Department of Banking and Finance, Faculty of Law
The Nigerian Banking System has grown in leaps and bounds since 1892 when banking business commenced in Nigeria.  Although this has not been without occasional hiccups, the structure, size and depth of the system in terms of financial products and the level of sophistication had changed significantly over the years.  However, what followed were occasional failures particularly in the early 1990’s, which led to the establishment of the “Failed Banks’ (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractice in Banks Decree No 18 of 1994”.  This paper traces the history of failure in the system and how these endemic  failures were stemmed by the military  decree of 1994. The transition from the failed banks’ decree to the 1999 failed banks’ Act of the National Assembly  provided the impetus for the Bank capital regulation leading to the recent recapitalization exercise of the Nigerian banking industry. These has resulted in the apparent state of soundness, stability and security  in the system amidst global wave of financial crisis at the moment.
A bank is said or considered a failure not only when it ceases operation but also when it cannot meet any of its obligations (Ezeuduji, 1997). These obligations are due, first and foremost, to its customers as well as to its shareholders and the community where it is established.  However, failure to meet obligations could be mild, serious or negligible.
The critical importance of banks in economic growth and development explains why every economy takes serious view of their failure. Consequently, any affected economy seeks to prevent such failure.  However, despite preventive measures, every economy experiences varying degrees of bank failure at one time or the other. It is on this backdrop that the need to check failure follows from adverse consequences of failure.  Also the Federal Military Government of Nigeria following the colossal and monumental failures earlier recorded in the banking sector promulgated a Decree entitled “Promulgation of the Failed Banks’ (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractice in Banks Decree No. 18 of 1994.”
The 1994 Failed Banks” Decree was transformed (through an Act of the National Assembly) to a Failed Bank Act following the transition to civil rule in 1999.
Since then, the law has come to stand as one of the most important instruments in the prevention and management of distresses and failures in the Nigerian banking industry.  Not only does the law empower the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure deposit liabilities of all licensed banks in the country, it also provides legal background for the protection of bank capital. While most authors and researchers have focused on the distress resolution role of the 1994 failed Bank Act, very few emphasis is placed on the provisions of the Act that are proactive and protective of the assets and capitals of banks. Example of such provisions is the 1999 amendments to the CBN and BOFI Acts which empowered the CBN to revoke a bank license without seeking the approval of the presidency.  The current reforms in the banking sub-sector are aimed at achieving strong, reliable and healthy banks so as to avert the cycle of periodic bank liquidations occasioned by the failure of badly managed institutions.

1.1       Statement of the Problem
Poor capitalization, bank distress, fraud and poor financial intermediation characterized the Nigerian banking industry before it was consolidated from 89 banks to 25 banks (now 24) between 2004 and 2005 (Onwe, 2007).
The expectation was that reforms and consolidation would help to solve the problems of the industry and possibly boost public confidence on banks.  Unfortunately, little progress has been recorded since the consolidation, especially as signs of distress continue to build up.  As is usually the case in the country, the laws and policies might be right, but implementation is in most cases faulty.  Poor adherence to existing laws and guidelines and non-enforcement of such by the regulatory agencies contribute to breeding signs of distress in banks.  This negatively affects the capital bases of the banks.
Following the enactment of the 1999 Banking Act of the National Assembly, those policies which were less enforced in the bid to protect banks in the 1994 failed Banks Decree were consequently restructured and subsequently used as a basis for the recent recapitalization exercise in the banking system.
Attempts to understand the Decree only focus on the distress resolution role, with less research interest on the protective role.  This paper seeks to bridge the gap between these distress resolution roles and the current protective role of the new Act.

1.2       Objectives of the Study  
The main objective of this paper is to attempt to unravel the interlink ages between the draconian decree of 1994 in resolving distress situation in the banking industry and the subsequent Act of 1999 which dwelt extensively on protective resolutions against bank distress and failure in Nigeria. Specifically, the paper addresses the following objectives:
-                      To examine the aspects of the provisions of the 1994 decree (as amended in the 1999 Act) which provided the platform for the recent recapitalization exercise in the banking industry between 2004 and 2005 with a view to assessing their adequacy.
-                      To ascertain certain provisions of the enactment leading to the protective resolutions of bank capital regulation and supervision by the Central Bank of Nigeria.
     -            To examine the capacity of the Act to protect bank capital against
                  depletion and  possible insolvency.

