REFORMS
Keeler
(1993) quoting the Oxford English Dictionary (1988) defines reforms as “ the amendment,
or altering for the better, of some faulty state of things, especially of a
corrupt or oppressive political institution or practice, the removal of some
abuse or wrong” (Keeler, 1993:775). Caiden (1970) provides a useful working
definition of reform to mean an induced,
permanent improvement in administration. According to Wallis (1993), Elekwa and
Eme (2006), this definition, however, requires additional discussion and
explanation. The word “induced” is employed
to indicate that we are talking about a form of change in administration which
is deliberately brought about, not one which just happens by accident but it is
one where conscious
effort is made either by an institution or an individual (e.g. the president of
a country) decreed that an action is needed.
The
concept “permanent” carries a connotation that the changes introduced will be
long-term, not just temporary. That is a reform is “permanent” when the changes
made have “taken root”. The final term requiring discussion within this
operational definition is “improvement” simply put, to improve means “to
makebetter”. Though one man’s improvement may be another man’s decline (See
keeler, 1993) and Wallis, 1993 for detailed analysis of reforms). Taking in
tandem, economic reforms refer to the removal, correction and cancellation of
errors that would have negative impacts in the national economy of a given country
especially in her productive sectors
-
Financial, industrial, human resources and capital components.
TO GET THIS COMPLETE MATERIAL
PRICE:
Pay #5,000 Naira, (i.e. the price
for this material) into our account.
ACCOUNT DETAILS:
Bank: Ecobank
A/c No: 2691085510
Name: Martins Chima
NEXT STEP:
Send your teller no, name and email
address to 07030722911. We will confirm your payment within 3hrs (working
hours) and you will receive this topic material immediately after confirmation
through your e-mail.
We will also send a text
message to your mobile phone number informing you that we have sent you the
COMPLETE MATERIAL.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
OF ANALYSIS
This
paper will adopt the radical political economy approach as its framework of
analysis. There are numerous schools of though related to political economy.
They can be rough fully divided into economic nationalist, economic
internationalist and economic structuralists. These
approaches are both descriptive and prescriptive; in that they, all purport to
describe how any why conditions occur and make arguments about how policy
should be conducted. The
core of economic nationalism is the belief that the states should use its
economic strength to further national interests. By extension, economic
nationalists also advocate using a
state’s power to build economic strength. To accomplish their ends, economic
nationalists rely
on a number of political economic strategies. These
include the use of imperialism and neo-imperialism (that is direct control
imperialism) and indirect control (neo-imperialism) economic incentives and
disincentives (economic carrots (favourable Trade policies and foreign aids)
and disincentives (sanctions) to promote the state’s national interest; and
protectionism and domestic economic support. From
this perspective, economic nationalists are suspicious of economic
interdependence on the ground that it undermines state sovereignty andweakens
the national economic strength. Economic nationalists would proffer that their
local economies use trade barriers, economic subsidies and other policies to
protect national industries, especially strategic ones.
A
second major theoretical perspective and policy approach to political economy
is economic internationalism. This approach is closely associated with such
terms as capitalism, laissez-faire, economic liberalism, and free trade
respectively. Economic internationalists are liberals.
They
posited that international economic relations should and can be conducted
cooperatively because, in their view, the international economy is non-zero sum
game in which prosperity is available to all. Economic internationalists
contend that the best way to create political and economic prosperity is by
freeing economic interchange from political restrictions. They, therefore,
oppose tariff barriers, domestic subsidies, sanctions, and any other economic
tools that distort the free flow of trade and investment capital.
The
origins of economic liberalism lie in the rootsof capitalism. Adam Smith and
David Richardo used it to theorize about the market economy and to attack
mercantilist policies. James Mills and Jeremy Bentham used it to
integraterepresentative government with the calculus of utilitarianism, equating
good policy with the aggregation of individuals’ preferences.
Economic structuralists believe that economic structure determines politics.
That is the structuralists contend that society is divided between have and
have-nots and that theformer
work to keep the latter in order to exploit them. To change this, economic
structuralist favour a radical restructuring of society and the economic system
designed to end the uneven distribution of wealth and power. The structuralists
can be divided into two major camps. The first is the Marxist Theorist Group,
which sees the state and Capitalism as inherent
sources of economic evil. The second groupincludes dependency and world system
analysts, who do not necessarily share the view of the evils of capilism. Instead,
they advocate
fundamental reforms to end economic oppression.
Marxism
is perhaps the best-known strand of structuralist thought. Communalist
ideology, associated with Karl Marx, maintains that the economic order
determines political and social relationships. Thus, the distribution of wealth
andthe struggle between the propertied and powerful bourgeoisie and the poor
and oppressed proletariat is the essence of politics.
According
to Beckman (1983) “the theory and method of Marxian political economy is based on
historical and dialectical materialism” (Beckman, 1983:106). Momoh and
Hundeyin, (2005) adds: “Marx believes that it is the material existence of an
individual that determines his/her consciousness. Marxian political economy
thus gives primacy to the material existence and production of the society,
especially the role of the economy in the study of society. For the sake of
emphasis, the commoditization process is the basis of the scientific analysis
of the Maxian political economy. According to this approach (especially under
capitalism), those who control the means of production (economic/sub structure
are those who also control the polity (super structure), to this extent, the
societal ideology, values, philosophy, legal and political institutions all
reflect and reinforce the economic interest of the dominant ruling class. It is
only this approach that has strongly established the linkage between the
economy and policy. The stage therefore is an organ of oppression by the ruling
class. It exists as a result of the irreconcilable antagonisms between the
bourgeoisie and proletariats contrary to the claims of bourgeois political
economy that states, exists as a neutral entity regulating conflicts among
social forces in the society. This assertion has led to accusation by
bourgeoisie scholars that Marxists analysis amounts to economic determinism or
a unilinear analysis of society. This claim can hardly be sustained because
what Marxist analysis emphasizes is the role of the economic as the determinant
in the last instance” (Momoh and Hundeyin, 2005:46). According to Ibeanu, the
very separation of the state from the economy is a capitalist phenomenon. To
understand why this is so, we need to understand the nature of production relations
in class societies generally, and subsequently, their specificity under
capitalism. In a society divided into classes, the commodification relations
appear as a double interaction:
(a)
The interaction between man as the agent of production and the objects and instruments
of labour, and through this,
(b)
Relations among these agents of commodification, which are class relations.
These two interactions involves
1.
The relationship between the non-worker (the owner) and the objects and
instrument of labour, and
2.
