CHAPTER TWO
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we shall examine the
literature that discusses the legal regime of ownership of petroleum and land
use in Nigeria. Particularly, we intend to examine how scholars have treated
the relationship between the legal regime of ownership of petroleum resources
in Nigeria and non-participation of the people of the Niger-Delta region in the
petroleum industry. We shall also consider how the literature treats the
question of land expropriation under the Land Use Act and how this affects the
lives of the people of the Niger-Delta region. This chapter shall also consider
the views of authors on the nature of surface rights and quantum of
compensation paid for breach of such rights in Nigeria, especially in the
Niger-Delta. A significant amount of literature in this field dwells on the
causes of militancy in the Niger-Delta. This work however, trents the insights
embodied in the literature that explores the link between expropriation by the
Federal Government of mineral resources, including land and militancy in the Niger-Delta.
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2.2 Relationship
between Legal Regime of Ownership of Petroleum Resources in Nigeria and
Non-Participation of the People of the Niger-Delta Region in the Petroleum
Industry
In the municipal jurisdiction, the
concept of economic self-determination is limited to the provisions of state
law. Therefore, state law on the ownership pattern of natural resources is
exclusively within the prerogative of the federal authorities. According to
Lorenzo Cotula, “the ability of states to regulate activities within their
territory is a key attribute of sovereignty.
It is also important for the quest for economic development and, and
sustainable development of the environment in such a way that long term
benefits would be sustained and derived from their natural resources”.[1]
Kaniye Ebeku, in his work, “Oil and the Niger Delta People: The Injustice
of the Land Use Act”[2]
painted a gloomy picture of how the expropriation of natural resources and land
by the Federal government of Nigeria from the people of the Niger-Delta region
has negatively affected their participation in the petroleum industry in the
country, in spite of the fact that the commodity is exploited from and on their
lands. According to him, prior to the enactment of the expropriatory legal
regime[3]
on the ownership and exploration of crude oil in Nigeria, the people who live
in the region where the product is exploited, derived satisfaction in the level
of their participation in the industry through the rights over their lands in
the region. In his words:-
It
is significant to note that before the promulgation of the Act oil companies
that had obtained mining rights from the federal government approached
oil-bearing/land-owning communities for a right of access to the land for its
operations. This was a way by which the communities had some sense of
participation in oil operations, as they received some compensation for
granting access and for any damage to land and any surface rights thereon. It
would appear that this sense of participation has been lost since the unity of
land rights with oil rights in 1978.[4]
In the case of the Petroleum Act, the Act (continuing a colonial policy) vests the entire
property in petroleum (mineral oils) in the country, in the state (federation).
The result is that the federal government has absolute right and control over
oil resources in the country, which is found only in the Niger Delta region of
the country. It therefore, exclusively farms out oil mining rights to oil
companies and receives rents and royalties from them, money which accrues to
the Nigerian state rather than the people. The Land Use Act on the other hand,
(promulgated as a Decree by a military government) vests all the lands
comprised in the territory of each state of the federation in the governor of the
state in ‘trust' for all Nigerians. The Act thus, removed the radical title to
land in Nigeria from the people and vested same on the Governor of the various
states, a situation which has led to a lot of perceived injustice against the
people of the oil rich Niger-Delta region.
For
instance, Ebeku exhaustively treated
the question of the impact which the Land Use Act has had on the people of
Niger-Delta region. This includes: the erosion of the powers of traditional
authorities, thereby leading to chaos in the communities; and loss of the right
of compensation for the intrinsic value of land rather than merely surface
rights.[5]
Other literature has sought to establish the
relationship between the legal regime of ownership of petroleum resources in
Nigeria and the loss of livelihood of the people of the Niger-Delta region.
Thus, the literature focuses on how the activities of oil companies have led to
the depreciation of the way of life of people of the Niger-Delta through oil
pollution, environmental degradation and gas flaring, and how the people of the
region are sidelined in the aftermath of such deleterious activities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for
instance, describes the region as suffering from “administrative neglect,
crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.”[6] They
observed that the majority of the people of the Niger Delta do not have
adequate access to clean water or health-care.[7]
Meanwhile, the poverty in the region contrasted with the wealth generated by
oil, which has become one of the world’s starkest and most disturbing examples
of the “resource curse”.[8]
According to Mukagbo, Cable Network News (CNN) anchorman for Inside Africa 2007, the Niger Delta “is
a region where time seems to have stood still and where people live the most
meager of existences, leaving them bitter and angry from not having benefited
from the black gold that makes Nigeria Africa’s largest producer”.[9] The
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) quite rightly observed that the
developmental challenges of the region are:
“Widespread poverty; severe dearth of infrastructure
and amenities in the rural areas; being the world’s third largest wetland with
fragile ecosystems; high unemployment, rural-urban migration, urban decay; and
environmental degradation and pollution”.[10]
The fact that the people of the
Niger Delta have not benefited from oil wealth is only one part of the story.
The second and most unfortunate part is the deleterious effect which the
exploitation of crude oil has had on the people’s livelihood, health, human
rights and local economy. Widespread and unchecked activities related to the
oil industry have pushed many people in the Niger Delta deeper into poverty and
deprivation, fuelled conflict and led to a pervasive sense of powerlessness and
frustration. The multi-dimensional crisis is driven by the actions of the
security forces and militant groups, extensive pollution of land and water, corruption,
corporate failures and bad practice and serious government neglect.[11]
According to UNDP, more than 60 per cent of the people in the region depend on
the natural environment for their livelihood.[12] For
many, the environmental resource base, which they use for agriculture, fishing
and the collection of forest products, is their principal or sole source of
food.[13]
Pollution and environmental damage, therefore, pose significant risks to their
survival and basic human rights.[14]
According to a study carried out by a team of Nigerian and international
environmental experts in 2006,[15] the
Niger Delta is “one of the world’s most severely petroleum-impacted
ecosystems”. They stated:
“The
damage from oil operations is chronic and cumulative, and has acted synergistically
with other sources of environmental stress to result in a severely impaired
coastal ecosystem and compromised the livelihoods and health of the region’s
impoverished residents.”
While oil spills[16] and gas
flaring[17] are the
most frequently referenced forms of oil-related pollution in the Niger Delta,
there are in fact several other ways in which the oil industry has continued to
harm the environment, such as disposal of wastes and effluents,[18]
dredging, drilling, and seismic activities.
Coupled with the deleterious effect
of oil activities on the people, Ebeku has shown that since the enactment of
the LUA, the oil companies no longer approach the communities to negotiate
access to land for oil operations, on terms of payment of compensation, as was the
case before. In fact, "it is possible for the government to acquire a
vast area of land for petroleum purposes, i.e. granting the operator a lease
over a large area, yet the villages will know nothing about the acquisition";[19] they
wake up one morning to find that the government has given out their farmland to
oil operators. Hence the feeling of participation in the exploitation of oil
found in their land has been lost and this has accentuated a sense of
deprivation.