2.1       History of Bank Failure in Nigeria
Commercial banking in the Nigerian colony commenced in 1891 with the advent of the African Banking Corporation (Uche 2001).  In 1894, banking operations were taken over by the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA). In 1899 a second foreign bank, the Bank of Nigeria, was established.  This bank was absorbed by the BBWA in 1912.  For the next four years, the BBWA had the banking field in Nigeria to itself. All this changed in 1916 with the advent of the Colonial Bank.  Barclays Bank entered the Nigerian banking arena in 1925, through the merger between the Colonial bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (which it already owned) and the National Bank of South Africa to create Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas).

Up till 1928, when the foreign banks dominated the Nigerian banking arena, there was very little documentation of malpractices in banks in the country.  This was so despite the fact that there were few rules regulating the practice of banking at the time.  In fact, some of these foreign banks had sufficient internal control mechanism to help prevent malpractices with consequent failure.  They had extensive experience in other parts of the world before establishing themselves in Nigeria.  For instance, the colonial bank had a successful operation in the West Indies spanning almost 80 years.
It therefore became imperative that there was obvious need to establish indigenous banks, having the economic emancipation of Africans as its main objective.  In practice, however, many of these indigenous banks became known more for their fraud and malpractices and less for their role in assisting Africans.
            The near absence of regulations was in part responsible for this.  The emergence of these indigenous banks took the center stage with the arrival of the first indigenous bank in Nigeria as; The Industrial and Commercial Bank in the year 1929.  This bank was however short-lived and went into liquidation in 1930.  It’s failure has been attributed to mismanagement, accounting incompetence, embezzlement and the non-co-operative attitude of and denigration by colonial banks.
            The second Nigerian indigenous bank that came into operation was the Nigerian Mercantile Bank.  It also had a short and chequered life having been established in 1931 and failed in 1936.
Next was the National Bank, established in 1933 and became the first successful indigenous bank to be established.  It also failed accordingly.  In 1945, the Nigerian Penny Bank was established but by 1946, the bank had failed.
            In 1947, another indigenous bank (the African Continental Bank) was established. Worried by the spate of establishment of such indigenous banks and not unmindful of past bank failures, the central government, in 1948, appointed G. D. Paton, an official of the Bank of England, to enquire generally into the business of banking in Nigeria and make recommendations to the Government on the form and extent of control which should be introduced.
Paton submitted his report accompanied by a draft ordinance on 28th October, 1948.  This culminated in the 1952 Banking Ordinance. Preceding the enactment of the 1952 Law, Africans fearing the imminent clampdown on the establishment of commercial banks following the setting up of the Paton inquiry, had rushed to establish more banks before the advent of regulation.  The result was that by 1952, at least 24 local banks had been established.  By 1954, with the promulgation of the ordinance, most of them failed.
Again, fraud, insider abuses and mismanagement became widespread in most of these failed indigenous banks.

2.2       Provisions of the Failed Banks’ Decree 1994
            Due to the deregulation of the economy in the early 1980’s coupled with loopholes in and in some cases outright evasion of the law by some of the new banks, it was  possible for some of them to survive, simply by buying and selling foreign exchange.  Banks therefore made brisk profits.  This defective government policy was mistaken by many as proof of banking profitability.  This opened the floodgate of application for banking licenses and the number of registered banks dramatically rose from 41 in 1985 to 120 in 1993, (Uche, 2001).
The Decree
Government believed that the banking crises of the 1990s was caused mainly by frauds and therefore had no other option than the enactment entitled “Promulgation of the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree Number 18 of 1994 (Failed Banks Decree)”.
The Provisions of the Enactment
The Failed Banks’ Decree was supposed to represent an attempt by the Nigerian military government to prevent parties from evading justice by exploiting the technicalities, inefficiencies and loopholes in the legal system (CBN, 2004:14).The decree therefore assigned little weights to legal technicalities and contained provisions that  helped ensure speedy conclusion of trials. For instance, on any one case, the tribunals were mandated to deliver judgments not later than 21 working days from the day of the first sitting.
Section 1(2) of the Decree stated that;
“To enable the tribunal to achieve the above objectives ,they are granted exclusive jurisdiction over all auxiliary matters, including remand, bail and any other preliminary issues connected with an offence or hearing over which  the tribunal has jurisdiction”. “They also have the powers to admit and act on any evidence which are considered relevant in any civil or criminal proceedings, notwithstanding that the evidence is inadmissible under any other law or enactment”.