The relationships between the direct producer (the worker) and the objects and instruments
of labour. These relationships define two crucial issues. First, they define economic
ownership. By this we mean the real economic control of the means of production
that is, “ the power to assign the means of production to given uses and so to
dispose of the product obtained” second, they define possession that is, “ the
capacity to put the means of production – always corresponds with economic
ownership. “It is the owners who have real control of the means of production
and thus exploitthe direct producers by extorting surplus labour from them in various
forms” (Poulantzas, 1975: 18-19, Ibeanu, 2006:5)
Applying
this approach in the analysis of the study to the Nigerian situation, the
analysis goes as follows: it is only under capitalism that the direct producer
loses possession of the means of production, leading to the emergence of the
“naked worker”. This occurred by forceful mean initially (primitive
accumulation). But, importantly, underlying all of these elite perceptions and
struggles and the mobilization of identities to garner popular support for
their political projects is the imperative of capital accumulation dependent on
the character and role of the Nigerian state in capitalist development as nurtured
and conditioned by its colonial origin and the mono-cultural and rentier nature
of the modern, post-colonial Nigerian economy. (Jega, 2003:17). Critical to
understanding these, is an appreciation of the nature and character of the
postcolonial sate in Nigeria. Many scholars (e.g.: Graf, 1988; Forest, 1993;
Joseph, 1987; Diamond, 1986.) have identified capitalist rent seeking;
patrimonialism as the major characteristics of the postcolonial Nigerian state.
Some have even fancifully referred to the Nigerian state as a ‘rogue state’ (e.g.
Joseph, 1996). These characteristics have combined with one another, and with
many others, in complex dynamics, to undermine the Nigerian state’s capacity to
discharge those fundamental obligations of a modern sate to its citizens, such
as socioeconomic provisioning, guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms,
ensuring law and order and facilitating peace and stability as preconditions
for growth and development. Those who have presided over the state have tended
to personalize power and privatization collective national resources, while
being excessively reckless in managing the affairs of the nation. Indeed, the
state has become the prime mover of capitalist development and class formation,
with all the associated contradictions that this is wont to spew up. As noted
elsewhere, in Nigeria: The ruling class derived both its origin and wealth from
the state, around which it gravitates, using every available means to secure
power and access. Hence, in the competition and struggles for state power,
especially in the period of economic crises, identity politics become
heightened and tend to assume primacy. The state tends to resort to politics of
identity for its legitimation, while those excluded tend to resort to identity
politics to contest this exclusion. The state, thus, is projected as the
critical variable in identity transformation, and the resurgence of identity politics
(Jega, 2000:19). According to Jega (2003); the colonial state pursued a
capitalist development strategy initially through the promotion of primary
commodity production for export, through which foreign commercial interests
established a firm footing in the Nigerian economy; facilitating the rise of an
indigenous commercial comprador class and the introduction of capitalist
relations of production. Subsequently, in the postcolonial Second World War
epoch, manufacturing enterprises controlled by foreign capital burgeoned, with
the growing comprador classes playing a supporting role. With this came an
accelerated process of urbanization and proletarianisation, the development and
consolidation of capitalist production processes and relations. Jega (2003)
goes on to posit that the role of the indigenous class in the capitalist
production processes and accumulation increased in the era of
decolonialisation, as foreign capital sought willing partners to protect its
investments, and then even more swifty in the post-independence period when the
post-colonial state be come a prime mover of capitalist development. These forces
of self-serving “urban parasites” repressed oppositions (middle class
professionals and the working/unemployed poor) by justifying their actions
using capitalist ideology. The self-serving “urban parasites” in the 1970s till
date not only colluded with colonial trading and manufacturing firms, but also
recruited from the critical organs of the state such as the police, the
military, bureaucracy, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary and the
state itself has been the major source, facilitator and protector of their wealth,
either through deliberate policies, such as indigenization, economic reforms or
through corruption. Thus, given the critical role of the state in capital
accumulation in the post-colonial epoch, political contest for the capture of
state power became intense, more with the expanded revenue base it came to
acquire from oil and gas earnings, which rose dramatically and profoundly in
the late 1990s. Clearly, also, this phenomenon is associated with, if not
directly caused by, the dynamics of the accumulation processes under economic crisis
and economic reforms, as dominant social forces compete for access to the state
for its power and resources.
According
to Jega, “the onset of economic crises inNigeria in the decade of the 1980’s,
which was accompanied by the introduction of structural adjustment programme
(SAP) by the Babangida regime, gave rise to a profound crises of legitimacy of
the postcolonial state (Olukoshi 1993; Fadahunsi and Babawale, 1996; Jega,2000).
SAP was acclaimed to have, not only structurally adjusted the Nigerian economyto
the requirements of global capitalism, but also created mass poverty in Nigeria.
(Jega
2002:37). As noted elsewhere: The incidence and magnitude of poverty has
increased dramaticallyin Nigeria since the 1980’s, with the result that about
67% of Nigerians are decisively entrapped in conditions of acute poverty. Poverty
has ravaged communities and families, it has torn the moral fabrics of society,
and it is now threatening the country with violent eruptions. Most of the
recent violent ethno-religious and communal conflicts can also be explained by
poverty, joblessness and intense competition over scarce resources and services
bothin the urban and rural contexts. The mass of unemployed youth in both the
rural and urban areas of Nigeria need little motivation or mobilization to partake
in riots and ‘reprisal attacks’, given the inducement or ‘opportunity’ for looting
that often accompany these. Thus, poverty and joblessness, especially amongst the
youth, are important causal and facilitating factors in violent conflicts. Such
objective economic conditions nurture the subjective conditions of frustration
and aggression, which create conducive atmosphere for violent conflicts to
erupt (Ayoade and Jega, 2002). Beyond this, this paper has made very interesting
revelations about the specificity of the dynamics of the resurgence of capital
accumulation in Nigeria since 1999.
OIL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
REFORMS IN NIGERIA
The
management of the polity in the last eight years by the former President
Olusegun Obasanjo’s Administration is characterized by reforms of several
sectors; ranging from banking to the ports. There was also, privatization, but
the wide gulf between the expenditure and deliveries, as in poor
infrastructure; particularly power supply has overshadowed the gains in banking
consolidation and exit from debt trap. To the man in the street, things are
worse. Segun Adeleye recently articulated this anxiety. He lamented the rise of
negative forms of socio-economic dividends of democracy, and their potential
exposure consequences. He stated, among other things, that: When the Obasanjo’s
administration look office in may 1999, it acknowledged that he economy was
characterized by declining capacity utilization in the real sector, poor
performance of major infrastructural facilities, large budget deficit, rising
level of unemployment and inflation. In addition, the economy had emerging problems
of import dependence, reliance on a simple economic sector (oil), weak
individual capacity, low level of agricultural production, a weak private
sector, high external debt overhang, inefficient public utilities, low quality
of social service and unacceptable rate of unemployment (Adeleye, 2007:2)
However,
the government’s economic policy to tackle the problems was blur, rather than
sharp at the beginning as the government reneged on its guiding principles to
be lean, efficient; honest, transparent, cooperative and friendly; operate on
the basis of extensive devolution of power, and function mainly as a facilitator
Adeleye (2007), adds. HectorIgbikiowubo (2007) has articulated socio-economic
reform under Obasanjo (especially in the oil sector) in the following ways: Eight
years after marshalling policies and actions for the Nigerian energy industry,
the President Olusegun Obasanjo administration may be leaving behind contingent
liabilities capable of eroding whatever gains that may have been made within
the period. From the downstream, midstream to upstream oil and gas sectors, as
well as management of the Nigerian content development initiative, militancy in
the Niger Delta and its consequences for conducting an enabling operating
environment, to resultant impact on power supply, its been a pot pouri of
measures and half measures.
