This paper examines the inter-relationship between the concepts of freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike. It is argued that freedom of association and collective bargaining are interrelated with the exercise of the right to strike. It is argued that the freedom to associate is not a bare liberty to associate, but to participate in all the activities of such association. The essence of forming and joining a trade union would be ineffective if workers could not also exercise the right to strike as one of the legitimate activities of such trade union. The paper further examines the role of collective bargaining in the exercise of the right to strike.
What is it that motivates strikes? Conflict is inevitable in any industrial society and the major means of settling conflict in industrial relations is through collective bargaining and the exercise of the right to strike. It is argued that it is the failure of collective bargaining that justifies industrial action. Workers have the right to belong to the trade union of their choice and to bargain collectively. What happens in the event of negotiations collapsing? It is argued that workers are permitted to take lawful industrial action to realise their demands. The right to strike is thus an essential weapon for ensuring the success of a collective bargaining system. It is a sine qua non to collective bargaining.
It must be noted that the right to strike is not a single or isolated right, but the organic content of the system of labour rights. The right to strike, the right to organise and the right to bargain collectively jointly form “basic labour rights” and the cornerstone of effective labour relations systems. These rights are interconnected and take effect mutually. As between them, the right to organise is a basic requirement, the right to collective bargaining is the core, and the right to strike exists to guarantee the right to bargain collectively.
Is the right to freedom of association a bare freedom to associate? Does the right to form unions carry with it the concomitant right to achieve the purpose for which the union is formed? In other words, if the workers are guaranteed the right to form unions, should such trade unions be entitled to engage in collective bargaining and to exercise, if necessary, the right to strike so that the main reason for the establishment of trade unions serves its purpose?
Generally, there are two ways to approach the concept of freedom of association. First, it can be seen as a liberal political right, derived from the principle that an individual should be free to associate with other persons of their choice as long as no harm is caused. Freedom of association is a political right, “because political interests can be effectively championed only in community with others.” The second approach treats freedom of association as a functional guarantee which is protected in order to secure a clearly defined purpose, such as the attainment of some sort of equilibrium of bargaining power between employers and workers. In the present context, we are concerned with the relevance of the concept of freedom of association in industrial relations. According to Anderman:
“the rights of association underlying collective labour legislation are based on the basic political freedom of association of individuals, comparable to freedom of speech, assembly and religion. As a way of enhancing the bargaining economic power of employees, the rights of association are meant to modify the prerogatives of the employer.”
Freedom of association thus enables the collective defence of workers’ interests and it is therefore the key enabling right and the gateway to the exercise of a range of other rights at work. The right to freedom of association is promoted throughout the world. At the opening of the first ILO African Regional Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1960, the then Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, declared that, “Freedom of association is one of the foundations on which we build our free nations.”
Labour lawyers and industrial relations experts are, however, not ad idem so far as the content of the concept of freedom of association in industrial relations is concerned. There are two competing views as to the content of the concept of freedom of association. One view is that freedom of association extends no further than the right of individual workers to join an association. The second view takes a more liberal approach, contending that in order to give the concept of freedom of association more meaning, all other rights and freedoms that flow from such association be encompassed in the concept, including the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike.
Summers, for example, argues that the concept of freedom of association comprises three distinct forms. The first is the right to organise, which according to Summers is the right of individuals to join together and to combine economic resources for the common good. Secondly, the concept might imply the freedom to choose between organisations – the right of the individual to join and work through the organisation that speaks best for his needs. Lastly, freedom of association might also mean the freedom not to join any trade union at all – this involves the right of the individual to refuse to participate in collective action. Summers makes a crucial observation in that the above freedoms are not always mutually enforceable in the sense that the exercise of one may at the same time be at the expense of the other.
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton is of the opinion that freedom of association can be interpreted either purposively or restrictively. A purposive interpretation protects all activities involved in such association, including the right to strike, whereas a restrictive or static conception means just a right to join a trade union without doing more.
