I. Introduction
Undoubtedly, in the context of
multilateral economic intercourse between the Multinational Oil Industry and
the Host Countries, there are underlying national imperatives as well as trans-nationally
superimposed economic imperatives. However, despite the variant
characterization of this relationship in terms of economic nuances of parties
to international petroleum contracts, the fact is, beyond all posturing exists
extra-legal legitimate demand for the relationship. For instance, beyond the
mechanics of doctrine of pacta sunt servanda,
there are the imperatives of responsible corporate citizenship. The issue of
corporate social responsibility is at the core of the general purpose of the relationship
because without sustained peace in the business environment, economic
activities cannot flourish.
However, while the industry has the tendency to
argue that it is not contractually accountable to the host communities of the oil
producing areas (which is true in the case of Nigeria), these communities too
must come to the realization that corporate social responsibility is a matter
of social contract. The bitter truth is that the socio-economic and political
development of the host country is not the prerogative of the Multinational Oil
Industry under the subsisting international petroleum agreements. The
agreements are structured in such a way that the issue of corporate social
responsibility does not impose any legal duty on the Industry and does not
overlap into the realm of public governance. The purpose of this discussion is
to provide analysis on the boundaries of corporate social responsibility within
the context of international petroleum contract between Nigeria and the
Multinational Oil Industry.
II. Distinguishing
the Responsibilities of the Multinational Oil Industry from those of the Nigerian Government
As far as facts from this research
are concerned, the Niger Delta has suffered two wrongs: Firstly, degradation of
the environment of the Niger Delta through oil operations and unintended
consequences of environmentalism.[1]
Secondly, neglect of the region by successive governments during the last three
decades in the Niger Delta.[2]
Considering these issues, it is obvious that the responsibilities of the
government and the industry have been determined by the nature of the wrong.
Although the private interests of companies
and the public interest of government are almost always divergent, it appears from
the opinion of the people of the Niger Delta region that the above two interests
are fundamentally contrast with the feeling of the people of the region.[3]
It is the considered view among these communities that classification of the
responsibilities of both government and the companies in terms of public and
private interest in basically academic.[4]
As far as they are concerned, the responsibilities of both to the communities
are joint and complementary. There is a legal basis for this argument; for sure
the two are involved in a joint venture and the companies operate on that basis
in the Niger Delta.[5]
Therefore, it is only logical that any charges of environmental wrong arising
from the operation of the joint venture are levelled against the joint
partners. From that standpoint, every joint partner is liable to perform its
part in the socio-economic development of the region. To the communities, it is
not the distinguishing means that matter but whether it impacts on the lives of
the communities.
However, as espoused in the doctrine
of equity that “Whoever seeks equity must do equity”,[6]
it would be fundamentally wrong to ignore the legal status of the entities in
defining the scope of their responsibilities to the oil-producing communities.
What then are the responsibilities of both based on this characterisation?
III. The Corporate Responsibilities of the
Multinational Oil Industry to Oil
Producing Communities of the Niger Delta
Without
a doubt, the strategic position of the multinational oil industry in the socio
economic and political life of Nigeria places huge responsibilities on the
shoulders of the industry.[7]
Its dominant position meant a privilege capacity to influence the policies of
the government, in short an indispensable element of the decision making
processes of the government. At the end of the day, it is the wealth they
create that sustains the government; therefore, the symbiotic relationship puts
both in a position of mutual influence.
A. The
Political Sphere
In
the context of the Niger Delta, its dominant economic position, coupled with
contact with the successive governments over a period of five decades, meant
the industry was destined to play a crucial role in the political future of the
country. The strategic areas of concern to the communities in particular and the
country at large would be restoration of democracy, fiscal discipline and return to true
federalism, the promotion of rule of law, and human rights.[8]
The Federal Military Government had deployed troops to restore some semblance
of law and order in the area since 1993.[9]
The conflict is expressed in the form of native activism against the activities
of the multinational oil industry in the region. In the course of discharge of
their constitutional duty of managing violence, the Nigerian security forces have
been accused of extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and draconian
restriction on the rights of the communities.[10]
In the words of human rights watch commissioned studies of 1999:
...