DOWNSTREAM SECTOR
In
1999, the Obasanjo administration inherited a regulated sector that depend on
imported petroleum products to meet domestic consumption requirements; four
refineries that were operating at sub-operational capacity, 7,00 kilometers
pipeline system that was ruptured in several sections and was largely poorly
maintained,depot facilities across the country starved of products, an outdated
products receptor terminal at the Atlas Cove jetty and equity in some operating
companies such as Unipetrol (OANDO),National (Conoil) and AP PLC.
Despite
these developments, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) received
an allocation of 450,000 barrels of crude per day for purported domestic
refining of petroleum products, at highly subsidized levels. (Igbikiowubo,
2007:33). In the last eight years, the Obasanjo administration has succeeded in
deregulating the sector by expanding the scope for participation of Nigerian
companies in particular, in the importation, supply and distribution of petroleum
products. Indeed the expanded scope of participation has had a multiplier
effect in the creation of thousands of jobs across the country but failed to
curb price profiteering among operator companies at the expense of the
consuming public. Contrary to claims by the proponents of government
deregulation and liberalization policy in the downstream, eight years into the
life of the Obasanjo administration and four years after the deregulation of the
sector, prices of fuel haveonly gone up with its attendant consequences for the
prices of goods and services. Contrary to claims also by proponents of the
deregulation and liberalization policy of the Obasanjo administration in the
downstream sub-sector of the Nigerian oil industry, four yearsafter the
introduction of the policy to chagrin of fuel consumers, the margins have
failed to attract investment into the mid-stream or refining end of the
business. Perhaps the failure of 18 refinery licenses to mobilize to site and
commence construction work almost four years after government so licensed them,
bears eloquent testimony to the lack of faith in the efficacy of the policy.
Currently, the banks fall over themselves to fund fuel importation business because
the return on investment satiates the gargantuan appetite of the bankers forinterest
on loans so advances. Unfortunately, while the operator companies and their
bankers declare huge profits, the fuel consuming public is bled dry and the
cost of doing business mounts. Under the Obasanjo administration, government
has also divested its holdings in downstream petroleum marketing companies,
with indigenous players snapping up these equities to emerge big operators in
the sub-sector. However, the divestment has mostly served to enrich the
indigenous players and their shareholders, withlittle impact on the wellbeing
of the fuel consuming public. Government also claims that it has expended over
$700 million in the rehabilitation of the refineries and other facilities,
which had gone into disrepair in the downstream sub-sector – including the
extensive kilometers of petroleum products pipelines and the products storage
depots across the country.
However,
the products pipelines have equally been repeatedly vandalized, while some of the
rehabilitated depots continue to be starved of products supply as a consequence
(Igbikiowubo, 2007:33).
MIDSTREAM
Although
the NNPC claimed that its refineries were operating at an average 80 per cent
installed capacity after Turn-Around-Maintenance (TAM) was carried out on them,
output from them could only serve 40 per cent of domestic consumption
requirements, leaving the balance to be sourced from imports. As if that was not
bad enough, while the Obasanjo administration was still caught up in a
semblance of inertia over management of Nigeria’s domestic fuel consumption
needs, the activities of militants in the Niger Delta cut of feedstock and
dealt the refineries a mortal blow – perishing any thoughts of improving output.
In Venezuela, a fellow OPEC member nation, a conscious decision was taken by
the government last year to construct three new refineries. Unlike Nigeria,
Venezuela does not export crude oil but refined petroleum products. Perhaps, the
government took the decision to construct new refineries because it was well
aware that the last time any of the multinational operating companies built a
refinery was 30 years ago. Indeed, tightness in refining capacity accounts
largely for the spike in crude oil and petroleum products prices witnessed
after Hurricane Katrina Knocked off output from refineries in the West Coast of
the United States of America in 2005. Eight years into the life of the Obasanjo
administration, this realization has failed to inspire government to consider
the construction of new refineries an imperative (Igbikiowubo, 2007:53).
Although
two years ago government said it was considering getting multinational
operating companies to refine 50 per cent of their crude oil output locally by
2006, the government failed to enforce this. Essentially, the Obasanjo administration
failed to impact the midstream sector and will be leaving it precisely where it
met it eight years ago – with no visible improvement in refining capacity.
UPSTREAM
The
Obasanjo administration inherited a sector that was outputting 2.1 million
barrels per
day,
run by multinational operators, a backlog of cash call arrears owing to
predecessor
government’s
non-responsiveness to its joint venture obligations; worrisomely embarrassing gas
flaring levels but well thought out plans to expand into deepwater as well as
monetise the abundant gas reserves; a Production Sharing Contract (PSC)
agreement which left the government with limited ‘take’ and crude oil reserves
portfolio put at 30 billion barrels.
However,
in the last eight years, Nigeria ’s upstream has witnessed a steady growth in
reserves and production capacity. Proven crude oil reserves now amounts to 35
billion barrels with producibility put at three million barrels perday. Due to
the activities of militants however, current output figures fluctuates between 2.6
million and 2.2 million barrels per day. His Royal Majesty, Dr. Edmund Daukoru,
the Minister of Energy and Amayanabo of Nembe Kingdom had while speaking with
the Vanguard in one of the numerous interviews he granted explained that the growth
in output is underpinned by the current deepwater discoveries. Exploration in
new frontiers has progressed successfully – “about 7 billion barrels of oil and
19 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas has been discovered in Nigeria’s deepwater
since 1996. For instance, Bonga commenced production in December 2005 with
60,000 b/d and has ramped up to 225,000 b/d.” In deepwater also, ExxonMobil
operated Erha field has since come on stream with an output of 210,000 b/d.
overall, 500,000 b/d additional output capacity has since been added from
ongoing projects. Besides, the licensing of new oil blocks at the 2005, 2006 (mini
round) and 2007 rounds significant potentials for further reserves additions.
When speaking also, on the development, Dr. Funsho Kupolokun, the Group Managing
Director of the NNPC noted that at the current rate of exploration, the
government’s aspiration of 40 billion barrels and 4million b/d by 2010 is on
course and achievable. In the last eight years also, the Nigerian petroleum industry
has attracted a lot of investment and in an energy hungry world, it would appear
that there might be no end in sight yet to the degree of investment that the
sector can expect (Igbikiowubo, 2007:39).