There is no doubt that the interpretation of the concept of freedom of association is bound to have an effect on the extent to which workers and trade unions will be allowed to function. Where freedom of association is perceived as nothing more than just a right of workers to come together, the scope of trade union activity will be narrowed. However, if one interprets the concept purposively, then all activities which flow from such association might be protected.
It is submitted that in its simple and everyday form, freedom of association will include anything from the right to form, join, participate in activities and remain in trade unions, to the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike and trade union independence from both the employers and the state. First of all, it has to be accepted that the right to associate for trade union purposes includes, inter alia, the right to form and belong to trade unions. Secondly, the purpose of forming and joining trade unions is to improve the workers’ economic and other interests. Thirdly, the principal way of improving these interests is through collective bargaining. Fourthly, in the event of a breakdown in collective bargaining, workers exercise the right to strike in order to compel the employer to accede to their demands. Thus, freedom of association must be given a purposive interpretation which recognises and protects all activities which flow from such association, including the right to strike. Ben-Israel supports this view:
“It follows that the recognition of the freedom of association must signify that there is also a simultaneous recognition of the complementary freedom to conduct collective bargaining. But that, too, is insufficient. The freedom to associate and to bargain collectively must be supplemented by an additional freedom, which is the freedom to strike. Hence, freedom to strike is a complementary freedom of the freedom of association since both are meant to help in achieving a common goal which is to place the employer-employee relationship on an equal basis.”
Indeed, freedom of association would be hollow if workers were not able to engage in collective bargaining and exercise the right to strike. As Bayda, J has said:
“To be in association means to act in association,” and “the freedom to bargain collectively, of which the right to withdraw services is integral, lies at the very centre of the existence of an association of workers. To remove their freedom to withhold their labour is to sterilise their association.”
There is therefore clear support for a freedom of association which protects industrial action. Indeed, at the collective level of industrial relations it is hard to envisage freedom of association without the right to strike.
Some decisions outside Nigeria have taken a different approach. The leading example is Collymore v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago where the Privy Council held, in 1970, that there was no necessary link between freedom of association and the right to strike. The court said:
“It … seems to their Lordships inaccurate to contend that the abridgement of the right to free collective bargaining and of the freedom to strike leaves the assurance of ‘freedom of association’ empty of worthwhile content.”
Similarly, in Schmidt and Dahlstrom v. Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights held that, while Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) specifically mentions the right to join trade unions as a species of the broader right of association, this does not ipso facto include the right to strike. The Court said:
“The Article does not secure any particular treatment of trade union members by the State…. [It] leaves each State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end. The grant of a right to strike represents without any doubt one of the most important of these means, but there are others. Such a right, which is not expressly enshrined in Article 11, may be subject under national law to regulation of a kind that limits its exercise in certain instances.”
However, with the greatest respect to their Lordships, to accept these decisions would be to deny the purposive role of freedom of association. The protection of members’ interests would be difficult for an association which has no sanctions, such as the strike, to employ. It is submitted that, while it is vital to protect the ability of workers to form, join and maintain unions, unless workers are also protected in their pursuance of the objects for which they have associated, such as the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike, the freedom is meaningless. In international law, the concept of freedom of association has come to be accepted as a functional guarantee in the field of industrial relations, the main purpose of which is to maintain bargaining equilibrium between employers and employees. Furthermore, there is a clear consensus amongst the ILO adjudicative bodies that the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (Convention No. 87) goes beyond merely protecting the formation of labour unions and provides protection of their essential activities – that is of collective bargaining and the right to strike. It is therefore submitted that, with due respect to their Lordships, unless freedom of association is interpreted as purposive in nature, it is rendered useless. As Skelly J has said:
“Obviously, the right to strike is essential to the viability of a labour union… [I]f the inherent purpose of a labour organisation is to bring the workers’ interests to bear on management, the right to strike is, historically and practically, an important means of effectuating that purpose. A union that never strikes, or which can make no credible threat to strike, may wither away in effectiveness…and cannot survive the pressures in the present-day industrial world.”