Section 1(3(b) also states that;
“The tribunals are granted powers to lift the veil of a body corporate where it is necessary for the purpose of revealing its members who may be guilty of an offence under the decree or liable, jointly or severally, for the debts owed by the corporate body to a failed bank.  It is in this spirit that the decree defines a director to include a wife, husband, mother, father, son or daughter of a director”.

An employee is also defined by the decree in Section 1(4)(a-d) to mean,
 “Any person who is or has been employed or connected in any capacity with the affairs of a bank or any person arraigned before the tribunal under the decree”.

Therefore, persons associated with such failed banks long before the decree came into effect are all liable under the decree.  In other words, the decree takes retrospective effect.
 Section 1 (4)(a-d) of the decree further specifies that,
“The jurisdiction or authority of the tribunals shall not be affected by the fact that a person charged or brought before the tribunal for trial or hearing has resigned or retired from the banks, has had his appointment terminated in the bank or has otherwise left the employment of the bank.”

Any person who attempts to commit any of the offences specified by the decree is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction for the same punishment as is prescribed for the full offence under the decree.
 Furthermore, Section 3(7)(i-iv) states that;
“Where a person is charged with any of the offences specified by the decree, but the evidence establishes an attempt to commit that offence, such a person may be convicted of having attempted to commit that offence although the attempt is not separately charged and will be liable for the same punishment as is prescribed for the offence”.

The decree further provides that,
 “where the assets of a debtor company, whether pledged as security or not are inadequate to offset the company’s debt, the personal property of the directors of such a company can be sold and applied for the satisfaction of the outstanding debts”.

Where the security pledged for a loan is impossible to locate, or where no security is pledged at all or the debtor is fictitious, the tribunal will hold liable for the outstanding debts and interest thereon the directors, shareholders, partners, managers, officers and other employees of the failed bank who in the performance of their duties were found to have been connected in any way with the granting of the loan which has become irrecoverable.
Section 3(i)(a-e), stipulates that;
 “Any director, manager, officer or employee of a bank who knowingly, recklessly, negligently, willfully or otherwise grants, approves the grant, or is otherwise connected with the grant or approval of a loan, advance, guarantee or any other credit facility or financial accommodation to any person:

(a)       without adequate security or collateral, contrary to the accepted  practice or the banks regulations, or
(b)      with no security or collateral where such security or collateral is normally required in accordance with the bank’s regulations, or
(c)       with a defective security or collateral or
(d)      without perfecting, through his negligence or otherwise, a security or collateral obtained, is guilty of an offence”.

“Any official of the bank, who grants, approves the grants or is otherwise connected with the grant or approval of a loan, advance, guarantee or any other credit which is above his officially approved limit or contravenes any directive of the regulatory authorities is guilty of an offence”.

The decree empowers members of the police force or armed forces to arrest offenders under the decree without any warrant, and allows for the trial and sentencing of offenders in absentia.

2.3     Aspect of the 1999 Failed Banks’ Act drawn from the 1994 Failed Banks’ Decree
            In order to transmute from a Decree to a civilian Act, certain aspects of the decree had to be amended  in order to add colour and reflect  the human face in the new Act, for example;  some provisions of the Failed Banks’ Act  such as the trial in absentia and the stringent bail conditions were amended in 1999.
            Secondly, the jurisdiction of the Act was transferred to the Federal High Courts for adjudication instead of a Special Military Tribunal as was the case before the Act. Since then, few debt recovery cases had been concluded at the courts. For instance, a total of 1,049 debt recovery suits were yet to be settled as at the end of 2004, amounting to N14.14billion or $46.6million then, of this amount only N554.1million was recovered (NDIC 2004).
            Altogether, the judgments obtained as at the end of 2004 on debt recovery in favour of the closed banks stood at a total of 743 judgments valued at N6.186billion or $34.14million, then.