UPSTREAM INVESTMENT
Although
industry watchers contend that the high degree of investment the Nigeria
upstream sector has courted under the Obasanjo administration is a consequence
of the growing needs of an energy hungry world, the fact remains that the
administration has pursued a deliberate policy to attract such investment
distinguishing itself admirably between 2005 and 2008 it is expected that as
much as $ 67 billion would be invested in the expected made up of $34.4 billion
would oil and $32.7 billion for gas. While speaking at a various oil and gas
conferences in the last two years, Dr funsho Kupolokun explained that the
expenditure would focus on five key areas including engineering design, fabrication
and construction, materials and manufacturing, banking and insurance, shipping
and logistics (Igbikiowubo, 2007:39).
GAS MONETIZATIONS
The
gas sector has enjoyed a good run in the last eight years under the Obasanjo administration
with operating companies putting in place different gas commercialization scheme
to meet the 2008 deadline on flaring. This has facilitated the rapid
monetization of gas. With about 184 Trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas reserves,
split almost equally between associated gas and a daily production of about 2.5
Billion cubic feet (Bcf), mainly of associated gas, Nigeria is endowed in gas
resources which are expected to yield substantial process of commercialization
take root.
In
a presentation he made at word the petroleum congress in Sandton, South Africa,
in September 2005, Dr. Daukoru said there has been a significant reduction in
the volume of gas flared in the country from a high level of 75 per cent of
Associated Gas recorded in year 2000 to less them 40 per cent presently. “The reduction
in the amount of flared gas can be attributed to government’s
commercialization/ monetization policy which has led to several projects being
put in place to utilize the flared age, as well as Nigeria’s commitment to the
Kyoto Protocol Agreement.
Nigeria’s
premier liquefied natural Gas plant (NLNG) that commenced production in October
1999 with two trains has since increased the numberof trains to eight with the
fifth already producing and the sixth, seventh and eight scheduled to come on
stream before the close of the decade. Under the administration several other LNG
plants have also left the drawing board and are in various stages of
implementation and these include: the brass (spearheaded by Agipand Phillips),
Olokola (spearheaded by chevron, BG and Shell) and exxonmobil LNPC and Sasol of
South Africa, which owns the patent for the technology being used. Only recently,
president Obasanjo performed the groundbreaking ceremonies for the both Olokola
and Brass LNGs –underscoring the importance of gas monetization to his
administration.
It
is expected that at the rate of development, revenue from gas may rival that of
oil in the next 10 years. A transnational gas pipeline that would convey
Nigeria’s gas to neighboring West African countries for power generation is 95
percent completed, but has been impacted by the activities of militants in the
delta. Apart from mopping sizable quantity of gas upon completion in second
quarter of 2007, the project represents a boost to regional collaboration with
Sonatrach of Algeria for the Tran Saharan gas pipeline which will take
Nigeria’s gas through Algeria to southern Europe. Indeed, the concept of
regional cooperation as proclaimed in NEPAD is being given expression in these
transnational projects. One of the biggest beneficiaries of the gas commercialization
initiative is the power sector which to date has less than less than 4,000 Megawatts
of power generating capacity.
With
government intention to boost output to 10,000Megawatts before the close of
2007, the nation took recourse in the establishment of independent power
plants. As part of its efforts to monetize flared gas in its operations, the Nigeria
Agip Oil Company (NAOC) constructed and commissioned the Okpai 480 Mw power station
in 2005, while ten others are also in various stage of completion across
different parts of the country with those at Geregu and Omotosho accounting for
additional generation of 765 megawatts already commissioned this year.
Secondary and tertiary gas distribution network tapping from the trunk-lines established
by NNPC coupled with the incentive on gas utilization by industrial
establishment is giving a lot of boost to industrial consumption of gas. With
the manufacturing sector developing more confidence in gas as alternative tofuel
oil for industrial use, the market for downstream gas consumption is growing by
leaps and bounds especially in urban areas (Igbikiowubo, 2007:39).
In
response, the government has established franchises for gas distribution to defined
market/ industrial enclaves in different parts of the country on build operate
and transfer (BOT) basis and these are being snapped up by willing investors.
Perhaps, this market would develop even faster it and when a national transmission
system for gas is put in place. Ongoing gas transmission programmes will entail
commercialization of 14/50 mmscf/d of gas by 2011 (80 per cent by LNG). However
about $2.5 billion will be required annually in stable investments (upstream
and LNG plants) to capture opportunities in gas and power by 2010. Government
hopes to generate much as $12 billion from these gas projects by 2012. This
will no doubt contribute immensely to the economic development of the country.
With these developments in the gas sector as well as the transformation in the
upstream, it is believed that the energy sector –driven initiatives could contribute
up to 60 per cent towards doubling Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) over
the next 10 years. There are indications that potential GDP growth over the
period may be as highas $47 billion made up of direct contribution from energy
sector ($17 billion), indirect contribution through unlocking of other sector
($18 billion). In 2005, the administration initiated a new gas policy for
industry stakeholders input. Upon enactment by the National Assembly, the
document is expected to encourage investment in upstream and downstream gaswhether
or not the investor is a gas producer (Igbikiowubo, 2007:40).
PUBLIC
SERVICE REFORM
The public sector has come into a new
wave of prominence in the last fifteen years in Nigeria and Africa at large for
two significant but interrelated reasons. The first reason is that since 1999,
there has been a wave of democratic revival in the whole of Africa that led to
countries like Nigeria responding to the global demand for good governance and
responsible government. The second reason is that for government to be
responsible in enthroning good governance, it requires a machinery of
government that presents and transforms the intention of the government to the
people in the form of policy formulation and policy implementation that impacts
the lives of the citizens. This government apparatus is the public sector. And
it is characterised essentially by its ability to manage government business
effectively and its service delivery capacity to the populace.
These two reasons explain why the
public sector and its reform are serious issues for any government that lays
claim to being democratic. Reforming the public sector signals the intention of
the government to consistently present a human and humane face to the people.
When we talk, for instance, of the Nigerian State, what the citizens confront
is the Nigerian Police, the Nigerian Customs, the Inland Revenue Department,
the Schools, the Passport Office, the Corporate Affairs Commission, the
Hospitals, Waste Disposal Boards and all other segments of the public sector
administration in Nigeria. When the citizens are satisfied with the performance
of these segments, it is then that we can say that the Nigerian State is
working. Thus, for the government to perform effectively and efficiently, the
public sector requires serious and constant overhauling from time to time to
meet with global democratic and administrative standards for performance.
However, learning about what reforming
the public sector means and how it has been done so far, especially in Nigeria,
gives us the understanding of how the process can be moved forward. This is the
rationale for this study. The pivot of the study will therefore be hinged on
the significance of four questions:
- How is the PS perceived by the public?
- What are the requirements for global competitiveness?
- How do we want to be seen?