Human rights violations in the Delta were connected with the suppression of
protests at the oil companies’ activities ... There were repeated incidents in
which people were brutalised for attempting to raise grievances with the
companies; in some cases security forces threatened, beat, and jailed members
of community delegations even before they presented their cases”.[11]
In Nigeria, the climax of this
allegation was the arrest, trial and execution of Ken-Saro Wiwa and eighteen
others during the regime of General Sani Abacha.[12]
The chain of events that led to the arrest, trial, and execution of Saro Wiwa
has been linked to the covert Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or the Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA) between companies and the Nigerian Military
Government regarding the security of their facilities.[13]
Although this thesis does not hold a brief for the multinational oil industry, it is right to argue that some of these allegations are misplaced and unrealistic. Firstly, trans-national investment law and policy, and the practice of states guiding the treatment and management of foreign investment placed responsibilities on the Nigerian government to protect it against vandalism. Therefore, the MOU or rather the JOA on security of operational facilities should not be an issue. Besides, the nationalisation of the 70’ shad taught the industry a lesson on the price of meddlesomeness into the internal affairs of their host countries, so they do not want to push their luck too far about the state’s political ideology.[14] After all, they are business outfits concerned about profit maximization, admittedly with a moral obligation to promote social justice within the context of democracy and rule of law, but it would be unrealistic to assume that these corporations are emissaries of Western Political culture.[15]
Although this thesis does not hold a brief for the multinational oil industry, it is right to argue that some of these allegations are misplaced and unrealistic. Firstly, trans-national investment law and policy, and the practice of states guiding the treatment and management of foreign investment placed responsibilities on the Nigerian government to protect it against vandalism. Therefore, the MOU or rather the JOA on security of operational facilities should not be an issue. Besides, the nationalisation of the 70’ shad taught the industry a lesson on the price of meddlesomeness into the internal affairs of their host countries, so they do not want to push their luck too far about the state’s political ideology.[14] After all, they are business outfits concerned about profit maximization, admittedly with a moral obligation to promote social justice within the context of democracy and rule of law, but it would be unrealistic to assume that these corporations are emissaries of Western Political culture.[15]
This was the response of the
industry to calls from the Commonwealth, the European Union, and the United
States for Shell-BP, Chevron, and Texaco to withdraw from Nigerian in view of
the intransigence of the latter to return the country to democratic rule.[16]
Agreed that the companies are in a position to exert pressure on the
government, at the same time they are wary of their limits, and public
resentment of foreign interference in a perceived area of national sovereignty.[17]
Therefore, it is arguable that an objective judgment on the contribution of
these companies in the areas of political development of the host government
would not be on the basis of the magnitude of the problem, but the nature of
the issues and circumstances of the industry.
Undoubtedly, there have been
instances of human rights abuses in the Niger Delta, but not as magnified by
the Human Rights Watch.[18]
Human rights abuses are general characteristics of a military dictatorship[19]
as noted earlier; the constitution is normally abrogated by the military Government.
This would mean that the basis of enforcement is frozen and makes fragile the
claim to it and not least the infrastructure for its enforcement.[20]
On the issue of Ken-Saro Wiwa, their brand of activism bears the character of contempt for the federal government, which is treated as treasonable felony under the Nigerian criminal code.[21] As a matter of fact he was not tried for treason but for murder under the Nigerian Criminal Code and, traditionally, cases of such profile are sometimes adjudicated by a Special Military Tribunal (SMT). For instance, armed robbery, drug trafficking, coups, and economic crimes: military tribunals headed by a retired judge, try money laundering and failed banks offences.[22] As regards the severity of the sentence Justice Auta Tribunal passed on Ken and others, the point is that the death penalty is still part of the Nigerian Criminal Justice System.[23] During the period, given the frustration of the government about the unrest in the Delta, and its defiant temperament to calls for clemency by the international community (America, the British Commonwealth, the ED, OAD and International NGOS),[24] it would be extremely unlikely that the intervention of the international industry could have made any difference to the government’s resolve to execute the judgment of the tribunal. Without hesitation, this discussion agrees that under the present democratic dispensation the industry has the wherewithal and the opportunity to do more.
On the issue of Ken-Saro Wiwa, their brand of activism bears the character of contempt for the federal government, which is treated as treasonable felony under the Nigerian criminal code.[21] As a matter of fact he was not tried for treason but for murder under the Nigerian Criminal Code and, traditionally, cases of such profile are sometimes adjudicated by a Special Military Tribunal (SMT). For instance, armed robbery, drug trafficking, coups, and economic crimes: military tribunals headed by a retired judge, try money laundering and failed banks offences.[22] As regards the severity of the sentence Justice Auta Tribunal passed on Ken and others, the point is that the death penalty is still part of the Nigerian Criminal Justice System.[23] During the period, given the frustration of the government about the unrest in the Delta, and its defiant temperament to calls for clemency by the international community (America, the British Commonwealth, the ED, OAD and International NGOS),[24] it would be extremely unlikely that the intervention of the international industry could have made any difference to the government’s resolve to execute the judgment of the tribunal. Without hesitation, this discussion agrees that under the present democratic dispensation the industry has the wherewithal and the opportunity to do more.