Another set of literature has focused
on how oil legislation in Nigeria is a consequence of power politics in the
country, in which the ethnic majority groups who control the central government
use their power to deprive the people of the oil region participation in the
oil industry, through hijacking of jobs/employment in the oil industry for
their people and reduction of the derivation principle. Ejibunu, for instance,
clearly shows how unemployment is a major concern in the oil region, which has
had tremendous and adverse impact on peace and stability.[20] Amnesty
International confirms that as a result of poor management of the oil industry,
especially the downstream sector,[21] the
entire industry employs only 35,000 people directly or indirectly.[22] The
agricultural sector in the region has been totally destroyed by the oil
industry, and nothing else is done by the government to engage the youths.[23] Thus,
the rate of unemployment in the Niger Delta is extremely high compared to other
parts of the country.[24] It is
claimed that less than 5% of the people in the Niger Delta are actually
employed in the oil industry, and that rather, most of the available chances
are given to beneficiaries from other parts of the country.[25] Indeed,
a survey of members of armed groups in three Niger Delta states underscores the
link between unemployment and violent agitation. The survey concludes that:
At
least 50 per cent of the armed group members who responded to the AAPW
[Academic Associates Peace Works] questionnaire claimed that they were
unemployed, had no profession, or worked in unpaid jobs,
The literature has also shown the
connection between legislation, the dwindling fortunes of the derivation
principle in the constitution and non-participation of the people of the
Niger-Delta region in the petroleum industry. Thus, Mahler noted the
progressively diminishing revenue accruable from oil that has been allocated to
the region by the federal government since independence from Britain.[26] He
noted that while the percentage of oil revenues refunded to the producing regions
was almost 100% between 1953 and 1959,[27] it was
pegged at 50% by the 1960 Constitution,[28] and
reduced to 30% in 1970.[29]
Subsequently, Obasanjo reduced it by 5%, Shagari by 20%, and under Buhari, it
was pegged at 1.5%.[30] In
fact, some writers speculate that derivation actually hit an all time low of
zero per cent before the Babangida administration fixed it at 1% and later
increased it to 3%, where it remained until the coming into effect of the 1999 Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.[31] Under
the present constitution, 13% of revenue accruing to the federal government
from oil resources derived from any state of the federation is to be paid back
to that state.[32]
Ejibunu, observes that this percentage has failed to satisfy the yearnings of
the people of the Niger Delta region, but has nevertheless put into the hands
of state governments in the region billions of dollars since 1999.[33]
Unfortunately, this has not had any positive effects on the people of the
region, or on the local economy and development.[34] Large
amounts of money have disappeared within the states’ and local governments’
budgets, which are totally lacking in transparency.[35] corruption,[36]
patrimonialism, frivolity[37] and
other forms of personal enrichment have dominated public service in the region,
and indeed the entire nation. This state of affairs has served to exacerbate
insurrection and create the violence, instability and conflict in the Niger
Delta, as the youths are left idle and alienated from the presence and impact
of government and particularly, participation in the oil industry.[38]
Apart from the above, the literature
has shown that the inhabitants view the federal government’s actions with a
great deal of superior, as they consider the central government as playing
politics with issues of development in the region. This literature considers it
unfortunate that despite the several attempts made by the federal government to
develop the Niger-Delta region, development is still elusive in the region.[39] Thus,
the efforts of the federal government in establishing special development
agencies for the region since 1960 have been decried as journeys to nowhere, as
these have not brought any special development to the region;[40]
indicating lack of sincerity on the part of the government.[41] This
prevailing disillusionment is without regard to the consistent recognition by
government of the Niger Delta as a region that requires special developmental
needs, through the several committees and fact-finding missions established by
past[42] and
present governments,[43]
including international agencies.[44]
2.3 Relationship
between Expropriation of Petroleum and Land Resources and Militancy in the
Niger-Delta
There is an avalanche of literature
that discusses the phenomenon of militancy and conflict in the Niger-Delta in
relation to the political economy of oil in Nigeria.
In their work, Michael Watts et al, describe the Niger-Delta as an
oil-producing zone driven by a particular extractive logic, in relation to
extraction to violence, which they describe as the economies of violence.[45] A number
of recent studies have analysed the paradox of poverty and want amidst a
bountiful natural resource endowment– ‘the resource curse’ – that has blighted
many developing countries.[46]
Different theories with varied explanatory framework and contextual relevance, have
been propounded, for example, those propounded by Terry[47] and
Collier and Hoefller,[48] try to
explain the paradox and analyse the key drivers of the conflict, using
neo-Marxist dependency discourse,[49]
environmental scarcity theory,[50] and
greed versus grievance theory.[51] These
have all tended to establish some degree of positive correlation between the
structure of extractive economies dependent on primary commodity export, on the
one hand, and patrimonial corruption, intergroup struggles for resources and
dysfunctional conflicts, on the other. Another dimension of conflict amongst
extractive economies is the conflict associated with the consequences of
natural resource extraction for human livelihood, human settlement and the
sustainability of the planetary ecosystem. Ecological conflict, as it is often
branded does not, however, stand in isolation but is intrinsically related to
structural conflict of groups and factional struggle for resources, including
the mobilization of state power by privileged parties to advance the struggle.
An
apparent gap in most studies is a trans-historical multi-regional anatomy of reinter
politics in extractive economies that rigorously explores the accumulation
devices and tendencies of key stakeholders in their interplay with the
structures of domestic and international political economy. Thus, Kenneth
Omeje, concludes in his work[52] that
this largely unexplored or overlooked aspect of politics in extractive
economies seems to have the most decisive implications for dysfunctional
conflict (or lack of it) in different countries and regions of the global
South, including Nigeria.