- What must we do to be what we want to be seen?
With these questions as focus, the
paper will be developed in five sections. In the first section, we will be
examining the conceptual question of what reform means, especially within the
context of the Nigerian public administration. This will also enable us to
examine the critical phases in reform emphasis in Nigeria. The second section
therefore takes a historical turn as it considers the trajectory of reform in
Nigeria from its pre-independence beginning to its post-military manifestation
and resurgence with the arrival of democratic governance. We will move on in
the third section to do a critical assessment of reform performance so far in
Nigeria, especially from a global perspective of best practices and innovations
in reforming the public sector. This will lead us next, in section four, to ask
the question about reform complexity and the landmines that make reforming a
critical issue any government must guard against in making a success of public
sector performance. Lastly, the fifth section will highlight the institutional
issues involved in reforming the reform process for effectiveness and
efficiency in Nigeria.
The Idea of the Public Sector
The first issue to tackle is that of
delineating what the public sector means in any state. As we have earlier
noted, the destiny of the state and its public sector is tied in the sense that
an effective public sector makes for an effective and developmental state.
This is because the state exists essentially to serve the public interest, and
this consists solely in the provision of goods and services which enable the
citizens to live good, healthy and comfortable lives. Thus, Haque argues, in
this context, that the basic function of the public sector in Africa is to
provide goods and services to citizens based on “realization and representation
of public interests and its possession of unique public qualities compared to
business management” (Haque 2001: 65).
There is a sense therefore in which we
can use the “state” and “public sector” interchangeably. The reason is simply
that both are coextensive: In the first instance, the existence of the state
automatically signals the existence of the public sector. In the second
instance, the public sector is the manifestation of the abstract entity we call
the state. The space represented by the state and governmental activities is
what we call the “public space” as different from the “private” space where
individuals can become whatever they want to be without the intrusion of the
state. The public sector, therefore, represents the realm where the government
operates for the benefits of the citizenry. This is different from the private
sector where individuals operate.
The Dictionary of Politics and
Government defines the public sector as the “industries and services owned
by the government”. For Kai Wegrich, it refers to “the portion of the economy
composed of all levels of government and government-controlled enterprises…
[I]t also implies a definition of public activity that goes beyond the core
domains of public administration. The general definition of the public sector
includes government ownership or control rather than mere function, thereby
including, for example, the exercise of public authority or the implementation
of public policy” (2007: 776). Given this definition, the ECA sees the public
in a broader perspective as
…the machinery of government, that is,
the totality of services that are organized under public (that is, government)
authority. It is the totality of the administrative structures within which the
work of government is carried out…. The public sector covers the following
categories of institutions. They are the (a) the civil service in the strict
sense of ministries and departments of the central government; (b) the
legislature and judiciary; (c) local governments; (d) public or state
enterprises, boards, corporations generally referred to as parastatals
which operate and provide service in areas such as water and electricity; (e)
the security forces; (d) the professional regulatory bodies which are given the
power to prescribe training required for members; to regulate the conduct of
members and to prohibit the unqualified from practicing (2009: 4).
To buttress this broad perspective,
Wegrich suggests a concentric cycle at three levels that outline the scope and
reach of the public sector (See Fig 1). The inner cycle represents essentially
the public service provided by central and subnational government agencies. It
is in this sense that the analytic distinction between public and private sectors
is most acute, especially in terms of “employment relationship and exercising
public power” (2007: 226). The next cycle designates quasi-governmental
agencies that lie outside the direct accountability framework confronted by the
agencies at the first level. The last, outer cycle belongs to state-owned
enterprises “usually defined by the government’s ownership or [their] owning
the majority of shares” (ibid).
FIG 1: Public Sector Concentric Cycles
The public sector in most third world
countries signals the worst tendencies of the “dead hand” of
bureaucracy—corrupted, inefficient, poor services, cumbersome red tape—due to
“accumulation of excessive power, lack of accountability and representation,
indifference towards public needs and demands, official secrecy and
inaccessibility, and role in depoliticizing the public sphere” (ECA, 2009: 1).
This has led to a constantly declining level of efficiency and effectiveness in
the delivery of public goods to the citizens. This has precipitated the crisis
of underdevelopment that has equally made the government largely illegitimate
in the eyes of the people. This assessment of the bureaucratic nature of the
public sector in Africa coincided with the growing call, at the global level,
for a redefinition of the state in the light of their functioning capacity to
meet the growing needs of the citizens within a democratic dispensation. These
are the issues that gave birth to the idea of the reform of the public
sector.
The idea of reform
To reform, in simple terms, implies the
readjustment or repositioning of an organisation in order to be able to
effectively and efficiently meet the dynamism and challenges of its universe of
operation. It often requires a trajectory of moving from a present but
unfavourable state through series of strategic and institutional stages of
change towards a future state marked by efficient and effective improvements
leading to better performance. Reforming an organisation in this sense could
mean attempting to restructure it either to meet an original conception or to
prepare the said organisation for future challenges. These two senses may be
termed the “backward-looking/or rear-view reforms” and “forward-looking
reforms” respectively. The first sense is backward-looking/rear-view in that it
seeks to reform an organisation/system in accordance with some ideas conceived
in time past; while the second sense is forward-looking in that it seeks to
reform an organisation/system in order to position it to meet the challenges of
the future.
In either cases, the point is that the
organisation as-is is going through a present phase of decay and dysfunction.
To reform such an organisation therefore implies putting in deliberate efforts
aimed at changing the structures and processes of the organisation in order to
make it perform its designated function better and effectively. Public
sector reform involves the idea of improvement in the ways and manners in
which government is managed and public goods and services are delivered
effectively, efficiently, economically and with value for money. It involves
the “processes and practices which are concerned with improving the capacity of
institutions to make policy and deliver services in an efficient, effective and
accountable manner” (ECA, 2009: 4). For Pollitt and Bouckaert,
Public management reform is usually
thought of as a means to an end, not an end in itself. To be more precise we
should perhaps say that it is potentially a means to multiple ends.
These include making savings (economies) in public expenditure,
improving the quality of public services, making the operations of
government more efficient, and increasing the chances that the policies
which are chosen and implemented will be effective. On the way to
achieving these important objectives, public management reforms may also serve
a number of intermediate ends, including those of strengthening the
control of politicians over the bureaucracy, freeing public officials from
bureaucratic constraints that inhibit their opportunities to manage, and
enhancing the government’s accountability to the legislature and the
citizenry for its policies and programmes (2004: 6).
According to the African Development
Bank, “Public sector reforms usually include a range of reform measures dealing
with core government functions such as civil service reform, financial and
fiscal reform, decentralization, enhancing accountability, legal and judicial
reform, and improving corporate regulatory frameworks” (ADB, 1995: 139).