It is submitted as a matter of fact that the whole range of workers’ human rights could be involved and must be seen to be respected before one can speak of freedom of association in the true industrial relations sense. A trade union without the right to strike is a “poor” and “weak” trade union indeed.
Simply put, collective bargaining involves a process of negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements on terms and conditions of employment between employers and workers. The right to collective bargaining is intimately related to and dependent on the right to freedom of association and the right to strike. Workers generally associate with each other for the protection of their economic and other interests. Where they have to confront their employer in wage and other negotiations they have to present a solid front. The only way that they can meet the employer as equal partners is when they come through their trade organisations. Negotiation between the two parties is known as collective bargaining. From the above, it can be concluded that the right to bargain collectively stems from the right of association.
However, in some cases negotiations do not always have a satisfactory outcome. Sometimes the views of the parties are so diametrically opposed that negotiations break down. It is after the breakdown of negotiations that trade unions ballot their members for a mandate to commence strike action. It was accordingly held in Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd.v. Edet that a strike of this kind was functional to collective bargaining. Collective bargaining will thus not be effective without a credible threat of industrial action.
Without doubt, the stoppage of work initiated by the union will affect both sides. The employer’s operation may be shut down with the attendant loss of revenue and the employees will suffer hardship because they will be out of work and will be deprived of their salaries and wages. Both sides will naturally be hurt economically. The question may therefore arise as to: why do workers choose to bear the economic loss rather than accept the offer of the employer? The answer is that the workers resort to industrial action to force the employer to reach a mutually acceptable agreement about the terms and conditions of employment. The right to strike helps to equalize workers’ bargaining power and a chance to resist the economic compulsion inherent to an otherwise unequal wage bargain. In this sense the economic purpose of strikes plays an important role in collective bargaining. Thus industrial action, or the likelihood of its occurrence, is seen as one of the necessary conditions for collective bargaining to exist. As Kahn-Freund asserts, “The strike is the ultimate sanction without which collective bargaining cannot exist.” As Kahn-Freund further noted:
“Collective bargaining as we understand it is impossible without social sanctions….Collective bargaining cannot work without the ultimate sanction of the strike, no more than the law of, say, the sale of goods could work without the law of bankruptcy.”
The notion that there is a connection between collective bargaining and the right to strike is widely accepted by labour lawyers and industrial relations experts. Anderman, as previously mentioned, notes that:
“The right to strike is understood as a safeguard against the imbalance of power between individual employee and employer and it provides a necessary underpinning to collective bargaining. It has long been recognised that without a credible threat of damaging industrial action there is little assurance that management will be willing to engage in meaningful negotiation with trade union representatives over disputed issues of management decision-making.”
This view was acknowledged by Lord Wright in his famous dictum in 1942.Without doubt, the right to strike is not only a logical step in the collective bargaining process, but also a part of the price paid for industrial self-regulation of the conditions of employment. It is a necessary part of the process toward securing the adjustment of expectations of economic realities. Giving further justification for the crucial role of the right to strike in collective bargaining, Collins et al explain:
“The connection between the right to strike and collective bargaining is easy to understand. Collective bargaining would be rather empty of substance if the employer could say: ‘this is my offer - take it or leave it’, or if the employer could say: ‘I am proposing to change the terms of existing collective agreement—and there is nothing you can do about it, whether you agree or not’. The strike enables workers collectively to put pressure on the employer in pursuit of what they see as a just cause and a way of resisting what they see as unjust action by the employer.”
Examples of this link are numerous in Nigerian labour law. Adeogun, for example, says of the nexus between collective bargaining and the right to strike:
“Conceptually, the right to strike can be seen as an essential characteristic of collective bargaining. This is so because the ability of the union to bring direct economic pressure on the employer depends largely on the availability or use of the strike weapon … [T]he presence or threat of a strike induces the parties to engage in continuous dialogue for a search for an agreement. That is to say when workers are certain that they can strike, or employers are conscious of its occurrence, the seriousness of the dispute is intensified and, correspondingly, the bargaining power of the employees is increased.”