In the area of human rights the dawn
of evolving realities have proved that the multinational industry can no longer
afford to be complacent in view of the challenges posed to its future.[25]
The pre-emptive approach and the case by case approach to environmental and
human right issues are no longer adequate. As an evolving phenomenon, this
thesis concurs with the International Association of Geophysical Contractors,[26]
in that effective management of human rights and environment issues require
planning, training, consultation, and evaluation. The evaluation of the human
rights profile of the Niger Delta would capacitate the industry to make an
educated decision about operations and determine its activities with potential
environmental and human rights impact. Where the impact is inevitable it allows
the industry to make appropriate investment decisions, as to whether
considering the potential threats and the mitigation of costs it would be
economically worthwhile for a project to go ahead or not. Additionally, the
industry should always insist on environmental and human rights impact
assessment for every project, regardless of whether or not provided for under
the national law of the host countries.
B. The
Socio-Economic Sphere
The Niger Delta region constitutes a
wetland of approximately 70,000 square kilometres, inhabited by 1,600 standing
communities with a population of 7 million.[27]
The demography of the area has been variously influenced by the oil industry;
in fact the oil and gas industry drives the economy of the region and, to a
greater extent, the social activities in the entire area.[28]
The background hard fact about Nigeria is that, as noted earlier, it is the
largest producer of oil in Africa, and oil accounts for approximately 90% of
the foreign exchange earnings.[29]
Yet, despite its huge oil and natural gas reserves and untapped solid materials
deposits, as at 1999/2000 its per capita gross national product stood at US
$260.[30]
The implication of these statistics is that, from 1956 when oil was discovered
right up to this present time, oil revenue has not significantly impacted on
the socio-economic condition of the people.[31]
Undoubtedly, however, is the fact that oil exploitation and development has
transformed the local economy and, in the process, the elite from those areas
have benefited immensely from the transformation.[32]
The destruction of the traditional skills of the communities in fishing and
agriculture created a false sense of socio-economic prosperity but ultimately
left the communities impoverished.[33]
As the saying goes “To whom much is given much is expected”. In the same
spirit, the multinational oil industry operating in the Niger Delta has the
obligation (strictly speaking, not legal) to revamp the local economy by
reinvesting part of its profit in capacity building (development of structures)
that would improve the socio-economic condition of the people. The truth is
that, the industry has evolved pilot in the region.[34]
Shell-BP, which is the dominant oil company operating and controls 40%
producing capacity of the entire industry, has invested in health care,
agriculture, water and sanitation, education, micro-credit and business
development, and infrastructure development. See Appendix VI.
1. Shell
BP’s Investment in Nigeria’s Health Sector
Between 1999 and 2000 Shell-BP
invested in capacity building in order to enhance efficiency in delivery.[35]
During the period the company renovated health-care centres, upgraded
equipment, and drugs were supplied through a drugs revolving scheme.
Immunization and HIV support programmes have received support from the
industry.
|
Hospitals
Built and Currently Financed by Shell-BP
|
|
Aminigboko
Cottage Hospital
Umuebulee
Cottage Hospital
Souk
Cottage Hospital
Owaza
Cottage Hospital
Okoroka
Cottage Hospital
Erhoike
Cottage Hospital
Ogulagha
Cottage Hospital
Egbemo-Angalabiri
Cottage Hospital
Oben
Cottage Hospital
Okpare
Health Centre
Out-Jeremi
Health Centre
Otuasega
Cottage Hospital
Ellu
Cottage Hospital
Tomagbene
Cottage Hospital
Kalaibiama
Cottage Hospital
|
Source:
Shell-BP: People and Environmental Annual Report 2000
This
is in addition to about sixteen other rural health centres taken over and
renovated by the company in different parts of the region.[36]
2. Shell
BP’s Pilot Programme for Nigeria’s Agricultural Development
In the area of agriculture, the
emphasis of the industry’s social performance programme is in the area’s
agricultural-income generation and employment-creation projects, supported by
micro-credit schemes.[37]
There has been reasonable investment support in the areas of oil-palm plantations,
commercial oil-palm nurseries, and integrated fish ventures.[38]
Similarly, the industry has liaison with local and international NGOs, the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IF AD), the Living Earth
Foundation (EFDI), the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (UTA),
the Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR), and National Root Crop
Research )NRCRI). This strategic partnership is focused on seed multiplication,
crop protection, agricultural finance, and training and capacity building in
agro-allied areas.[39]
See the table below.