Public sector reform in Africa was
carried out within the conceptual framework of “redefining the role of the
state.” This is a highly ideological framework which speaks to the declining
relevance of state-managed economies, especially in the third world, vis-Ã -vis
the growing rate of progress recorded in the market economies of the Western
societies. Redefining the role of the state therefore implies that the state
restrict its interventions to those areas of governance that are strictly
public while subcontracting the rest to subnational agencies and especially the
private sector. In this regard, the significant function of the government is
to serve in a regulatory capacity that nurtures a conducive environment for the
private sector to perform and produce results.
The need for reform derives from the
acute dissatisfaction of the citizens with the performance of the government
and its apparatuses. The rationale for this is that since the taxpayers’ money
goes into the running of these institutions for socio-economic development, it
is only rational to ask that they produce efficient and effective results,
especially given the competition from the private sector. Innovation in the
public sector is therefore meant to meet the challenge of efficient service
delivery that will improve the receptiveness of this sector to public
expectations. The case for this efficiency in service delivery is even more
crucial in the African public service.
We can therefore say that public sector
reform is driven by what Pollitt and Bouckaert call the symbolic and
legitimacy benefits of management reform, which is the fact that
politicians want to be seen to be doing something. According to them,
For politicians these benefits consist
partly of being seen to be doing something. Announcing reforms, criticizing
bureaucracy, praising new management techniques, promising improved
services for the future, restructuring ministries and agencies- all these
activities help to attract favourable attention to the politicians who espouse
them…. There are also legitimacy benefits for those senior officials who,
almost invariably, play important parts in shaping and implementing such
initiatives. They may gain in reputation—indeed, make a career out
of—‘modernizing and ‘streamlining’ activities (2004: 6).
Another driver of reform is the need
for government to be better positioned in order that it may be better enabled
to meet the needs and aspirations in the society with governments using
“management reforms to reshape the role of the state and its relationship with
citizens” (Kettl, 2000: 1). In this regard, governments have had to improve its
performance while at the same time reducing the cost of running itself;
increase the skill of government workers; increase the flexibility with which
government workers have to do their jobs while maintaining their fidelity to
government policies; redesign government services in an attempt to regain
citizen’s trust; define their new relationship with an increasing global
community, where neither economic nor social policies could be pursued in
isolation (Jain, 2001: 2).
Other reform drivers include:
Reforms resulting from the challenges
the public sector faced in the environment in which it operates. The challenges
of a public sector entering an information and knowledge age no doubt require
adapting to the adoption of information technologies to enable faster
informational processes.
Reforms also arise as a necessity due
to the bureaucratic incapacitation and constraints internal to the public
sector which prevents the officials and bureaucrats from carrying out their
functions effectively.
Reforms are also driven in the public
sector by the outcome of the innovations and best practices operating in the
public sector of other countries. A country is therefore faced with the results
of the lessons about what works and what does not with regard to public sector
governance. In this regard, a country’s decision to reform is sometimes as a
result of noticing the rate of progress made in other countries. This has been
followed by attempts to adopt, adapt, and institutionalise innovative ideas and
best practices put into the conduct of public service elsewhere.
The idea of public sector reform in Nigeria
The idea of reform in Nigeria straddles
both its backward and forward dimensions. In other words, the attempts at
reforms in Nigeria are meant not only to capture the framework of a
professional and efficient civil service the Nigerian state was blessed with at
independence. In his valedictory speech to the Western Nigerian House of
Assembly in 1959, Chief Obafemi Awolowo made this remark about the Nigerian
Civil Service:
Our civil service is exceedingly
efficient, absolutely incorruptible in its upper stratum, and utterly devoted
and unstinting in the discharge of its many onerous duties. For our civil
servants, government workers and labourers to bear, uncomplainingly and without
breaking down, the heavy and multifarious burdens with which we have in the
interest of the public saddled them, is an epic of loyalty and devotion, of
physical and mental endurance, and of a sense of mission, on their part. From
the bottom of my heart I salute all of them (cited in Adamolekun, 2005: 25).
Reforms are also meant, on the other
hand, to tackle the challenges of public sector management in a sophisticated
global environment driven by democratic ideals, modern technologies and market
exigencies. This requires that the institutional scope, capacities and competencies
of the public sector are broadened and the civil service restructured to meet
present and future challenges.
Reform in the sense we are talking
about, and especially in its Nigerian context, is strictly administrative
reform as different from administrative change. The latter is merely a
normal self-adjustment by an organisation responding to certain administrative
fluctuations. Administrative reform however refers to a more deliberate
effort at combating serious malfunctions in the capacity of the system to
self-adjust. According to Chief Jerome Udoji,
I regard as administrative reform any
systematic changes in the administrative system…designed to lead to more
efficient, effective and responsive administration. By responsive I mean
that the reforms must be geared towards the achievement of national objectives.
One must, however, distinguish between large-scale administrative reforms and
minor isolated administrative reforms. Examples of the latter include minor
improvements, care maintenance such as new leave rates, housing allowance,
creation of new posts, etc. To qualify as reform, there must be
across-the-board change, the aim of which is the achievement of national
objectives in the shortest possible time, and with the least expenditure in
human and material resources (cited in Olaopa, 2009A: 55).
Administrative reform in Nigeria has
included both a periodic review of a part or the whole of the processes and
systems of the machinery of government. In this sense, public sector reform is
conceived as “the process of aligning public service structures, systems and
processes, human and material resources to government policies, targets and
plans” under the justification that it is always only possible to determine the
configurations of the public sector organisations from the nature of the
comprehensive plans they exist to implement (Olaopa, 2009A: 55). When faced
with such a wholesale health check or turn around maintenance to re-engineer
the structure, management and functioning of the system, reformers are often
confronted with such critical questions like: “What features of our current
structures, cultures, systems, processes or skill-sets, etc get in the way of
what we are trying to achieve” or “What sort of strategy do we need to take
advantage of in order to be able to exploit our existing strengths and
opportunities”.
Nigeria has attempted to answer such
reform questions through the setting up of reform commission, panels, study
groups and so on to analyse the management and function of government operations,
and make recommendations that could orient the operations and function towards
the achievement of national objectives. The underlying principle upon which
these reform efforts take is: Form follows function. This implies simply
that it is only when comprehensive plans have been prepared, that it will be
possible to determine the appropriate configurations of public sector
organisations to implement them (SEEDS Manual, 2005: 209). Thus, reforms
essentially transform the manner in which government operates in view of
current or anticipated reality or desired state.
Nigeria has equally gone through the
gamut of reforms from policy to governance to institutional reforms. It should
be noted that all administrative reforms are connected generally with policy
performance in a government. Policy reforms include macroeconomic management
policies like the Vision 20:2020. Governance reforms include all attempt at
reforming the ways and manners that government duties are carried out. In other
words, emphasis on governance reforms ensures that the machinery of government
runs transparently as much as possible. This leads, for instance in Nigeria, to
the formation of the ICPC and the EFCC as anti-corruption instruments. Our
focus in this paper is the institutional dimension of administrative
reform in Nigeria, especially those structural and organisational issues that
are conducive to the proper functioning of the public sector or the civil
service.