There is little doubt that the right to strike is a very important instrument in collective bargaining in order to ensure the economic rights of workers. Indeed, if workers could not in the last resort collectively refuse to work, they could not bargain collectively. In the absence of the right to strike “collective bargaining” would amount to “collective begging.”
However, Nigerian law adheres to the principle of free collective bargaining, yet at the same time suppresses the right to strike. This is a significant discrepancy. This paper argues that the Nigerian approach of recognising collective bargaining and yet, ironically, suppressing the right to strike is anomalous and demonstrates that Nigerian law is deficient. The right to strike must be strengthened to enable collective bargaining to perform the important role envisaged in Nigeria’s system of industrial relations.
This paper has examined the link between freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike. As has been seen, there is a close nexus between freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike; therefore violations of the right of association weaken the exercise of the right to strike. Similarly, the right to strike is crucial for effective collective bargaining.
As Morris noted, “limiting freedom of associations is clearly a very effective way of making it difficult for workers to organise industrial action.”See G. S. Morris Strikes in Essential Services (London and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1986), p. 25; G. S. Morris, “Freedom of Association and the Interests of the State” in Human Rights and Labour Law: Essays for Paul O’Higgins, K. D. Ewing, C. A. Gearty and B. A. Hepple (eds.) (London and New York: Mansell Ltd, 1994), p. 52; S. S. Visweswaraiah, “A Critical Exposition of the Strike Law in India” (1991) 4:1 Central India Law Quarterly, p. 70; R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of the Freedom to Strike (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988), p. 27.
C. Kai, “Legislation on the Right to Strike in China”
<http://188.8.131.52/search?q=cache:HfxVgzv3KGAJ:www.airroc.org.tw/ISLSSL2005/program/doc/II-3.doc+the+right+to+strike+in+china&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk> (20 February 2009); W. Min and X. Jifeng, Labour Relations and Disputes (Taiwan: Taiwan National Open University Publishing House, 1999), p. 286.
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: A Primer on Freedom of Association < http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/freedom_of_association.htm > (29 January 2009); W. Min and X. Jifeng, Labour Relations and Disputes (Taiwan: Taiwan National Open University Publishing House, 1999), p. 286.
Ben-Israel has expressed a similar view, noting that the freedom to strike is “a three-faceted principle comprised of the freedom to organise, the freedom to bargain collectively and the freedom to strike.” See: R. Ben-Israel, “Introduction to Strikes and Lock-outs: A Comparative Perspective” in R. Blanpain (ed.), Comparative Labour Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1994), p. 6; W. Min and X. Jifeng, Labour Relations and Disputes (Taiwan: Taiwan National Open University Publishing House, 1999), pp. 286-291; A. M. Swiatkowski, “European Social Charter: The Right to Strike” (2005) 47:6 Managerial Law, p. 296.
F. von Prondzynski, “Freedom of Association in Modern Industrial Relations” (2001) 15 (1) Industrial Relations Journal, p. 10; T. Sheppard, “Liberalism and the Charter: Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike (1996) 5 Dalhousie Law Journal, p. 117.
M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Arlington, Vir: Engel, 1993), p. 385; F. Prondzynski, “Freedom of Association in Modern Industrial Relations” (2001) 15 (1) Industrial Relations Journal, p. 10; T. Sheppard, “Liberalism and the Charter: Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike (1996) 5 Dalhousie Law Journal, p. 117.
S. D. Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights (London: Butterworths, 1998), p. 289.
Press Release (ILO/00/17): Pioneering ILO Global report calls for more widespread respect for rights at work< ... www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/17.htm> (20 June 2007). See also: “Your Voice at Work: First global report on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining”< www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/download/magazine/pdf/mag35.pdf> (20 June 2007).
G. A. Johnston, The International Labour Organisation (London: Europa Publications, 1970), p. 150.
For more detailed discussion, see: S. Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labour Law and Political Theory (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 180-198; S. Leader, “Choosing an Interpretation of the Right to Freedom of Association” (2002) 40:1 British Journal of Industrial Relations, pp 128-137; S. Leader, “Freedom of Association, Labour Law, and the Needs of a Democratic Society” in Freedom of Association, Council of Europe (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp.176-184.