|
Planting
Materials Supplied by the Industry to Farmers
|
|||
|
Items
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
|
Cassava
Stem Cuttings
Pineapple
Suckers
Banana/Plantain
Suckers
Fish
Fingerlings
Oil
Palms Seedlings
Paddy
Rice Seeds (kg)
Cowpea
Seeds (kg)
|
7.0m
200,000
17,000
280,000
32,000
720
360
|
7.0m
228,000
53,000
358,000
43,000
1500
750
|
5.6m
259,000
64,000
334,000
43,000
5000
1,200
|
Source:
Shell-Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited: Operator of the
NNPC/Shell/EIF/Agip Joint Venture
3. The
Multinational Oil Industry’s Investment in the Educational Sector
The focus of the industry in this
area of provision of educational infrastructure is an adult literacy programme.[40]
“Teachers for Africa” is the cornerstone of its social performance in the
educational sphere. This is a sort of exchange programme that allows
experienced teachers from the US to organize in-house seminars to enhance
efficiencies in education administration, curriculum development, and general performances
in the sector. The most crucial of the industry’s effort is a scholarship
scheme for university scholars within Nigerian, and secondary schools students
from the region. See the table below
Table
111
|
Shell-BP
Nigeria Limited Education Scheme
|
|||||
|
Programme
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
199
|
2000
|
|
University
(AOA) Scholarship
|
427
|
430
|
430
|
430
|
430
|
|
University
(NA) Scholarship
|
130
|
130
|
153
|
150
|
153
|
|
Post
Pri-Scholarship
|
2,600
|
2,600
|
2,600
|
2,600
|
2,600
|
|
Science
Teachers
|
66
|
252
|
383
|
360
|
349
|
|
Scholl
with Science teacher
|
14
|
57
|
63
|
64
|
55
|
Source: Shell-BP Nigeria Limited
The above presentation raises two
issues; firstly, the above statistics though produced by the industry, have
never had their authenticity challenge either by the regulatory arm of the
government or the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta. Secondly, it is
the industry’s concern about its public image that made it extremely important
to document its activities, possibly to be used by a PR counter offensive. Thus
it is incontestable that the industry is involved in several socio-economic
initiatives intended to ameliorate the despair of the oil-producing
communities.[41] From my
interviews, it was discernible that what has happened over the years is a total
lost of confidence in the industry, engendered by broken promises and a lack of
transparency on the part of the industry.[42]
In addition, activism and oil nationalism has captured the psychology of the
people so much that, in defiance of the constitution, they consider the oil
“their own.”[43] Therefore,
it was the majority view that it was not common sense for the region to commend
the industry for reinvesting part of the wealth it had made through exploration
of the resources of the region.[44]
In such euphoria about how much the industry makes, there is the temptation to
weigh the socio-economic contributions of the industry in terms of such
overwhelming sentiment.
C. The Role of Government
There is no doubt that government as
the supreme authority over the entire country, and most importantly as the
licensor that sets the ground rules for the operations of the multinational oil
industry, owes huge responsibilities to the region.[45]
As the licensor, government regulates the inflow of foreign investment and its
utilization in the resources sector of the economy. From this standpoint,
government has the ultimate responsibility of developing strategies and
formulating policies for effective management of the potential environmental
problems. Sadly, due to competing priorities and unsustainable eco-centric
mentality of leadership in the developing countries, there has been less
enthusiasm and commitment to environmental management.[46]
In some instances, the apparent deficiencies in terms of enabling legislation
and sophisticated machinery to withstand the complexities of issues involved in
environment automatically relegates environment to the background.[47]
In the area of socio-economic
development, surely the Niger Delta deserves better attention in v view of its
vulnerabilities to hazards associated with petroleum exploitation and
development. However, what has often been ignored is the fact that the entire
country is the constituency of the federal government, and therefore the
appropriate index for development plan would be the country. The holistic but hard
truth about the general circumstances of the country is that lack of progress
on the socio-economic front cannot be limited to the Niger Delta; it is a
national phenomenon. This is the consistent error of judgment, which has become
the common feature of successive studies and analysis of the Niger Delta
problem.