Various
attempts are made by authors to explain the nature of conflict in the
Niger-Delta. A CIA report published in 2000, described the conflict as a
catalytic effect of “environmental stresses” in the oil-rich southern Delta on
deepening “political tensions”.[53] Many
other writers situate the remote causes of the violence and militancy in the
context of the expropriatory regime of oil legislation that tend to remove both
oil and land from the control of the people of the Niger-Delta, while the
proximate causes are related to the clamoring for resource control and
convention of a sovereign national conference. For instance, in some respects
the current militancy confirms Ken Saro-Wiwa’s prescient and bleak prediction
in 1990 of the “coming war” in the delta; “the people must be allowed to join
in the lucrative sale of oil” he said to avoid “the cataclysm that is building
up”.[54]
In
his work, Oyefusi[55] did a
large survey of the Niger Delta Oil Communities and discovered that 5% of the
population felt satisfied with the status quo and an astonishing 36.23%
revealed a “willingness or propensity to take up arms against the state”.[56] More
generally, other survey data show clearly that many of the youth grievances –
poverty, lack of employment, minimal educational opportunities – are felt
widely across the region beyond a generation who would be identified as
militants.[57]
A far greater proportion of Niger Deltans perceive economic neglect
(‘marginalisation’ in local parlance) than other regions in the federation and
over 50% of all respondents identified governance as the fundamental problem
working against their opportunity to benefit from oil.[58]
Osaghae,
in his work,[59]
chronicle the crisis in the Niger-Delta over the decades. He notes that what is
today considered as militancy in the Niger-Delta started since the 1980s in a low
key by youth and other ethnic movements – and was subsequently captured by the
southern political classes from the oil producing states as means providing
political pressure on the revenue allocation process. Thus, the minority fears
of the 1950s’s became minority grievances in the 1980s and minority militancy
by the 1990s. For instance, one of the demands of MEND was the immediate
payment of $1.5 billion compensation from Shell approved by the Nigerian
National Assembly covering four decades of environmental degradation.[60]
In
an interview with Karl Maier on February 21st 2006, Gbomo Jomo (the spokesman
of MEND) made it clear that MEND had “no intention of breaking up Nigeria” but
had no intention of dealing directly with government which “knows nothing about
rights or justice”. Resource control meant that the states would “directly
manage” oil. Other communiqués reiterated that these demands were not pecuniary
and “we shall receive no money from any quarters”.[61]
In
a related manner, Michael Ross[62]
explores the dynamics of oil politics along two parallel axes: ‘lootability’
(understood to be “easily appropriated [resource] by individuals or small
groups of unskilled workers”)[63] and ‘obstructability (that is to say the ease
with which its movement or its productive networks can be interrupted or
blocked). Oil (on-shore and off-shore) is unlootable; it is however readily
obstructable (pipelines can be broken, flow stations occupied, on shore but not
off shore). He holds open the possibility that oil (as an unlootable resource)
may yield different types of outcomes such as separatist in Cabinda and non
separatist in Sudan), but believes that non-lootability yields general
associations; to wit: unlootability is likely to yield separatism (control the
territory not the wealth), benefits to government (rather than the poor), reduced
duration of conflicts, and enhanced army discipline.
In an extension of the
frustration-aggression theory, Soremekun [64]
demonstrated that men are most inclined to aggression when subjected to
unjustified frustration. He drew a distinction between attitudinal aggression
and behavioural aggression as direct results of sustained frustration. For
Briggs,[65] the
potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope
of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity. If there is a
significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they
think they will get, there is a likelihood of rebellion. Just as frustration
produces aggressive behaviour on the part of an individual, so does relative
deprivation predict collective violence by social groups.[66] The
armed insurrection against military and civilian targets in the Niger Delta, by
militant youths, directed against government and the foreign oil companies is
viewed in this perspective.
Michael
Renner, in his work ‘the Anatomy of resource Wars’[67]
examined the relationship between resource extraction and conflict, and
situated his findings in the Niger-Delta region. He notes that resource
extraction is itself the source of conflict, especially the activities and
operations of oil companies, which create varied degrees of tension with local
populations. Apart from tension created by the confiscation of land from local
people without proper compensation, they cause an array of environmental
problems by poisoning drinking water, destroying arable land, clear-cutting
forests, and despoiling hunting and fishing grounds, and they introduce social
disruptions and communal tensions: roads etched into previously inaccessible
areas bring a heavy influx of construction workers, miners, loggers, and,
sometimes, migrant populations.[68]
Ovwasa,[69]
in his work maintains that the anger of the people in the region against the
oil majors is as a result of environmental degradation and the loss of
livelihood that their operations have engendered. These have led to a state of
hopelessness and the recourse to violence against the state and multinational
oil companies operating in the region. According to Raji,[70]
Oil spillage resulting from oil exploration has led to the pollution of
farmlands, fishing streams and ponds, while indiscriminate gas flaring pollute
the air and result in acid rain in the Niger-Delta. The environmental
degradation meant that farming and fishing, the mainstay of the economy of the
people in the region is constantly under threat. With little or no government
and private sector paid employment, a large proportion of the people,
particularly the youth face massive unemployment and a bleak future. The lack
of gainful employment has created pervasive poverty amidst riches for the people
of the Niger Delta. Given this state of affairs, one cannot but agree with
Ledum Mitte, that the Delta's problem is a crisis of frustration.[71]
This frustration is now being expressed through hostage taking, arson directed
at oil installations and attacks on agencies of the Nigerian State.
According to Obi,[72] in more ways than one, the struggle for resource
control by the minorities of the Niger Delta is fundamentally one over the
ownership and control of natural resources within a claimed political space,
and in the context of the Niger Delta this also significantly includes land
that is rich in oil and gas – Nigeria’s chief revenue earner(s). He cautioned
however that the struggle for resource control is not altogether an
undifferentiated one, because within the Niger Delta, there are contradictions
and divisions along ethnic, communal, class and inter, as well as
intra-generational lines. He concluded that it is therefore more useful to
glean the dynamics of the interplay of forces within and across fluid ethnic,
communal, and generational boundaries as the forces of resistance confront the
forces of exploitation, extraction, accumulation and repression.
In the same work,
Obi emphasises the collusion between the Multinational Oil Corporations and the
Nigerian state in the repression and exploitation of the people of the
Niger-Delta. In fact, he notes that the dynamics of power relations between the duo puts the Multinational
Oil Corporations at an advantage and makes the Nigerian state a mere instrument
of exploitation, repression and expropriation of the livelihood of the people
of oil producing areas of Nigeria. In his words:-
The external linkages to the struggle for resource control in
the Niger Delta exist at the two opposing levels: those of expropriation and
resistance. They are also implicated at the levels of production, accumulation
and distribution. It is the interaction between these levels that propels and
sustains the struggles in the Niger Delta.[73]
In another work, Obi[74]
notes that according to the JVA, most oil companies and the Nigerian state use
a 40:60 ratio for the sharing of oil profits after the operating company has
deducted operational costs. In the case of the Shell-NNPC JVA, the government
(through NNPC) owns 55 per cent, with 10 per cent owned by Elf, five per cent
by Agip and 30 per cent by Shell (Obi 1997:141). Since the Nigerian state is
over 90 per cent dependent on oil revenues and lacks control of oil technology and the
sophisticated politics of the oil market, the real power over oil, that is
resource control is in the physical sense exercised by the oil multinationals.