2.4       Aspects of the 1994 Failed Banks’ Act Dealing with Bank Capital Regulation  
From the foregoing, it is certain that the goal of the Act is not only to resolve distress, but also to protect banks assets and capital.  This is evidenced in the establishment of the NDIC as the major enforcement agent for the Act.  By that establishment, the NDIC is mandated to carry out the following functions (NDIC 2004):
1.                  Onsite supervision, which enables the NDIC to visit bank branches and perform on the spot assessment of documents required of them.
2.                  Taking over and management of technically insolvent bank to avert distress.
3.                  Financial assistance to enhance capital bases of banks.
4.                  Loan recovery assignments and
5.                  Imposition of holding Actions.
Essentially, in the bid to protect bank capital, the duty of monitoring and supervising how banks are using their capital has become a joint function of the Central Bank of Nigeria and that of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation.

2.5       Effects of Distress on Bank Capital
            As a result of distress, the capital base of the banks had been either completely or substantially eroded and each of them required huge sums of fresh capital injection.  Also the liquidity position of the banks had equally been precarious.  In that case, all the affected banks are saddled with large portfolios of non-performing assets and huge accumulated losses.  The qualities of management of the affected banks are nothing to write home about (NDIC, 2004). 
The Bank capital is however affected in the following ways (NDIC, 2004):
1.         Erosion on Capital Adequacy:
            Under a distress situation, the banks are grossly undercapitalized and technically insolvent.  The development no doubt will hamper banks ability to absorb losses thus exposing the banks fragile financial position.
2.         Negative Effect on Asset Quality:
            The Asset Quality of distressed banks are measured by relating the proportion of non-performing loans and advances to the total loans and advances granted by the failed banks. In this regard, the ratio of non-performing loans to shareholders’ funds will be negative.
3.         The problem of Management
            The self-serving disposition of management can affect bank capital as evidenced by the high level of insider loans to total loans disbursed.  This situation coupled with weak loan recovery efforts aggravates banks’ capital performance and lead to distress condition.
4.         Erosion on Earning and Profitability
            In this situation, most of the affected banks accumulate losses that are of very high magnitude  there by pulling down on bank capital.
5.         Bad Liquidity Position.
            Once a bank has been found illiquid, the capital of the bank is bound to be gravely hampered.  This illiquidity condition is further occasioned by a negative current account balances with the CBN.

2.6              The 2004 Recapitalization Regulation Drawn from the 1999 Failed Banks’ Act
            The implementation of the Failed Banks Act  sent a clear signal that it was no longer business as usual for debtors who borrowed from banks with no intention of repaying, as well as bank directors and officers who hitherto had squandered depositors” funds through insider lending and other malpractices.
            The Failed Banks’ Tribunal played a critical role in criminal adjudication by making accused persons refund the various sums involved in the offences committed. In fact, the fear of criminal prosecution alone compelled bank directors and customers to repay their loans so as to avoid the consequences and stigma of criminal prosecution and consequent conviction.
It was on this backdrop, and in order to avert the future resurgence of this ugly trend of distress and failure in the industry, that the Central Bank of Nigeria considered the option of recapitalization and consolidation in the sector.
            In July 2004, the CBN finally announced the increase in the premium paid-up capital of Banks to N25billion about $200million per bank.  This was in an effort to strategically place the nations banking system in regional and international context and promote soundness, stability and enhanced efficiency of the system.  This led to mergers and acquisition within the banking industry, thereby restructuring the entire system.
            The aim of the recapitalization exercise, amongst others, was to groom and transform the banks into institutions that investors could rely on, and depositors can trust; play developmental roles in the nation’s economy; eliminate corruption; enhance transparency, professionalism and corporate governance and accountability.  It is also expected that the reform will, over time, down-size the cost structure of the banks and guarantee higher returns to the shareholders and other stakeholders  of the banking industry.
            The consolidated banking system no doubt poses some challenges to both the banking institutions as well as the regulatory authorities.  This is because the banking industry becomes more concentrated as a result of recapitalization and larger institutions also are more complex and tend to deal in sophisticated financial products.  This makes them pose greater challenges in case of any failure. Nwankwo (2001) was specific in defining regulation in banking as;
 “a body of specific rules or agreed behaviour either imposed by some government or external agency, or self-imposed by the explicit or implied agreement within the industry that constraints the activities and business operations of the institutions in the industry to achieve defined objectives and act prudently.”