Having asserted that, it is
undeniable that the ecological circumstances of the Niger Delta, vis-a vis oil activities, underscore its
special needs and the priorities of those needs in national development
planning. It is these special needs that made imperative the creation of the
Oil Mineral Production Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1988.[48]
The mandate of the commission was to draw up a master plan for the accelerated
socio-economic development of the Delta region.[49]
Native to the area, Chief Albert Horsfall was appointed the pioneer executive
chairman of the commission directly answerable to the presidency. Between 1988
and 1996, when Horsfall presided over the OMP ADEC, it received a federal
budgetary allocation of 36 Billion Naira ($ 28 million).[50]
Under this stewardship, the OMPADEC executed 1,182 projects in the areas of:
water supply, land reclamation (environment), fire protection, road
construction, electricity, health facilities, markets, education, and drainage,
scholarships, and a small business loan scheme. According to the distribution
chart of the development projects, 177 projects were executed in Rivers State,
56 in Delta State, 25 in Imo State, 14 in Abia State and 8 in Akwa Ibom State.[51]
In 1996, due to allegations of corruption and growing cynicism about the
activities of the commission, it was dissolved and was replaced in 1999 by the
Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC).[52]
Under the Niger Delta Development Commission Act 23 of 1999, the Commission
inherited the structures of OMP ADEC and was reassigned the assignments of the
defunct organization.
On the strength of the foregoing it
is not entirely correct to say that the government has not been sensitive to
the plight of the Niger Delta region. The reality is that, due to oil
nationalism, there is very high expectation far beyond the competing scarce
resources at the disposal of the government.[53]
In addition, the official corruption that is endemic in every facet of national
development, undermines the successes of the government’s limited efforts and
creates a sense of total neglect. But the lack of accountability is
attributable to the psyche of the area. In 1994 the then chairman of OMP ADEC,
Prof. Opia, was accused of embezzling 4 billion naira ($30.4 million), and was
investigated and demised.[54]
The response of his home state was a politically motivated demonstration with
the chanting of “Oil is our own and Opia is our Son ...”[55]
while this is not a generalization about the Niger Delta, this kind of attitude
to national issues does have a negative impact on the sense of honesty and the
general conduct of public officials. Additionally, the general conduct of the
multinational industry leaves much to be desired in the area of corporate
social obligation. Invariably, this has engendered a sense of alienation,
cheating, neglect, and exploitation.
IV. Conclusion
From the discussion above it is
evident that as long as Nigeria continues to produce oil, international
petroleum contract despite its unpopularity is bound to continue. Nigeria like other oil producing developing
countries is wholly dependent on foreign investments as well as technology to
create and sustain its capacity to produce oil. In the same vein, the
Multinational Oil Industry (seven sisters) depends on Nigeria’s natural
endowment of proven and non-proven oil reserves to boost both its producing
capacity as well as its share of the international oil market. Therefore, it is
supposedly a symbiotic relationship albeit always in favour of the
Multinational Oil Industry, it has the characteristics of a most relationship
and beyond all extremes, a common ground is always found. It is the opinion of
this paper that while international petroleum contract is about mutual
imperatives of proportionate responsibilities, rights and duties, there is a
distinction between the demands of corporate social responsibilities and the
responsibilities of Nigeria’s public governance. Until and unless these differences
are recognized by both parties and the petroleum contract is made pragmatic to
adapt to the changing dynamics of the host business environment, this delicate
relationship will continue to be dogged by controversies. The most classical
example of what could happen to the relationship could be seen in the case of
the Nigeria’s Niger Delta whereby the Industry is ignorantly considered
alternative government and social corporate responsibility is likewise
considered a legal right. It suffices to say that international petroleum
contracts had travelled a difficult road to its present status, however, if
this journey must staggered on to
guaranty a future for the industry, host governments and the Multinational Oil
Industry must work on a common purpose.
* Ph.D, Lecturer, Faculty
of Law, University of Abuja, F.C.T.
** LL.M (Ph.D candidate) Lecturer, Faculty of
Law, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki
[1] Van Dessel Report: Frynas Supra
note 3.
[2] UN Report Supra note 97.
[3] Interview with a group of
persons in Okrika and Effik Communities in Port Harcourt (River State) and
Calabar (Cross River State) 2000/2001.
[4] Ibid
[5] Nigeria’s Joint Venture Model
Contract 1988.
[6] Obilade Supra Note 53.
[7] R. Welford, Corporate
Environmental Management Systems and Strategies (London: Earthscan Publication
1996), part 1., Human Rights Watch Supra Note 92.