See Re Public Service Relations Act, 38 D.L.R. (4th), p. 161. See also: G. England, “Some Thoughts on Constitutionalizing The Right to Strike” (1988) 13 Queen’s Law Journal, p. 168; C. D’aoust and F. Delorme, “The Origin of Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike: An Historical Perspective” (1981) 36 Relationes Industrielles, p. 916; T. Sheppard, “Liberalism and the Charter: Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike (1996) 5 Dalhousie Law Journal, p. 117.
See, for example, C. W. Summers, “Freedom of Association and Compulsory Trade Union Membership in Sweden and the United States (1964) 1 (112) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 647.
Ibid; S.D. Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights (London: Butterworths, 2000), p. 307.
 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, “Freedom of Association and the Philosophies of Labour Law (1989) 18 Industrial Law Journal, p. 16.
Ibid. See also S. Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labour Law and Political Theory (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 180-198; S. Leader, “Choosing an Interpretation of the Right to Freedom of Association” (2002) 40:1 British Journal of Industrial Relations, pp 128-137.
See generally, Jane Hodges-Aeberhard and Odero de Dios, “Principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association Concerning Strikes” (1987) 126(5) International Labour Review, pp. 543-561.
R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of the Freedom to Strike (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988), p. 27.
Retail Wholesalers v. Government of Saskatchewan (1985) 19 DLR 609 at 614- 629, per Bayda, J.
 F. von Prondzynski, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), p. 109.
 AC 538 (PC)
Ibid, p. 548 per Lord Donovan.
(1980) 1 EHRR 637.
Ibid, paras. 34-45; J. Hendy, “The Human Rights Act, Article 11 and the Right to Strike” (1998) European Human Rights Law Review, p. 582. This trend has been followed in other jurisdictions as well, notably in Canada where the Canadian Supreme Court has held that freedom of association as provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not incorporate the right to strike or the right to bargain collectively. See Reference Public Service Employee Relations Act (1987) 1 SCR 313; 38 DLR (4th) 161; Saskatchewan v. Retail and Department Store Union (1987) 1 SCR 460; 38 DLR (4th) 277; Public Service Alliance v. Canada (1987) 1 SCR 424; 38 DLR (4th) 249; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (1990) 2 SCR 367; 72 DLR (4th). Cf. R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of the Freedom to Strike; C. D’aoust and F. Delorme, The Origin of Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike (1981) 36(4) Relations Industrielles, p. 894; G. England, Some Thoughts on Constitutionalizing the Right to Strike (1988)13 Queens Law Journal, p. 180.
F. von Prondzynski, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), p. 109.
R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of the Freedom to Strike (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988), p. 27; F. von Prondzynski, “Freedom of Association in Modern Industrial Relations (2001) 15 (1) Industrial Relations Journal, p. 10.
In particular Articles 3, 8 and 10 of Convention No. 87 have been interpreted by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations as being incompatible with a denial of the right to strike. See ILO: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey 1994, para. 179; L. Swepston, Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: Development through ILO Supervision (1998) 137:2 International Labour Review, p. 187.
United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 588 (1971) 404 U.S. 802, p. 885. Similarly, in Uttar Pradeshia Shramik Maha Sangh v. State or Uttar Pradesh (1960) A.I.R 45, 49 when presented with the question of whether freedom to associate can be equated with freedom to pursue without restrictions the objects of the association the court said: “The purpose of an association is an integral part of the right, and if the purpose is restricted, the right is inevitably restricted. The right to form an association is not a right to be exercised in a vacuum or an empty or a paper right. The enjoyment and fulfilment of the right begins with the fulfilment of the purpose for which the association is formed ….” See S. S. Visweswaraiah, “A Critical Exposition of the Strike Law in India” (1991) 4:1 Central India Law Quarterly, pp. 70-71. According to Birk, “Freedom of Association is a classic case of implied fundamental right to strike.” See: R. Birk, “Derogations and Restrictions on the Right to Strike under International Law” in R. Blanpain (ed.), Labour Law, Human Rights and Social Justice (Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 96. See: H. M. Seady and P.S. Benjamin, “The Right to Strike and Freedom of Association: An International Perspective” (1990) 11 (3) Industrial Law Journal, pp. 439-459; C. D’aoust and F. Delorme, “The Origin of Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike: An Historical Perspective” (1981) 36 Relations Industrielles, pp. 894-921; S. Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labour Law and Political Theory (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 180-198.