While the federal state is far – thousands of kilometers away from the oil
communities, the impoverished villagers in the oil producing communities in the
Niger Delta do not feel its presence. What they see are the oil rigs, flow
stations, gas flares and oil pipelines operated by oil companies. Hence, it is
the visible agents of oil exploitation and expropriation – the oil companies
that is first confronted by the people
.
.
The
structure of extraction and dispossession in the Niger Delta is embedded in the
transnational political economy of oil. According to Watts,[75] it operates through an “oil complex”
comprising: ‘a statutory monopoly over mineral exploitation, a nationalised oil
company (NNPC) that operates through joint ventures with oil majors who are
granted territorial concessions, the security apparatuses of the state
protecting costly investments and ensuring the continual flow of oil, and an
institutional mechanism ‘derivation principle’ by which federal oil revenues
are distributed to the states and producing communities, and not least the oil
producing communities themselves.’
Watts
goes on to note that “central to the oil complex is its enclave character, the
extent to which it is militarised as a national security sector, and a dominant
fiscal sociology, namely the massive centralising consequences of vast unearned
income, flowing to the federal exchequer, derivative of the alliance of state
and capital.” The result is that the Nigerian state acts transnationally to
facilitate oil extraction, with the power elite using state power to accumulate
oil wealth, using such a ‘privatised’ state to militarise extraction by
crushing protest and resistance to oil exploitation, while using oil wealth to
reinforce control over power, and continued participation in transnational
accumulation.
2.4 The Land Use Act and Expropriation
of the Livelihood of the People of the Niger Delta
According
to USAID, land is a unique, valuable and immovable resource of limited quality
and that is not the only basic aspect of subsistence for many people.[76] And to
Ndubisi Nwokolo, land and labour remain the two commonest factors of production
in Africa Land has remained a major resource with easy access to rural
communities, and it is considered as the main asset in sustaining the
livelihood of most rural African Communities.[77]
R.
Jennings and A. Watts also assert that the fundamental resource of the nation
state is land.[78]
Even Datong stated that human society all through the world is heavily
dependent on land and its resources. And it is not an overstatement to say that
without land there would be no human existence. This is because, it is from
land that man gets items very essential for his survival such as food, cloth,
shelter, medication[79] e.t.c.
However,
L. M. Olayiwola and O. Adeleye opine that a careful and detailed analysis of
the role land has played in the lives of the people and more importantly, how
the system of land tenure has that has evolved has affected the lives, and
beliefs and general disposition of the people who live on the land and thus, led
to some fundamental attitudes.[80]
Ndubisi
Nwokolo in his work, stated that the rapid growing oil sector between 1960’s
and 1970’s, made the Nigerian state to decide through military decree to
promulgate what is known today as the land use Act of 1978. This Act brought
about a land reform system vesting the ownership of land within the federating
state in Nigeria, on the governors.[81]
This
Act according to Rhuks T. Ako, was promulgated to nationalise all lands in the country,
purportedly due to the increasing difficulty experienced by private and
government institutions in acquiring land for development.[82] Even
though legislation existed to empower governments to acquire land compulsorily
for public purposes, it was observed in the Third National Development plan
that the cost was exorbitant in some of Nigeria’s urban Centres.[83]
By
virtue of Section 1, the governors are to hold these lands vested on them on
trust for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians [84]and the
designation of urban and non-urban areas of a state is the responsibility of
the state governor[85]. Hence,
the Act legitimised the appropriation of land in the region.
Bola
Fajemirokun, believes that the abolition of private ownership of land by this
Act, was based on three reasons: (1) to
facilitate access to land for public and private use, (2) to promote tenure
security, and (3) to curb land speculations, which had been driving land values
upwards and out of the reach of most Nigerians[86]. May be
this could be why Professor Imran Oluwole in his inaugural lecture, stated that
land use act regime established a system of right of occupancy harmonizing the
various degrees of proprietary interest in land subjecting same to the radical
title of the governor.[87]
Section
28,[88]
according to Frynas, shows that the military governor is empowered to revoke a
right of occupancy for overriding public interest and it includes the requirement
of land for military purpose or oil pipelines, or for any purpose connected
therewith[89].
And Rhuks T. Ako, has even said that section 28 of the Act, which provides that
land may be appropriated for “overriding public interests”, has been defined to
include, “the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or
for any purpose connected therewith. In essence, the inhabilitants of the
region may be dispossessed of their land whenever their land is required for
oil exploration, making them tenant-at-will of the oil industry on the land
they have owned and inhabited for centuries.[90]
Ndubisi
Nwokolo, however, stated categorically that the this act which vested the land
of the Niger Delta regions in their state governors, promoted the use of land
in the region for oil resources production rather than agriculture, and in most
instance, have the crisscross of oil pipelines to contend with over space. In
many situations, their farms or fishing waters suffer from occasional pollution
from oil spill[91].
This situation puts a lot of pressure on the population that resides in Niger
Delta. And it was rightly pointed out Amali has established that 70% of the total
Nigerian Population lives in the rural area and out of this number, over 60% of
the population engage in agricultural or related occupations.[92]
The
region as of 1990 was described by Ikelegbe as one of the least developed and
poorest, but due to the increasing oil exploration, the region has become
economically and socially prostrate, courtesy of extensive environmental
degradation and ensuring socio-economic disruption and poverty.[93]
Even
Ibeanu, described that the magnitude of poverty in these oil bearing
communities, is directly linked to the oil production activities, especially
the environmental consequence, which have destroyed livelihood by destroying
farmlands and fishing water. In short, it has led to poverty, insecurity and
under development[94] Ibeanu,
further described the situation as a contradiction of security.[95]
Furthermore,
Omeje stated that the Act in theory makes land a property of the state and vest
its allocation and administration in the state governor. And as a result of
this oil exploration, some people became landless and this affected their
livelihood negatively.[96]
The
peculiar impact of the Act, as observed by Rhuks T. Ako, on the inhabitants of
the Niger Delta region that hosts upstream activities of the oil industry, is
that the Act has led to the assertion that it was specifically made to deprive
those inhabitants of the right to participate actively in the oil industry.[97]
Again,
the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria has contended that the legal advantages
enjoyed by the oil companies in the context of this controversial Act
effectively alienate oil communities from their traditional and cultural
resources. This has become a backdrop for which land has become the most
contentious resource in the Niger Delta region.[98]
Leftwich,
has opined that in some circumstances land reform can be an important condition
for promoting rural development and agricultural productivity because small
farmers are often mre productive than large scale farmers. Though the Act
targeted at giving petrol-business pre-eminence over agriculture, turned
Nigeria from a country that can meet all its food requirements into a country
that imports food. And as a result of the consequence provided by the Land Use
Act, oil resources and the rents accuracy from the oil resources have become
the livelihood for all concerned, especially the dwellers of these rural oil
bearing communities[99]. And
Collier having looked at the whole situation stated that states, whose economy
depends on exploration of primary commodity, are likely to witness political
instability and armed conflict.[100]
It
was based on all these, that is, deprivation and exploration of the Niger Delta
land, which rises as a result of section 28 of the Land Use Act, that the
movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) stated thus: “we will
fight for our land with the last drop of our blood regardless of how many
people the government of Nigeria and Oil Companies are successful in bribing”.