GENDER
AND ELECTORAL REFORM 1999-2010
Historical
analysis of constitutions and electoral laws and processes in Nigeria are
incontrovertibly gender insensitive. Beginning from 1922, when the first
Constitution in Nigeria was made to the 1999 constitution, which purportedly
gave legitimacy to the third republic, aspirations and concerns of women, who
represent majority of the population, have been undisputedly discarded.
But
since the return of civilian rule in 1999, there seem to be a lot of momentums
gathered around the need for constitutional and electoral reforms. This development
has also challenged the women folks in the country, with several women groups
lending their voices to the electoral and constitutional reform discourse.
Their active participation is dated back to the first attempt at reviewing the
1999 constitution by President Olusegun Obasanjo Administration in October
1999, when the first Presidential Committee was inaugurated to do a
comprehensive constitutional and electoral review. The committee had twenty
four members out of which four were women. The report submitted by the
committee had some gender friendly provisions, to wit; a proposal that
the Federal Character Commission be replaced with Equal
Opportunities Commission with a more expanded and inclusive mandate; It also
proposed that women should have a choice in claiming their own state of origin
or their husband’s in political arrangements, the third major amendment
proposed by the committee was the substitution of the word “sex” as it refers
to the feminine in the Constitution with the word “gender”. On Political
Parties, it also included gender as one of the grounds for which discrimination
in terms of membership of the Party shall not be permissible. Unfortunately,
the report was later jettisoned.
After
the re-election of the President in 2003, he again convoked a National
Political Reform Conference (NPRC) in 2005, to address the challenges of
Nigeria’s political system. Unfortunately, in terms of representation the
conference did not attempt to give equal opportunities to all Nigerians. There were
only 30 women out of about 400 delegates. Despite the obvious gender gaps
in representation of women, the NPRC significantly mainstreamed gender issues
in its outcomes. This attempt at political reforms also failed.
Nigeria then ran into the 2007 elections without a viable constitution but with a weak electoral law adopted a year earlier in 2006. As it has been widely acknowledged, the 2007 elections were replete with charges of irregularities, electoral malpractices, violence and various degrees of disruptions.
Nigeria then ran into the 2007 elections without a viable constitution but with a weak electoral law adopted a year earlier in 2006. As it has been widely acknowledged, the 2007 elections were replete with charges of irregularities, electoral malpractices, violence and various degrees of disruptions.
One
would then think that the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) inaugurated
by the late President, Alhaji Umaru Yar’ Adua on 28th August 2007 with
the mandate to review and ensure quality and standard general elections would
address some of the pertinent issues of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. The
Committee, headed by a reputable retired Chief Justice of the Federation,
Justice Muhammed Bello Uwais, went round the country taking memoranda and oral
presentations from Nigerians; it also met several women groups agitating for
the inclusion of women issues and concerns in the committee’s recommendation to
the government. The committee’s recommendation has been adjudged as one of the
best in the history of constitutional and electoral reforms in Nigeria. The
report of the committee acknowledged the voices of women and their proposals
for gender democracy and made some gender sensitive recommendations of the
committee worthy of note. For example (i)on the composition of the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC): it recommended that the Chairman
and the Deputy should not be of the same gender and out of 6 geo-graphical
representations 2 must be women. In addition, there should be a woman
representative from the women’s organization. ii) On political parties’
registration and regulatory Commission, the ERC recommended that 2 out of 6
persons from the geo-political zonal representatives must be women. It
also recommended further that the political associations should maintain 20%
women in the membership of its governing bodies. iii) On enhancing
internal democracy in the political parties: the ERC recommended that political
parties should give more attention to the nomination of women and youths as
candidates and ensure that women have equal access to leadership opportunities
within party organizations. The report also recommended that
political parties shall nominate for the proportional representation at least
30% female candidates and 2% physically challenged candidates for legislative elections.
The
ERC report was subsequently submitted to the National Assembly for
consideration. The National Assembly has passed the 2010 Electoral law and has
concluded the review of the constitution. The only probable gender friendly
proposal by the National Assembly was the new clause allowing for independent
candidacy which was later thrown out by the state houses of assembly. This
development shows the failure of the Nigerian state once again to put a legal
framework in place to support a gender friendly electoral system. One of the
challenges therefore for women in the 2011 general elections in Nigeria is the
need to engage political parties and demand for gender parity.
GENDER
AND INTERNAL PARTY STRUCTURES IN NIGERIA
The
absence or under-representation of women in the very process of decision making
and implementation undermines the fundamental concept of a democratic form of
governance which assumes that participation and representation in all areas and
levels of public life will be equally available to women and men. However,
politics and political arrangement in Nigeria has undermined female legitimacy
resulting in women’s political powerlessness. From available statistics women’s
overall political representation and participation in government is less than
7%.
The
consignment of women’s roles to the domestic arena while the public space is
seen as the traditional place for men, tend to perpetuate discrimination and
distinctions on the basis of sex although there is growing emphasis on gender equality,
which is a central component of the process of democratization. The case for
promoting gender equality in governance is simple: the increased involvement of
women in the democratic process of any country is essential to broadening and
deepening its commitment to democratic governance. Thus, canvassing for support
for gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization. It is part of
a broad cultural change that is transforming industrialized and developing
societies and bringing growing mass demand for increased democratic
institutions.
Among
the factors affecting women participation in politics in Nigeria are: gender
and cultural patterns, ideology, pre-determined social roles assigned to women,
male dominance and control, conflicting demands on the time of women candidates
due to their domestic and social responsibilities and women’s lack of
confidence to run elections. Others include women perception of politics as a
dirty game, lack of funds and resources as politics is heavily monetised,
poverty and unemployment, illiteracy and limited access to education, the dual
burden of domestic task and professional obligation, lack of confidence in
other women, lack of access to information and the multiple effect of violence
against women. Nomination and selection processes of candidates in political
parties usually consider women as the second best. In most cases, women are
usually considered fit for nomination only if they have powerful men as their
pillars. Besides, the processes are usually so heavily monetized that most
women with lean financial muscles are elbowed out of the race from the outset.
For
these and other reasons, the choice of our electoral system has important and
significant impact on a range of issues. It is within this context that the
recommendation of the ERC that political parties should have 20% of women in
their governance bodies becomes significant. It is believed that such
representation will have positive effect in engendering party democracy in
Nigeria.
Since
the commencement of indigenous politics in Nigeria in the mid-1950s, one
remarkable feature has been the near absence of women in the parties especially
in party leadership. Although there has been improvement over the years, the
situation today still leaves much to be desired. Despite several efforts made
by women locally and internationally to improve the situation of women in
politics, very little progress has been made as women are still excluded from
the mainstream while the support they enjoy is at best cosmetic. As a result
the marginal increase in their participation has not enhanced their positions
within the party hierarchy; their influence in decision making is equally
minimal and not commensurate with their number.