            In Uche (2001), regulation generally suggests some form of intervention in any activity, and ranges from explicit legal control to informal peer group control by government or some such authoritative body. Banking regulation has to do with prescriptions and directives, which are binding on banking institutions in order to attain some expressed objectives.  The regulation may either be officially imposed by the regulatory authorities or self – imposed by the constituent institutions in the system (self-regulation). Whichever is the case, there are rationale or objectives for banking regulation.  In general terms, banking regulation aims at achieving efficiency, stability and fairness in both the banking industry and the entire economy (Vittas 1992).  Other objectives include to ensure safe and sound banking practices by individual banks to ensure depositor’s protection amongst others (Odozi, 1992).
            The banking sector operates on a platform that is uniquely different from that of the other sectors of the economy.  The sector provides the grease that lubricates the engine and drives the other sectors and, indeed, makes it a strategic sector in any economy.  Besides, the sector is rocked on public confidence and once that confidence is shaken, the sector’s survival becomes endangered.  Here a high level of transparency is required and this informs the high level of statutory regulation which banks are usually subjected to.

An Overview of the Recapitalization Exercise
The Nigerian banking system has undergone remarkable changes over the years, in terms of the number of institutions, ownership structure, as well as the scale of operation driven largely by the deregulation of the financial sector in line with the global trend. Prior to the recapitalization exercise, the banking sector was highly concentrated with the top ten banks accounting for more than 50% of the total assets.  Many of the 89 banks then, were small in size and unable to compete effectively with the 8 bigger ones.  The banking industry was highly oligopolistic and plagued by low capital base, weak corporate governance as manifested in the meddlesome interference in management function and poor risk management (Ogunleye, 2005).
            The then CBN governor in his July 6, 2004 address to the Bankers Committee stated that when the nations banking sector is compared with the banking sectors of the emerging economies, “our banking sector could be rightly described as fragile, poorly developed and extremely small.”
As observed by Marcus (2001), small banking systems under-perform.  They suffer from concentration of risks and are more vulnerable to external shocks. Regulation and supervision of small banking systems have also been observed to be disproportionately costly.
The foregoing weakness and the global trend of competition and internationalization of finance informed the decision to reposition the Nigerian banking industry.  This took the form of recapitalization through mergers and acquisition.
            According to Ogunleye (2005), recapitalization of banking firms involves either a combination of existing banks, growth among the leading banks or exit from the industry of weak banks.  The policy was aimed at developing a more resilient, competitive and dynamic banking system that supports and contributes positively to the growth of the economy with a core of strong and forward looking banking institutions that are technology driven and ready to face the challenges of liberalization and globalization.