2.5 Nature of Surface Rights and Quantum
of Compensation for Oil Pollution
In
most countries of the world according to Hobart King, all mineral resources
belong to the government. This includes all valuable rocks, minerals oil or gas
found on or within the earth. Organisations or individuals in those countries
cannot legally extract and sell any mineral commodity without first obtaining
an authorisation from the government.[101] And in
Nigeria, Section 1 (1)-(3)[102]
provides that the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or
upon any land shall be vested on the state. And it also includes land covered
with water.
By
the above provision, all petroleum in Nigeria is vested in the Federal
government, whose sole responsibility it is to control the resources and permit
their exploitation under license in accordance with the Petroleum Act 1969.
Hobart King further states that in as much as the general purpose of a lease or
a purchase contract is to convey the rights of exploitation and production to a
mineral development company that has obtained a licence, the owner of the
surface still has some rights. Basic rights of the surface owners are provided
by state laws, and every surface owner should decide if stronger protections
are needed. The only way to preserve them is to make sure that the contract
contains adequate language to protect crops, livestock, buildings, personal
property, access and any other desire during the duration of a lease.[103]
However,
the term “surface right” according to Black’s Law Dictionary[104], is
also known as surface interest. It is defined as every right in real property
other than the mineral interest. The surface right owner or surface interest owner
is entitled to whatever non-mineral substances that may be found in or under
the soil.
Roy
Spooner also defined surface rights as every right in land other than mining
rights[105].
This could be why Vincent M. Okwechime Jr., states that where there is acquisition
of surface rights, there will be payment of compensation to the land owners for
the land per-se, and items such as economic trees, cash crops, building,
structures, etc, which exist naturally (‘fructus naturales’), or are on the
land as a result of man-made improvements (‘fructus insustriales’).[106]
Also,
Mc Graw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms[107] saw
surface rights as the ownership of the surface land only, mineral rights being
reserved.
Again,
the Business Dictionary[108] does
not miss out in giving a definition. It defines surface right as a landowner’s
right to the exterior or upper boundary of the land (except those restricted by
the mineral owner’s right), and water and other substances (except those
defined as minerals) below it.
In
Nigeria, there are existing laws and regulations that are channeled towards the
protection of surface rights. This is to say that they prohibit unlawful
discharge of petroleum products onto land, into any river or creek, into the
waters of port, into a sewer, or into supplies.[109]
Regulation
25[110], therefore
provides that the licence or lessee shall adopt all practicable precautions,
including the provision of up-to-date requirement approved by the Chief
Petroleum Engineer to prevent the pollution of in-land waters, rivers, water
courses, the territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil, mud or
other fluids or substances which might contaminate the water, banks or
shoreline, or marine life and where any such pollution occurs or loss occurred,
shall take prompt steps to control and if possible, end it.
Furthermore,
Section 11 (5) (a-c)[111],
formerly Section 20[112],
entitles one to compensation where the person’s land or interest has been
injuriously affected by the exercise of the holder’s right; where the person
has suffered damage by reason of neglect on the part of the guarantees and r
his agents and servants; and where the person has suffered damage as a result
of any breakage of or leakage from the oil pipelines.
Akanimo
Sampson,[113]
it observes that the main statutory liability under Section 11 (5) of Oil
Pipeline Act, is to pay compensation and A.O. Ekpu, [114] has asserted
that there are three strands under which victims of oil pollution may seek
payment of compensation from oil industry. These are the Statutes, the Common
law and the rule of international law.
However,
the essence of compensation as held by the court in the case of Rawyards v. Coal Co.[115], is to
restore the injured party to the position he or she was in, prior to the harm
or injury complained of. The kind of compensation claimed is dependent on the
kind of damage that has occurred. But what then can be the quantum of
compensation? Black’s Law Dictionary[116]
defined quantum as a Latin word which means the required, desired or allowed
amount; portion or share.
In
determining the quantum of compensation, some factors will be put into
consideration. Vincent Okwechime, Jr[117],
critically looked at impacted land and impacted water, in order to determine
the quantum of compensation. For impacted land, he said that, where the damage
is as a result of the spill on the land, it may lead to ‘a loss of farming
right’. Where this is the situation, it must be claimed and proved. If done,
the nature of farming and the kind of crops and capacity of the farm as a whole
can be taken into account in order to determine a fair and adequate
compensation. And if it turns out to be that the land has been permanently
damaged, he argued as has been done elsewhere that there should be an outright
sale of the land, and the market value
of the land should be determined by reference to the time of the spillage.
He
further stated that in addition to payment of “ temporary loss of use”, due to
the structures have been affected, the polluter may be required to take care of
the cost of the temporary relocation until the spill has been properly clean
up.
As
regards to impact on water, he stipulates that damage caused to fishing nets
and other fishing equipments and paraphernalia as a result of a spill must be
made good by way of monetary recompense; and in some cases, the damaged items
may have to be replaced. And the measure of compensation is the current market
value of the items.
If
a fish pond is a structure that is impacted, the potential number of fishes,
and its income generating capacity will be taken into account for compensation
of compensation. And where there is ‘loss of fishing right’ the size of the
area fished, the kind of fish in that area which form the daily catch, the
number of fisherman and women involved in the fishing and the income generating
capacity will be taken into consideration for compensation of compensation.
Finally,
he stipulates that when it has to do with “loss of water right” that the oil
producers Trade Section rates, provides for the square nature of the affected
body of water.
The
Sahara Reporters, New York[118]
through their report, state what can be quantified as the quantum of
compensation. In their report, the
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) sanctioned Nigeria’s
Agip Company Limited, a mere one million naira fine for poor response to oil
spills in its operational area, that is, for its failure to remedy oil spill
impacted sites in River State. And this quantum of compensation was determined
by the outcome of the damage assessment conducted by NOSDRA.