[8] E.E. Osaghae, ”Human Rights
and Ethnic Conflict Management- The Case of Nigeria”, Journal of Peace Research 33(2): 171-181.
[9] Guardian, “Military in the
Niger Delta to protect lives and properties-I Bamayi (Chief of Army Staff)”, 7th
March 1997.
[10] Human Rights Watch Supra Note 98.
[11] Ibid. p.1. of 12 (Summary).
[12] Ken-Saro Wiwa Trial report
1995, Preamble.
[13] C. Doudu, “Shell admits
Importing Guns for the Nigerian Police”, The
Observer 28 January (1996).
[14] T.H. Moran, “Trans-national
Strategies of Protection and Defenses, Multinational Corporations: Spreading
the Risk and Cost for Nationalization”, 27
Int. Organ. 273, (1973)., G.R. Delaume, “State Contracts and Transnational
Arbitration”, 75 AM, J. Int. K. 784
(1981)., H. S. Zakariyah, “Political Risks of Transnational Petroleum
Investment: The Mitigating Role National and International Insurance programmes”,
11 Nat. Resources F. 165 (1987).
[15] Prof. Sornarajah,
International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1996), pp. 3-303.
[16] Doudu, Supra Note 113.
[17] Sornarajah Supra Note 115, P. 303.
[18] Human Rights Watch Report 98.
[19] Constitutional Rights
Project, Military Tribunals and Due Process in Nigeria (1999)., Suppressed
Rights: Constitutional Violations in Military Decrees 1984-1999., Nigeria: The
Limit of Justice (1993)., Human Rights Practices in the Nigerian Police (1993).
[20] The Constitutional Suspension
and Abrogation Decrees of 1966, 1976, and 1983 are all instances in view.
[21] S. 220 & 222 of the Penal
Code of Northern Nigeria.
[22] National Deposit Insurance
Corporation Decree of 1994, and Money Laundering Decree of 1995.
[23] Doudu Supra Note 113.
[24] The International Community
Snubbed: Ken-Saro Wiwa and others executed Guardian Newspaper (1995).
[25] CPMLP Journal Supra note 63.
[26] Ibid
[27] Shell BP Annual Report
(2000),P.7
[28] Ibid.
[29] Central Bank of Nigeria
Annual Report (1979), p.12.
[30] Human Rights Watch Report 98,
p. 4 of 12
[31] Ibid
[32] Human Rights Watch Report 98,
p. 4 of 12
[33] Ibid.
[34] This is the claim of the
Public Relations Department of Shell BP, backed up by statistics. This was not
denied by the natives during my interviews, but they complained that more often
than not these projects are executed without prior consultation to formed out
the priority areas of their needs. This is a fact corroborated even by the
Human Rights Watch report of 1999.
[35] Shell BP Annual Report
(2000), p. 16.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid, p. 20.
[38] Ibid, p. 19.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., p. 23. Corroborated by statistics from the Department of
Petroleum Resources Abuja, Nigeria.
[41] Ibid.
[42] This fact has been
corroborated by the earliest studies, conducted by both Human Right Watch
(1999), and Frynas (2000).
[43] CPMLP Journal Supra Note 63.
[44] Ken-Saro Wiwa “Government,
Multinational Oil Industry and US”, Daily
Times 5th Oct. (1994).
[45] Osaghae Supra Note 108.
[46] J.J Warford, M. Munasinghe,
& W. Cruz, The Greening of Economic Policy Reforms (The World Bank
Environmental Department and Economic Development Institute 1993), pp.
9-11.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Oil Mineral Producing
Communities Decree No. 23 of 1988.
[49] Ibid.
[50]O. Madukaife, “OMPADEC Not a
Failure, Horsfall Tells Senate”, Vanguard:
Niger Delta, 6th Feb. 2001, at http://www.vanguardngr.com105022001/d2060201.
[51] Ibid.
[52] O. Madukaife, “How to Make
NDDC Work-Horsfall”, Sunday Vanguard:
Interview 11 Feb. 2001, available at
http://www.vanguarddnr.com/05022001/si211201.htm.
[53] Vision 2010 Report (1997)
[54] E. Nnadozie, “Ex OMPADEC boo,
Opia declared Wanted”, STH Feb. 2001 at http://www.Vanguardngr.com/05022001/c20S0201.htm.
Special Police Gazette: Force Directive CID No. 48 (2001).
[55] H. Sirajo, “Oil is our own
Opia is our Son”, Democrat, May (1994).