 S. S. Visweswaraiah, “A Critical Exposition of the Strike Law in India” (1991) 4:1 Central India Law Quarterly, p. 70.
R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of the Freedom to Strike (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988), p. 27.
(1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288 at 291.
 K.W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (England: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 245; S. D. Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights (London: Butterworths, 2000), pp. 358-359.
E. Chianu, Employment Law (Ondo State: Bemicov Publishers Nigeria Ltd, 2004), p. 277; T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.77; S. D. Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights (London: Butterworths 2000), p. 358.
S. D. Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights (London: Butterworths 2000), pp. 358-359.
O. Kahn-Freund, Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 77. As Chamberlain and Kuhn also assert, “[T]he possibility or ultimate threat of strikes is a necessary condition for collective bargaining.” See N. Chamberlain and J. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining (New York: McGraw-Hill College, 1986), p. 391. As Cox et al noted: “It is through the appreciation that the risks of losses that a strike can cause are so great that compromise is cheaper than economic battle: The strike or the fear of a strike is the motive power that makes collective bargaining operate.” See A. Cox, D. Bok and R. Gorman, Cases and Materials on Labor Law 10th edn. (New York: Foundation Press, 1986), p. 484. According to Myburg, “It is one of the ironies of collective bargaining that the attainment of the object of industrial peace should depend on the threat of conflict. The reason for this dependence is a functional one. The freedom to threaten strike action and, if needs be, to carry out the threat is protected, because in an imperfect world, the system of collective bargaining requires it.” See Myburg, J.F., “100 Years of Strike Law” (2004) 25 Industrial Law Journal, p. 966.
 O. Kahn-freund, “Legal Framework” in A. Flanders and H.A. Cleggg (eds.), The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), p. 101.
S. D. Anderman, Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights (London: Butterworths 2000), pp. 358-359.
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd V. Veitch  A.C. 435, 463.
 A. A. Adeogun, “Industrial Relations and the Law” in T.O. Elias, (ed.), Law and Development (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1972), p. 122.
 H. Collins, K. D. Ewing and A. McColgan, Labour Law: Text and Materials (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 864. According to Sykes: “The strike is itself a part of the bargaining process. … [T]he very economic pressure of the strike is the catalyst which makes agreement possible. Even when no strike occurs, it plays its part in the bargaining process, for the very prospect of the hardship which the strike will bring provides a prod to compromise. Collective bargaining is a process of reaching agreement, and strikes are an integral and frequently necessary part of that process.” See: E.I. Sykes, Strike Law in Australia (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1982), p. 3.
A. Emiola, Public Servant and the Law (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1985), p. 67; A. A. Adeogun, “Industrial Relations and the Law” in T.O. Elias (ed.), Law and Development (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1972), p. 122; T. Fashoyin, “Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Retrospect and Prospects” in T. Fashoyin (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector in Nigeria (Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria Publishers, 1987), p.12.
T. Fashoyin, “Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Retrospect and Prospects” in T. Fashoyin (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector in Nigeria (Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria Publishers, 1987), p.12; A. A. Adeogun, “Industrial Relations and the Law” in T.O. Elias, (ed.), Law and Development (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1972), p. 122.
 O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1983), p. 292.
A.J.M. Jacobs, ‘The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs’ in R. Blanpain and C. Engels (eds.), Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (5th edn., Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), p. 423; B. Perrins, Trade Union Law (London: Butterworth, 1985), p. 22.