According
to Uduehi [119].,
payment of compensation by oil firm is procedural. In an event of a spill
resulting in damage to property, the first approach by the concerned department
of the oil firm is to initiate assessment or evaluation of the extent of
damage. The land officers, estate officers and surveyors carry out this
assessment. In the process, property destroyed are identified, assessed and
recorded. This has to do with the use of “before” and “after” value of the
impacted property. This, as it were, must be quantified. With this, the valuers
will deduct the value of the property before the incident.
Monday
Effiong Noah[120],
however, has observed that the above method is ambiguous. The owner of the impacted
or impaired property is never consulted in the so-called scientific evaluation
to ascertain how much he has invested on the farm, pond or land as the case may
be. Agents of the oil companies assess damage perhaps relying on their whims
and caprices, and paying little attention to market and farm gate prices of the
impacted property.
The
World Bank[121]
revealed that based on annual rent of #5000 that the amount of compensation for
land should at least be #50,000 per hectare.
This
compensation, as observed by Monday Effiong Noah[122], may
not be adequate or satisfactory. To him, payment of compensation is one of the
intractable problems facing the oil industry in Nigeria. The internecine crisis
between oil firms, the host communities and the federal Government could be
traceable to the issue of neglect which is synonymous with the low compensation
paid to the victims of negative externalities from the oil industry.
Aghalino[123] has asserted
that even when oil companies consent to pay compensation, there is always the
procedural problem. According to him, issues are raised as to the extent of the
area polluted, categories of damage to be compensated, and at which rate; and
the problem of whom to pay. Oil companies in most cases, prefer to pay directly
to the victims of the oil spillage because it would appear it cost less to pay
directly as they lacked the finesse to bargain economically.
Rhuks
T.Ako[124],
has affirmed the assertions of Monday Effiong Noah, and Aghalino states that
the right to be adequately compensated is also negated by the provision of the
Act. He specifically mentions Section 77 of the Minerals Act, which provides
that any person prospecting or mining shall: pay to the “holder or occupier” of
private land such sums as may be fair and reasonable compensation for any
disturbance of the surface rights of that owner or occupier and for any damage
done to the surface of the land upon which his prospecting or mining is being
or has been carried on, and shall compensate the owner for any crops, economic
trees, buildings or works damaged, removed or destroyed by him or by his agents
or servants.
In
conclusion, in as much as the minerals in the land belong to the Federal
Government in Nigeria, the owner of the surface of the land also has the surface
rights and this entitles him or her to compensation when violated even though
the compensation as observed may not be adequate.
[1] See Lorenzo Cotula, ―The Regulatory Takings Doctrine‖ online: http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/17014IIED.pdf at page
1.
[2] Kaniye Ebeku, “Oil and the Niger Delta People: The
Injustice of the Land Use Act,” Centre
for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy Journal Vol. 9, 2001, University of Dundee, available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol9/vol9-14.html (accessed October, 16,
2010)
[3] The most important
oil-related legislation in Nigeria include: the Petroleum Act 1969 (now LFN
2004), Oil Pipelines Act 1956, Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968, Federal
Environmental Protection Agency Act 1988 (now National Environmental Standard
and Regulatory Agency Act), and the Land Use Act 1978.
[4] Kaniye Ebeku, Op.
cit, n.2, p. 10
[5] Prior to the enactment
of the LUA holders of land in the Niger-Delta enjoyed three levels of
compensation in respect to access to land for the petroleum industry. These
included payment of annual rent as the head lord for the intrinsic value of the
land; payment of compensation for surface rights in case of damage to crops and
economic trees; and payment of compensation for pollution where occur. See Kaniye Ebeku, ibid.
[6] UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development
Report, 2006
[7] Ibid.
[8] See Amnesty
International, Nigeria: Petroleum,
Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, 2009, p. 9
[9] Tumi Makagbo, CNN,
Inside Africa aired on 2nd October, 2004, http://transcripts.cnn.com, accessed
June 26, 2007.
[10] Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC). 2006. Niger
Delta Regional Development Master Plan – popular version. NDDC, Port Harcourt.
[11] Amnesty International,
Op. cit., n.8, p. 9
[12] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, p74.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Nigerian Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Commission on Environmental, Economic
and Social Policy, with Federal Ministry of Environment (Abuja), “Niger Delta
Natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration Project Scoping Report”,
May 2006.
[16] As a result of the
sheer volume of oil exploration and related activities such as oil pipeline
networks in the Niger Delta, it is estimated that about 6, 817 oil spills occurred in the Niger Delta between 1976 and 2001
(about one a day for 25 years). See Amy Sinden, “An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate
Change: The Case Against Gas Flaring in Nigeria”, in William C.G. Burns &
Hari M. Osofsky, (eds.), Adjudicating Climate Change: Sub-National, National,
And Supranational Approaches, (Cambridge University
Press, 2008), p. 3. However, this estimate is considered as highly
conservative, as some experts put the figure at ten times higher. See Tom O’Neill, Curse of the
Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta, National Geographic (Feb. 2007), available at http://www7.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0702/feature3/index.html.
In fact, a CIA Report in the 1990s estimated that the amount of oil spilled in
the Niger Delta was already ten times the amount of the Alaskan Exxon-Valdez
spill. See Douglas Farah, Nigeria’s
Oil Exploitation Leaves Delta Poor, Poisoned,
WASH. POST A22 (Mar. 18, 2001). A group
of independent environmental and oil experts visiting the Niger Delta in 2006
put the figure for oil spilt, onshore and offshore, at 9 to 13 million barrels
of oil over the past 50 years, see Niger Delta Natural Resources Damage
Assessment and Restoration Project, Phase I Scoping Report, May 2006, conducted
by Nigerian Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social
Policy, with Federal Ministry of Environment (Abuja).
[17] The practice of gas
flaring has been on in the Niger delta since oil production started in the 1950s,
see Ike Okanta & Oronto Douglas, Where
Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, & Oil 61-63 (2003). It is estimated
that the MNOC operating in Nigeria flare about 75% of the natural gas produced
in Nigeria. See The Climate Justice Programme & Environmental Rights
Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, Gas
Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental, and Economic Monstrosity (2005)[hereinafter Gas Flaring Report], available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring/report/gas.flaring.in.nigeria.html.
Gas flaring is the 24/7 burning of the natural gas associated and extracted
with crude oil, which reaches hundreds of feet into the sky, killing the
surrounding vegetation with searing heat, emitting a deafening roar, and
belching a cocktail of smoke, soot, and toxic chemicals into the air, usually
resulting in the condition known as acid rain. The Niger Delta produces 2.5
billion barrels of crude oil every day, and most of the associated 2.5 billion
cubic feet of natural gas is burned off into the atmosphere, see the Gas
Flaring Report, id. A Report by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated
that ‘‘everyday, eight million cubic feet of natural gas are burned off in
flares that light the skies across the Delta, not only driving off 5 cms,
hunting the fishing and poisoning the agriculture, but contributing to global
warming”. See Hassan
Tai Ejibunu, (Ronald H. Tuschl, ed.), Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis: Root Causes
Of Peacelessness, EPU Research Papers, Issue 07, 2007, p.14 citing Comet Nigerian Newspaper, March 21, 2001, p.12. Indeed, in 2001, forty percent of all the natural gas burned
throughout Africa was attributable to gas flaring in Nigeria and the country’s
gas flaring has contributed more greenhouse gases to the atmosphere than all of
sub-Saharan Africa combined. See the Gas Flaring Report, ibid.