2.6       The Regulatory Challenges of Recapitalization
            The recapitalized Nigerian banking system poses some challenges to the regulatory authorities (Owo, 2007 :23) such as:
a)                   Inadequate Managerial Capacity: The mega banks need a fit and proper, competent, properly skilled and prudent management team who should be able to lead the institutions through its process of globalization and internationalization of the banking system. 
Given that banking is all about risk management, the inability of any bank management to effectively manage the risks facing it, would inadvertently constitute a challenge to the regulatory authority.  The recent case of Spring Bank Plc is an instance where the CBN had to wade in and dissolve the Board of Directors of the bank.
There is need for a change of orientation, attitude, value system and above all, capacity building by the operators at all levels, particularly at the top management level.
b)                   Poor Corporate Governance: The regulatory authorities always monitor responsive corporate governance in order to ensure transparency and accountability of management of banking institutions and the curtailment of their risk appetite. Strong corporate governance entails appropriate oversight by directors and senior management; compliance with legal and regulatory requirement; transparency and accountability to the various stakeholders: provision of adequate internal controls as well as appropriate risk management.
Weak or poor corporate governance becomes an issue with the emergence of these mega banks because it can cause a rapid collapse of an institution.  In the present dispensation, the collapse or distress of any bank will have far-reaching effects.
            The Central Bank of Nigeria, according to Chizea (2006), stated  specifically that for the financial sector, poor corporate governance has been identified as one of the major causative factors in virtually all known instances of a financial institutions’ distress in the country. 
            Good governance for banks should be about reducing risk of crisis and not intervening after the event.  The recapitalization exercise has produced mega banks with large funds that must be managed effectively to produce the kind of returns that the shareholders are expecting.  Some malpractices might take place in an effort to boost income as a result of intense competition and probable lack of risk management and marketing competences.  The board members must be people of high integrity and unquestionable character who understand the banking environment and can add value to the operations of the bank.  The new banking industry demands that the role of a bank board must change from management support to organizational leadership.  They are more expectations from the boards of banks than from the boards of other companies.  This is because the bank board not only looks after the interest of shareholders but has to protect the interest of depositors as well (Ogbechie, 2006). The regulatory authorities should therefore continue to encourage and monitor the enthronement of strong corporate governance structure for effective risk management by banks.
c)                   The Possibility of an Increase in the Level of Bank Fraud: With the advent of electronic based banking such as the use of Automated teller machines (ATM), electronic transfer of funds, amongst others, ample room and avenues is created for fraudsters to perpetrate their acts in the banking system. The possibility of cheque kiting, that is, when in – transit or non-existent cash is recorded in more than one bank account, is increased with the use of wire transfers. Also all forms of credit card fraud and theft is possible.  This poses a challenge to the regulatory authorities who will necessarily need to beef up their capability to deal with, check and curtail or prevent such frauds.
d)                  The Approach to Supervision: The adoption of an appropriate risk-based supervisory approach as against the hitherto transaction and compliance-based approach cannot be overemphasized.
            This approach will entail the design of a customized supervisory programme for each bank. This will enable the optimal utilization of supervisor resources. 
e)                    The Proliferation of Banking Services: The mega banks are flooding the market with all forms of banking services. Some instances are; the U-first of the First Bank, Diamond Advantage of the Diamond Bank, M-power of the Access Bank and a variety of savings products introduced by the banks most of which offered little requirement and documentation from customers.  The onus lies in the hands of the regulatory authorities to ensure the proper implementation of and compliance with the terms of each of the services provided by any of the banks.
            With the intense competition in the banking industry now and the aggressive marketing of bank services, the regulatory authorities need to ensure efficiency and compliance with ethical standards in the offer of these services.
f)                   Information Asymmetry Between Banks and the Investing Public: The recapitalization of the industry may create information asymmetry between banks and the investing public.  There is need for the regulatory agencies to review information disclosure requirement so as to minimize such.
            As stated by Ogunleye (2005), appropriate actions on the part of regulators need to be taken to ensure that business decisions by the investing public are well informed under the present dispensation. Adequate information disclosure requirement will force banks to pay greater attention to reputational risk that could result in loss of confidence as well as poor image.  As a necessary step to promote market discipline, it is important that the full weight of the provisions of relevant laws be brought to bear on erring operators in order to help promote safe and sound practices under the recapitalized banking environment.  The policy of zero-tolerance towards unethical  behaviour should be strictly applied.

3.1       Conclusions
            Having critically traced the history of bank failure in Nigeria and the consequent legislations to stem the tide of failure, this paper has shown that the Nigerian banking scene has suffered a chequered history of a sort. Different measures have however been adopted by successive governments (military and civilian) to sanitize the banking sector.
            The Failed Banks’ Decree, though genuine in intention, but fraught with the Nigerian factor, further complicated the issue and plugged the economy into more difficult banking situation.  This helpless situation led to the 1999 Failed Bank Act, which certain provisions were adopted  by way of amendment to form the 1999 Failed Banks” Act, upon which the critical framework  for recapitalization was formed in the year 2004.
            The recapitalization exercise was on this basis crafted to address the protective aspect of bank capital which the decree neglected and did not cover. However, with the reform in place, the issue of bank capital has been addressed with human face depicting civil touch in the Act.  There is now a paradigm shift from the military proceeding to issue of this sort, to the normal civil approach on issues in the Nigerian banking environment.
3.2       Recommendations  
            In view of the foregoing conclusion, this paper recommends that:
1.                  More legislation on protecting bank capital should be put in place to avert future distress situations as witnessed in the early 1990’s.
2.                  Though the Central Bank of Nigeria has been empowered by the new banking Act to revoke the licenses of ailing banks without recourse to the presidency, efforts should be geared towards legislations that empower the CBN to detect any distress situation using its instrumentality before it becomes of public knowledge.
3.                  No undercapitalized bank in Nigeria (in relation to the level of operation) should be allowed to open its financial window without adequate capitalization or otherwise achieving same through mergers and or acquisition.
4.                  The CBN should through the instrumentality of its supervision ensure that no high level of classified loan and advances should be allowed in the operations of banks in the industry. Unless these issues are addressed, regulating bank capital in Nigeria will continue to reoccur as a decimal in the Nigerian banking system.


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