An
analysis of Nigeria electoral system shows that 2003 and 2007 elections
witnessed unprecedented increase in the number of female aspirants and
heightened local mobilization of the generality of women, yet only a handful
made it to the end. Also a review of the manifestoes and constitutions of over
30 political parties in the last elections showed that almost all the political
parties in Nigeria, at best, paid lip services to women’s political development
since they are still considered ‘outsiders’ in the game of politics. The
experiences of women during the last elections show that the political parties
have refused to integrate women’s needs and concern in the business of
democracy. There are only few women in the National Executive of political
parties in Nigeria, Where they manage to get to this level, they are
given the post of welfare, social organisers or ex officio which may be
politically redundant. For example the Peoples Democratic Party has 52 National
Executive Officers out of which only 6 are women with 3 holding ex officio
positions and 2 occupying the position of national woman leader and deputy
national woman leader and the third, the position of deputy national publicity
secretary.
In the opposition Action Congress (AC), there are only 4 women out of 32 National Executive Officers. The four occupy the positions of national financial secretary, the deputy national publicity secretary, national legal adviser and the national women leader.
In the opposition Action Congress (AC), there are only 4 women out of 32 National Executive Officers. The four occupy the positions of national financial secretary, the deputy national publicity secretary, national legal adviser and the national women leader.
There
are 28 National Executive Officers in the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP),
only 4 are women, two national internal auditors, one national women leader and
one deputy national women leader.
These
forms of marginalisation and poor representation of women run through all the
other political parties. Incidentally, an analysis of the manifestoes of the
parties shows the inclusion of gender provisions despite that in practice this
is not evidenced. For example Article 6 of the PDP manifesto titled the ‘The
character of the Party’ states that ‘it shall be a non tribal, non religious
and non sexist democratic organisation’ (6.1). Section 6.5 says it shall
promote the emancipation of women by encouraging their representation at all
levels and combat sexism while Section 16 (a) specifically provides for the
position of a woman leader from national to Ward level (local). The ALL
PROGRESSIVE GRAND ALLIANCE (APGA) constitution and manifestoes has a chapter
16, titled the Policy on Women, which gives a brief but incisive analysis of
gender discrimination and emphasised the need to work in accordance with the
Beijing Declarations and promote gender parity and more inclusive democracy.
The policy proposes to ‘fight gender inequality and insensitivities in all
aspect of national life through public enlightenments, promote affirmative
action in employment, promote girl child education and compulsory
education for girls until 16...”
Also
the National Democratic Party dedicated her Chapter 20 to Women Policy. The
party promises to take active practical and concrete steps to empower women and
facilitate their entrance into various organs of the party; women will be
encouraged to contest elective party and public political post and as a matter
of politics women will be given their fair share of appointment and accept
equality of men and women.
Some ofthese provisions provide opportunities for women to hold their party accountable and demand internal democracy and parity towards 2011 general elections, such interventions can only yield fruits if it is well thought out.
Some ofthese provisions provide opportunities for women to hold their party accountable and demand internal democracy and parity towards 2011 general elections, such interventions can only yield fruits if it is well thought out.
STRATEGIES
FOR WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NIGERIA 2011 AND BEYOND
Going
by the amendment to the 1999 Constitution as recently concluded, elections are
expected to take place between 150 and 120 days to the end of every tenure. The
implication is that the forthcoming elections must hold between December 30,
2010 and January 29, 2011. Unfortunately women seem not prepared
enough for the coming elections, although there might be slight victories
compared to the representations between 1999 and 2007. The reasons for
this forecast is simple, women are still faced with the numerous challenges
that have contributed to their marginalization from mainstream politics. Though
there is growing awareness and resolve by women to influence the decisions that
affect their lives and their families, the political, economy and social
environment as well as the structure of the nation still define their political
participation and representation. Their strong- will must be tapped into
to change the situation of women in politics in 2011 and beyond
As it has been noted above, one of the forward looking approaches to 2011 is that women in political parties must negotiate gender parity through the party system as a temporary measure. Since there is no legal framework backing affirmative action, the National Gender Policy 2007 remains the only persuasive document that can translate into a good negotiating instrument for concession for women. Women activists in Nigeria can mobilize around the policy, create awareness particularly, regarding the provisions relating to 35% affirmative action and through this demand electoral accountability from political parties.
Political
Parties are the ultimate political gatekeepers because they produce party or
candidate lists. Although women account for a significant number in party
membership in Nigeria, it is commonplace to have parties presenting consensus
candidates (most of whom are men backed by their godfathers). Women activists
and politicians should explore the opportunities created by some gender
friendly provisions in political parties’ manifestoes and constitutions to
demand accountability for women.
Another
opportunity existing for women groups in 2011 is to proactively identify and
recruit women members with political potential for future elections. In
addition, party women members must insist that parties democratize
their leadership structures and reform their financing mechanisms to ensure
increased participation by women. Success in recruiting and promoting women’s
leadership within parties may also point the way for engagement of other
under-represented sectors in social change processes in 2011 and beyond.
Another
door of opportunity is for women activists to engage INEC. The recent
appointment of Prof. Attahiru Jega as Chairman INEC and 10 other national commissioners,
as well as 19 resident electoral commissioners have been largely well received,
except for the pocket of protests about the partisanship of few of the
nominees, which however the President responded to by dropping them.
Also, out of the 13-member board of INEC, there are three females. Women can
work with INEC to begin to model an electoral process that mainstreams gender.
Through collaborative partnership with INEC, the possibilities of gender parity
in political structures could be more open.
TO GET THIS COMPLETE MATERIAL
PRICE:
Pay #5,000 Naira, (i.e. the price
for this material) into our account.
ACCOUNT DETAILS:
Bank: Ecobank
A/c No: 2691085510
Name: Martins Chima
NEXT STEP:
Send your teller no, name and email
address to 07030722911. We will confirm your payment within 3hrs (working
hours) and you will receive this topic material immediately after confirmation
through your e-mail.
We will also send a text
message to your mobile phone number informing you that we have sent you the
COMPLETE MATERIAL.
Change
in political parties will require commitment from the top and pressure from
below. Unfortunately, leadership of a party’s “women’s wing” is rarely seen as
a desirable position in the party hierarchy, perhaps because it lacks real
responsibility. Women party members cannot rely only on quotas to bring real
change to their political organizations. Rather, they will need to mobilize and
organize for change from within, through alliances that may include other party
members, women from other parties and gender-focused civil society groups.
Women should also be encouraged to register with parties of their choice as
card carrying members and be actively involved in the party primaries. Besides
campaigns for balanced gender representation in political decision-making
positions, an integral part of the core of strategies for women's political
participation is building women's agenda for change.