[18] These are wastes
produced from the different phases of oil production and indiscriminately disposed
of, in the environment. For example, Shell SPDC in a 2006 report disposed of
about 481 tonnes of wastewater and 16,885,000m3 of produced water in
the environment and especially surface water. See SPDC, People and the Environment, 2006, p18.
[19] Kaniye Ebeku, Op. cit, n.2, p. 15
[20] See Hassan Tai Ejibunu,
(Ronald H. Tuschl, ed.), Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis: Root Causes Of
Peacelessness, EPU Research Papers, Issue 07, 2007, p. 16.
[21] In Nigeria, crude oil
is hardly processed within the country. Nigeria
currently imports almost 85 percent of the refined oil products it uses. While
the capacity of the four existing state‐owned refineries is completely insufficient, so far no
private refinery exists in Nigeria. See Energy Administration Information
(2009): Country Analysis Briefs – Nigeria, p.4 (Last Updated May 2009),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf (5.5.2009).
[22] See Amnesty International, Oil in the Niger Delta, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/pages/nga‐031105‐action‐eng (15.1.2009)
[23] See Robert Kappel, Strukturan passungsma ßnahmen undihre
Auswirkungen in Nigeria, in: Nord‐Sud aktuell, 5 (4. Quartal 1991), 4, pp. 587‐602. Cited in Annegret Mahler, Op.
cit., n.16, p.18.
[24] Ben E.
Aigbokhan, “Reconstruction of Economic Governance in the Niger Delta
Region in Nigeria: The Case of the Niger Delta Development Commission”, in Karl
Wohlmuth & Tino Urban, Reconstructing
Economic Governance after Conflict in Resource‐rich African Countries, (Berlin: LIT,
2007), pp. 195.
[25] Hutchful E. Oil Companies and Environmental Pollution in Nigeria, (In
Political Economy of Nigeria, (ed.) Claude Ake, (London: Longman Press 1985). The domination of the oil wealth produced from the region by
non-Deltans has also fuelled resentment and anger amid claims that the oil of
the region is being stolen by other groups, leaving the source of the wealth to
wallow in paradoxical poverty. See Ebeku, Kaniye, 2008. “Niger Delta Oil,
Development and the New Development Initiative: some reflections from a
socio-legal perspective,” Journal of Asian and
African Studies, Vol. 42, No. 399, pp.300-303
[26] Annegret Mahler, Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the
Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta, GIGA Research Programme (Violence & Security)
Working Paper, No. 120, January, 2010, p. 16.
[27] See A. E. Ogbuigwe,
“The Law and Environment; The Niger Delta Challenge”, Port Harcourt Law Journal, 1999, p.94.
[28] s. 134 of the 1960
constitution. See also s.140 of the 1963 Republican constitution.
[29] See Decree No. 13 of
1970. See generally, Hemen P. Faga, “Taming the Tiger in the Niger Delta: the
Role of Law in the Niger Delta Question: Whither?” Akungba Law Journal, vol.
1:2, 2008, p.306
[30] See The Niger Delta:
Phoenix of Nigerian Democracy, Vanguard Book Series, in Vanguard Newspaper,
Monday, January 22, 2000, p.27.
[31] See A. E. Ogbuigwe, op.
cit., n.52, p.94. See also United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP): Niger Delta Human Development Report,
(2006), Abuja: UNDP.
[32] s.162 of the 1999 CFRN
[33] See Hassan Tai Ejibunu,
(Ronald H. Tuschl, ed.), Op. cit., n.17, p. 18.
[34] A. A. Brisibe, African Tradition “The Identity of a People: With Special
Focus on Globalization & Its Impact in the Niger Delta” C.O.O.L Conference,
Boston, U.S.A, March 18, 2001, p.1
[35] Human Rights Watch (2007): Chop Fine, The Human Rights
Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State,
Nigeria, January, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007), pp.32-33. The authors
especially accentuated the so‐called “security vote,” a voluminous pool of state
funds at the local, state, and federal levels (which in some cases exceeds the
budget for health or education) meant for the nebulous purpose of maintaining peace and security. In practice the allocation of these funds is not at
all controlled, and it is reported that in Port Harcourt “many local government
chairs […] will give half of the [security vote] money in the name of
‘empowerment’ to youth they use as thugs and the rest goes into their own bank accounts”
ibid, 33.
[36] Various top officials
of the federal government have admitted the monumental corruption of state
governors in the oil producing region who receive the highest allocation from
the federation account each month. See confession of Minister of finance, Esther Nenadi Usman in 2007; N. E. Usman, ‘‘Governors Waste Monthly Allocations’’ in Corruption in High Places, available at
http://www.unitedijawstates.com (accessed July 01,
2007). The former Head of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC), Nuhu Ribadu, estimated that in 2003, 70 per cent of oil revenues, more
than $14 billion was stolen or wasted. See Nigerian
Oil, Curse of the Black Gold in http://www7.nationalgeographic.com (accessed July 01, 2007)
[37] Apart from the
so-called security vote which serves as a conduit for siphoning state funds,
governments at all levels in Nigeria engage in frivolities which better serve
the personal interests of those in government rather than addressing the real
needs of the people. For instance, the Rivers State government had a budget of $1.3 billion in 2006. It included transportation fees of
$65,000 a day for the governor’s office; $10 million for catering, gifts and
souvenirs; $38 million for two helicopters, and health services in the entire
state received only $22 million. See N. E Usman, ibid.
[38] A leader of the foremost militant group operating in the region, the
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), General God’s Will confirmed to Jeff Koinage of CNN that they were fighting for liberation
of the Niger Delta and against bad governance. See CNN.Com “ Nigerian
Kidnappers Release Hostages”, February 13, 2007, (accessed July 01, 2007)
[39] See for instance,
Precious –Ann Ahiarammunnah, “Oil Companies: Legislation on Corporate Social
Responsibility and Peace in the Niger Delta”, Ebonyi State University Law Journal, vol. 2, No. 1, 2007, p. 191
[40] The government has
established so far about four special agencies for the development of the Niger
Delta region since 1960, including presently a federal ministry for the Niger
Delta. These agencies include the Niger Delta Development Board established
under section 159 of the 1960 Constitution, the Niger Delta River Basin
Authority established in 1976, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development
Commission (OMPADEC) established in 1992 and the Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC), which replaced OMPADEC in 2000. The Federal Ministry of
Niger Delta Affairs was established in 2008 by late President Yar`Adua. For a
comprehensive analysis of the political intrigues and nuances of the government
in the effective financing of the various agencies and sincerity in the
development of the Niger Delta, see, Hemen P. Faga, Op. cit., n. 29, pp. 301-305.
