. Legitimacy and leadership are also the basis of a typology
developed by the German sociologist Max Weber.
In Weber’s scheme there are three basic types of rule: charismatic, in which
the authority or legitimacy of the ruler rests upon some genuine sense of
calling and in which the followers submit because of their faith or conviction
in the ruler’s exemplary character; traditional, in which, as in hereditary
monarchy, leadership authority is historically or traditionally accepted; and
rational-legal, in which leadership authority is the outgrowth of a legal order
that has been effectively rationalized and where there is a prevailing belief
in the legality of normative rules or commands. The Weberian typology has been
elaborated by a number of writers who have found it particularly useful for
comparing and classifying the political orders of the non-Western world.
Political
Ideological Principle
1.
Ideology is one of the most
controversial concepts encountered in political analysis.
2.
The concept of ideology has commonly
been used as a political weapon to condemn or criticise rival creeds or
doctrines.
3.
An inclusive definition of ‘ideology’
must be neutral: it must reject the notion that ideologies are ‘good’ or ‘bad’,
true or false, or liberating or oppressive.
4.
Political ideologies should be treated
as an action-oriented belief system, an interrelated set of ideas that in some
way guides or inspires political action.
5.
Liberalism is the ideology of the
industrialised West, and is sometimes portrayed as a meta-ideology that is
capable of embracing a broad range of rival values and belief.
6.
Meta-ideology:
a higher or second-order ideology that lays down the grounds on which
ideological debate can take place.
7.
Individualism: is the core principle of
liberal ideology. It reflects a belief in the supreme importance of the human
individual as opposed to any social group or collective body. Human beings are
seen, first and foremost, as individuals. This implies both that they are of
equal moral worth and that they possess separate and unique identities.
8.
Freedom: individual freedom or liberty
is the core value of liberalism. It is given priority over equality, justice or
authority. This ensures that each person is able to act as he or she pleases or
chooses. Nevertheless, liberals advocate ‘freedom under the law’, as they
recognise that one person’s liberty may be a threat to the liberty of others.
9.
Reason: Liberals believe that the world
has a rational structure, and that his can be uncovered through the exercise of
human reason and by critical enquiry. This inclines them to place their faith
in the ability of individuals to make wise judgments on their own behalf,
being, in most cases, the best judges of their own interests.
10. Equality:
individuals are ‘born equal’, at least in terms of moral worth. This is
reflected in a liberal commitment to equal rights and entitlements, notably in
the form of legal equality (equality before the law) and political equality
(one person, one vote; one vote, one value). Liberals favour equality of
opportunity that gives all individuals an equal chance to realise their unequal
potential. Liberals thus support the principle of meritocracy, with merit
reflecting, crudely, talent plus hard work.
11. Toleration:
liberals believe that toleration is both a guarantee of individuals liberty and
a means of social enrichment. They believe that pluralism, in the form of
moral, cultural and political diversity, is positively healthy.
12. Consent:
authority and social relaionships should always be based on consent or willing
agreement. Government must be based on the consent of the governed. This is a
doctrine that encourages liberals to favour representation and democracy.
13. Constitutionalism:
liberals see government as a vital guarantee of order and stability in society,
they are constantly aware of the danger that government may become a tyranny
against the individual. They believe in limited government. This goal can be
attained through the fragmentation of government power, by the creation of
checks and balances amongst the various institutions of government, and through
the establishment of a codified constitution embodying a bill of rights that
defines the relationship between the state and the individual.
POLITICAL CRITICIZER
Political
criticism (also referred to as political commentary or
political discussion) is criticism that is specific of or relevant to politics,
including policies,
politicians,
political parties, and types of government.
There is great
controversy over the relevance and importance of political criticism in
civilizations, particularly democratic societies.
Those who contend
that it is of vast importance assert that political discussion creates and
promotes the variety of opinions necessary for a true democracy. The American constitution is often pointed to as
support for the belief, ensuring for all peoples under its administration such
maxims as free
speech.
Critics of this
philosophy affirm instead that the general public (and, on a more individual
basis, the "Average Joe") lacks the resources and capability to
conceive opinions that are educated enough to be taken seriously. Thus, the
abundance and fervent promotion of such opinions merely confuses and
complicates political matters that, given an appropriate amount of factual
education, are either easily understood or should be discussed only by those
with sufficient intelligence to do the matter justice.
METHODS OF POLITICAL CRITICIZER
BOOKS
Throughout
history one of the most influential methods (arguably the most
influential method) of promoting political opinions has been literary. This
peculiar pattern of books influencing the thinking of the masses, reinstated
with such books as the Bible, Uncle Tom's Cabin, the Qur'an, The Diary of a Young Girl, Nineteen Eighty-Four and many others, has been
attributed to many of the characteristics of writing. While it
has been proven that a well-written book can indeed appeal to one's intellect
with reasoning and ideas sprung from common
sense, the drive of literature and writing is most commonly considered to be
derivative of the emotional impact of the text, guiding people to think a
certain way by making them feel a certain way. This often has great political
consequences, most particularly when the subject of the emotional reaction is a
plea for moral justice, as can be seen (to use America as an example once more)
in the aftermath of the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin concerning American views about
slavery. It is
from this correlation between books and politics that the phrase, "the pen is mightier than the sword",
derives.
Television and films
Since their
development in this past century, both television
and films have
often had far-reaching political effects throughout the world. Influential
films and television events include Countdown with Keith Olbermann, Citizen
Kane, the works of Walt Disney, and such political satire as that
found in The Simpsons. Like literature (see above), a movie or
television event has the capacity to have emotional impact on its viewers,
making it an invaluable tool for politics. This attribute is noticed and used
frequently by politicians and ordinary citizens alike; political propaganda
on the screen now has an effect on everything from a nation's outlook on its
economy to the smallest of elections and political decisions.
Political cartoons
Political cartoons (also known as
"editorial cartoons") are infamous for their ability to promote
political views through satirical means. With cartoons the fight for the minds
of the public is not a verbal but a visual one and
leaving strong impressions with the use of powerful symbols or metaphors in
order to communicate the artist's messages.
Criticism of the Roman Catholic Church
Criticism of the Roman
Catholic Church
Criticism
of the Roman Catholic Church subsumes
critical observations made about the current or historical Roman Catholic
Church, in its actions, teachings, omissions, structure, or nature; theological
disagreements would be covered on a denominational basis.
Criticisms may regard the concepts of papal primacy and supremacy, or aspects
of church structure, governance, and particular practices. Since the Roman
Catholic Church is the largest Christian church representing over half of all
Christianscite book |, these criticisms may not represent the majority view of
all Christian believers.
Criticism
of the Roman Catholic Church in previous centuries was more closely related to theological disputes. The
Protestant Reformation (16th century in Europe) came about in no small part due
to abuses of church practices by corrupt clergy in addition to these same
theological disputes.
Political
disputes compounded the theological grievances between Protestants and
Catholics and to this day the debate begun at the Reformation has been
reflected in the diversity of Christian denominations. Contemporary criticisms
of the Roman Catholic Church have tended to come from outside of
Christianity,Fact|date=August 2008 relating more to concepts in philosophy and
culture e.g., Christianity vs. humanism. For this sort of criticism, see
Criticism of Christianity.
Criticism of Roman Catholic beliefs
Opposition to teaching on Biblical grounds
Some
Protestants charge that some Catholic teachings are unbiblical.
[Roman
Catholic position on Scripture and tradition
Protestants
critical of the Roman Catholic Church have attacked its reliance on what was
referred to as "tradition" by the Church.
Others
countered that the notion of "church tradition" did not mean custom.
"Traditio" is that which is handed down — Roman Catholics
believe that the whole "deposit of faith" was given by Christ to the
apostles. Tradition, the written part of the larger tradition, are the
scriptures which, the Church says, must be interpreted in the context of the community
founded by Christ.
The
Roman Catholic notion of "traditio" refers to what is passed down,
and it is generally considered that the Church predates the Bible in written
form.