[41] see The Guardian Newspaper “Niger Delta: Government Must Dump
Past Deceptive Tactics”, available at http://www.guardiannewsngr.com, accessed July 06, 2007 (particularly statement credited
to Akanna Campbell, Executive Secretary, South-South Community Development
Union (SSCDU), a Niger Delta research group); see generally, Hassan Tai Ejibunu,
(Ronald H. Tuschl, ed.), Op. cit., n.17, pp. 19-20. See also Hemen P. Faga, ibid, and Victor Ojakorotu, “The Internationalization of Oil Violence in the
Niger Delta of Nigeria”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 106-108.
[42] The intractable
instability in the Niger Delta has led past governments to establish committees
to make recommendations on how best to tackle the problems of the region. Some
of these committees include the following:- the Belgore Judicial Committee
1992; the Don Etiebet Inter-Ministerial Fact-Finding Team 1994; Vision 2010
Committee 1996; Popoola Committee 1998; the Ogomudia Special Security Committee
on Oil Producing Areas 2001; Presidential Panel on National Security 2003; the
Niki Tobi National Political Reform Conference 2005 and the Presidential
Council on the Social and Economic Development of the Coastal States 2006. See
Precious –Ann Ahiarammunnah, Op. cit., n.39, p.192.
[43] The present government
has so far set up the following committees to address the Niger Delta issue:
President Umaru Musa Yar`Adua’s Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008 and
the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger
Delta, 2009, including the Amnesty Implementation Committee 2009. See Tell Magazine, “Securing a Troubled
Region: Amnesty Proclamation Pursuant to Section 175 of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria”, August 17, 2009, No. 33, p.53.
[44] The United Nations and
its specialised agencies have also at various times made recommendations on the
Niger Delta. For instance, the United Nations established the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights Situation in Nigeria in 1997 and the UNDP has issued
several reports, including United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP): Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006,
Abuja.
[45] Michael Watts, Ike Okonta and Dimieari Von Kemedi, “Economies of
Violence: Petroleum, Politics and Community Conflict in the Niger Delta,
Nigeria”, Institute of International studies, University of California Working,
No. 1, 2004, p. 6.
[46] R.M. Auty, Sustaining
Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, London: Routledge, 1993.
[47] Terry Lynn Karl, The
Paradox of Plenty: Oil Boom and Petro-Politics, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).
[48] Collier, P. and A. Hoefller (2000), Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf.
Accessed on 28 April 2004
[49] For a detailed discussion of neo-Marxist dependency theory,
see Hoogvelt Ankie, Globalisation and the
Post-colonial World, London: Macmillan. (1997), Chapter
2.
[50] For a detailed discussion, see Homer-Dixon, T.
‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’, International Security, 19/1, (1994), pp. 5–40.
[51] For a detailed discussion, see Collier and Hoefller, Op. cit.
[52] Kenneth Omeje, Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the
Global South: Re-Engaging Rentier Theory and Politics, 2003.
[53] See http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/nigeria.html
[54] International Crisis Group, Fuelling
the Delta Crisis, Report No. 118, International Crisis Group,
Dakar, 2006, p.16.
[55] A. Oyefusi, Oil and the Propensity for Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta
region of Nigeria, (Washington DC: The World Bank, Post Conflict Transitions Papers No. 8, WPS4194, 2007).
[56] Ibid, p.16.
[57] In Ikelegbe’s (2006:97) sample of youth (including militants, opinion
leaders and others), ethnic neglect and political marginalization (including
state repression) were the overwhelmingly dominant reasons given for the rise
of youth militia. See, Ikelegbe, A. The economics of conflict in oil rich Niger
Delta region of Nigeria, African and Asian
Studies 5/1 2006 23-55.
[58] UNDP, Niger Delta: Situation Assessment and Opportunities for
Engagement, (Port Harcourt/Abuja, UNDP, 2007).
[59] Osagae, E. Do ethnic minorities still exist in Nigeria?, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 24/2 1986 151-168.
[60] A Federal High Court sitting in Port Harcourt in February 2006
ordered SPDC to pay $1.5 billion to “Ijaw Aborigines of Bayelsa State”. Justice
Okeke rejected a stay of execution by Shell and ordered the company to pay the
Central bank of Nigeria the full amount no later than May 22nd 2006.
[61] Vanguard, February 4th 2006.
[62] Ross, M. Oil, Drugs and Diamonds, in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman
(eds)., The Political economy of Armed Conflict. Reiner, Boulder, 2003.
[63] Ibid, p.47.
[64] K. Soremekun, “Oil and Democratic Imperative in Nigeria”, in Olowu et al
(eds.), Governance and Democratization in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books,
1995, p.34.
[65] A. Briggs, “Niger Delta Struggle Minus Criminal Militancy.” Lagos:
Vanguard Newspapers, 2008, p. 39.
[66] A. Máire, "Aggression” Beyond Intractability, Boulder: Guy Burgess
and Heidi Burgess (eds.), Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado,
Boulder. Posted: <http://www.beyondintract ability.org/essay/aggression/>.Retrieved:
3/14/2009.
[67] Michael Renner, ‘The Anatomy of Resource Wars’, World Watch Papers, No. 162, 2002.
[68] Ibid, pp. 39-40.
[69] L. Ovwasa,
“Oil and the Minority Question”, in Saliu, H. A. (ed.) ‘Issues in
Contemporary Political Economy of Nigeria’, (Ilorin: Sally and Associates,
1999), p.90.
[70] W. Raji, “Oil
Resources, Hegemonic Politics and the struggle for Re-inventing Past- Colonial
Nigeria” in Abdul-Rasheed Na’Allah (ed.) ‘Ogoni’s Agonies: Ken Saro-Wiwa and
the Crisis in Nigeria’, Trenton, NJ: Africa World press Incorporation,
1998), p.111.
[71] Time Magazine
“Special Report: Nigeria, May 22,2006, p.23.
[72] Cyril Obi, “Youth and the Generational
Dimensions to Struggles for Resource Control in the Niger Delta; Prospects for
the Nation-state Project in Nigeria” (Monograph Series: Council for the
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